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Much of the literature directed at the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) has revolved around 
parity issues, focussing on the problem of how to individuate the functional roles and on 
the relevance of these roles for the production of human intelligent behaviour. 
Proponents of EMT have famously claimed that we shouldn’t take the location of a 
process as a reliable indicator of the mechanisms that support our cognitive behaviour. 
This functionalist understanding of cognition has however been challenged by opponents 
of EMT [such as Rupert (2009); Adams & Aizawa (2009)], who have claimed that 
differences between internal, biological processes and putatively extended ones not only 
exist but are actually crucial to undermine the idea that inner and outer are functionally 
equivalent. This debate about how to individuate the functional roles has led to a 
treacherous stand-off, in which proponents of EMT have been trapped under the 
persistent accusation of causal/constitution conflation. My strategy for responding to this 
charge is to look precisely at those functional differences highlighted by critics of EMT. I 
reckon that extended cognitive systems are endowed with quite different properties from 
systems that are “brain bound” and argue that it is precisely these differences that allow 
human minds to transcend their biological limitations. I thus defend a complementarity 
version of the extended mind, according to which externally located resources and 
internal biological elements make a different but complementary contribution to bringing 
about intelligent behaviour [Sutton (2010)]. My defence of complementarity is based on 
both the phylogeny and the ontogeny of cognitive systems. I initially explore the 
interrelation between brain and cognitive development from a neuroconstructivist 
perspective [Quartz & Sejnowski (1997); Mareshal et al. (2007)] and then argue that our 
brains do not have fixed functional architectures but are sculpted and given form by the 
activities we repeatedly engage in. As a result of repeated engagements in socio-cultural 
tasks, relevant brain pathways undergo substantial rewiring. Development thus scaffolds 
our brains, which become geared into working in symbiotic partnership with external 
resources. [Kiverstein & Farina (2011)]. On these grounds, I call into question any 
tendency to interpret the human biological nature as fixed and endogenously pre-
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determined and side with proponents of DST [Oyama (2000); Griffiths & Gray (2001)] 
and ontogenetic niche construction [Stotz (2010)] in arguing that we should think of 
natural selection as operating on whole developmental systems composed of living 
organisms in culturally enriched niches. [Wheeler & Clark(2008)].  
Complementarity defences of EMT argue that many of the kinds of cognition humans 
excel at can only be accomplished by brains working together with a body that directly 
manipulates and acts on the world [Rowlands (2010); Menary (2007)]. I take Sensory 
Substitution Devices (SSDs henceforth) as my empirical case study. SSDs exploit the 
remarkable plasticity of our brains and with training supply a novel perceptual modality 
that compensates for loss or impaired sensory channel. I argue that the coupling with 
these devices triggers a new mode of phenomenal access to the world, something I 
propose to label as a kind of “artificial synaesthesia [Ward & Meijer (2010)].This new 
mode of access to the world transforms our cognitive skills and gives rise to augmented 
processes of deep bio-technological symbiosis. SSDs therefore become mind enhancing 
tools [Clark (2003)] and a perfect case study for Complementarity. Having shown the 
relevance of SSDs for EMT, I then take up the possibility that these devices don’t just 
relocate the boundaries of cognition but may also stretch the bounds of perceptual 
awareness. I explore the possibility that perceivers using SSDs count as extended 
cognitive systems and therefore argue that the experiences they enjoy should be counted 
as extended conscious experiences.[Kiverstein & Farina, (forthcoming)]. SSDs are quite 
often said to involve some form of incorporation.[Clark (2008)]. Rupert has challenged 
this idea and its relevance for EMT on the grounds of his embedded approach. 
Particularly, he has explained tool-use in terms of the causal interaction between the 
subject and its detached tool. In the final chapter of my dissertation I critically look at his 
objections and argue that all his arguments fail to apply to SSDs. In SSD perception in 
fact the tool becomes geared to work in symbiotic partnership with the active subject and 
then get factored into its’ body schema so that both of them come to form a single system 
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In this dissertation I defend the extended mind thesis (EMT). EMT (henceforth often 
referred to simply as ‘extended’) is a view about the location of the physical mechanisms 
of mind and cognition that affirms that mental states and cognitive functions can extend 
spatiotemporally beyond the skin of the organism with biological and environmentally 
located elements entering into a partnership that enables flexible thinking and acting. 
[Farina (2010)]. EMT therefore allows for distributed representations to expand outward 
from their cranial prison into the environment and for humans to transcend their 
biological boundaries through dynamical couplings, persistent interweavements and 
cognitive loops. [Rowlands (2009)]. Although EMT has nowadays acquired a prominent 
status in the cognitive sciences, its validity still remains controversial as its crucial tenets 
have fallen far short of effectively settling the dispute with intracranialism.  
In the first chapter of this dissertation I sketch a brief overview of the debate surrounding 
the extended mind as it has unfolded thus far, pinpoint the parity principle and analyse the 
literature directed at it. In particular, I focus on the problem of how to individuate the 
functional roles. I review the arguments in favour of and against parity and acknowledge 
a potential stand-off (generated by the persistent accusation of causal/constitution 
conflation) in which proponents of parity-style defences of EMT seem to have been 
trapped. Rather than combating the battle for the extended mind thesis on a purely 
functionalist turf my strategy to escape from the impasse in which the debate between 
EMT and the embedded theory (henceforth often referred to simply as ‘embedded) 
appears to have fallen is to make a case for EMT from a different route. I set aside parity 
issues and rather argue that it is precisely the differences between extended systems and 
systems that are “brain bound” that allow human minds to criss-cross their biological 
boundaries. I therefore defend a Complementarity version of the extended mind thesis, 
according to which “different components of a softly-assembled system can play quite 
different roles and have different properties while nevertheless combing to make 
complementary causal contributions that bring about flexible thinking and intelligent 
behaviour”. [Clark (1997); Sutton et al. (2010); Kiverstein & Farina (2011); Farina 
(2011), p.285].   
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My defence of complementarity is based both on the ontogeny and phylogeny of 
cognitive systems.   
In the second chapter of this thesis, I turn my attention to the ontogeny of cognitive 
systems and explore the interrelation between brain and cognitive development from a 
constructivist perspective. [Quartz & Sejnowski (2002); Mareshal et al. (2007)]. 
Neuroconstructivism characterizes development as a trajectory that is shaped by multiple 
interacting biological and environmental constraints in which complex representations 
develop based on earlier and simpler ones. [Westermann et al.(2007)]. This increase in 
representational complexity is realized through a progressive elaboration of functional 
cortical structures. These structures are not selected from a constrained juvenile stock 
but rather emerge in an experience-dependent way. I use the work on 
neuroconstructivism and the principles of Hebbian learning to explain how externally 
located resources can become enmeshed into our problem-solving strategies. The human 
brain is incredibly plastic and this plasticity which extends well into adulthood allows our 
brains to be shaped by our cultural environment to a much greater extent than any other 
creature [Merzenich et al. (1978); Huttenlocher (2002)]. Cortical plasticity, I then argue, 
is a pre-condition for extended cognition enabling human beings to incorporate 
environmentally located resources into their problem solving routines. Human agents, I 
maintain, do not have fixed biological natures, but rather come to have the specific nature 
they do because of the brain’s plastic ability to be sculpted by the different but 
complementarity contributions to which it is post-natally exposed.    
The third chapter of my dissertation is concerned with the phylogeny of cognition. I 
investigate the relationship between developmental systems theory(DST henceforth), 
niche construction and Neo-Darwinian accounts of natural selection. I call into question 
any tendency to interpret the human biological nature as fixed and endogenously pre-
determined [Griffiths & Stotz (2000)] and side with proponents of DST [Oyama (1999), 
Griffiths and Gray (2004)] and ontogenetic niche construction [Stotz (2010); West & 
King (1987)] in arguing that we should think of natural selection as operating on whole 
developmental systems composed of living organisms in culturally enriched niches. 
[Odling-Smee  et al. (2003); Wheeler & Clark (2008)]. Cognitive processes, I argue, are 
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dynamically constructed in each generation by means of a persisting reliance on external 
scaffolding [Sterelny (2010)] and emerge from the continuous, delicate and 
complementary interactions with the rich matrix of resources available outside the 
genome [Jablonka & Lamb (2005)]. Against purely genetic understandings of human 
evolution I thus put forward the idea that we are bio-mechanical ensembles, 
heterogeneous developmental matrixes in which culture and technology flourish and co-
evolve. This is the phylogenetic equivalent of the ontogenetic claim abovementioned that 
human cognitive functions are shaped, forged and sculpted by the many activities we 
repeatedly engage in, in the world.  
In the fourth chapter of this thesis, I tackle another crucial aspect of Complementarity 
defences of EMT, the idea of manipulation and therefore discuss Sensory Substitution 
Devices (SSDs henceforth) to explore the empirical ramifications of Complementarity. I 
argue that SSDs are a perfect example of cognitive and perceptual transformation 
[Kiverstein, Farina & Clark (forthcoming)] and that through the coupling with them the 
visually impaired subject acquires, via cortical plasticity, a new form of perceiving and 
experiencing; a cross-modal union of senses in which the proximal input (either tactile or 
auditory) is accompanied by some new sensory (quasi-visual) mode of access to the distal 
one. In agreement with Ward and Meijer (2010), I propose to call this new form of 
phenomenal access to the world artificial synaesthesia and argue that it becomes available 
to the visually impaired user only after substantial training with the device. Since the 
continuous coupling with these devices leads the impaired subject to experience this new 
form of perceiving, something she wouldn’t otherwise get if she was to rely exclusively 
on her own brain, I claim that SSDs become mind enhancing tools. SSDs systematically 
transform the sensory experience of the visually impaired and provide access to novel, 
hybrid, variant and unfamiliar forms of perceptual sensorimotor interaction with the 
environment. For this reason I take them to count as shiny examples of Complementarity.  
Having shown that SSDs count as mind enhancing tools and constitute a strong form of 
cognitive and perceptual enhancement, at least for the visually impaired, I then take up 
the possibility that these devices don’t just relocate the boundaries of cognition and 
perception, but may also stretch the bounds of phenomenal awareness. In the fifth chapter 
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of this dissertation I therefore explore the possibility that SSDs can count as cases in 
which the conscious mind extends. Although I am quite sympathetic with this idea and 
even though I have elsewhere argued that SSDs experience qualifies as a case of 
extended perceptual awareness [Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming)]; I conclude this 
chapter with an objection (raised by David Chalmers in private correspondence) that 
shows negatively that we can't (probably) yet make an argument for extended 
consciousness, at least based purely on plasticity and integration.  
In the sixth and final chapter of this thesis, rather than responding to the Chalmers’ 
objection and tackling the question of whether integration and plasticity are sufficient to 
establish extended consciousness, I look at attempts that argue that incorporation is not 
enough even for extended cognition. I therefore address Rupert’s criticism of EMT, 
further discuss SSDs as cases of cognitive and perceptual supplementation and argue that 
even if integration and plasticity don’t yet establish a knockdown argument against 
bounded, intracranialist accounts of consciousness, incorporation (most likely) allows me 
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1.1 Setting up the Scene 
 
I begin by quickly reviewing the so-called situated movement in the cognitive sciences. 
Unlike individualistic conceptions of mind and cognition that give a solipsistic account of 
the mental properties of an organism [Fodor (1980], the situated movement suggests that 
thinking and learning are deeply rooted in physical and social contexts and that knowing 
is inseparable from doing. The situated programme therefore describes cognition as 
naturally tied to action, context, and culture [Brown, Collins, & Duguid, (1989)] and 
explains it “as a relation involving an agent in a situation, rather than as an activity in 
an individual’s mind” [Greeno (1989), p.135]. In this chapter, I link this understanding 
of cognition to externalist accounts of the mind in the cognitive sciences (section 1). In 
particular, I focus on the idea of cognitive extension. In section 2, I introduce the 
extended mind thesis (EMT) as “an ontic thesis of  partial and contingent composition 
of some mental processes” [Rowlands (2009),p.54] and describe its central tenets. I then 
distinguish three areas (natural, technological and socio-cultural) within which extended 
cognition can occur. [Wilson & Clark (2009)]. I argue that extended cognition emerges 
in one of these three dimensions or a combination of them, when any feature (either 
natural, technological or socio-cultural) that any agent uses for functional purposes, 
becomes so finely tuned, so well integrated into the agent’s cognitive repertoire that it 
allows for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. 
Having introduced EMT, in section 3 I turn my attention to the main business of this 
chapter, which is to look at the stalemate in which the debate between extended and 
embedded has fallen. Much of the literature directed at EMT1 has revolved around parity 
issues, focussing on the problem of how to individuate the functional roles and on the 
relevance of these roles for the production of human intelligent behaviour. Proponents of 
EMT have famously claimed that we shouldn’t take the location of a process as a reliable 
                                                             
1 See [Adams & Aizawa (2008)]; [Adams (2010)]; [Clark (2008), (2010a), (2010b)]; [Menary (2007), 
(2010)]; [Rowlands (2010)]; [Rupert (2004), (2009), (2010)]; [Sprevak (2009)]; [Sutton (2002), (2010)]; 




indicator of the mechanisms that support our cognitive behaviour. This functionalist 
understanding of cognition has however been questioned and strongly challenged by 
many opponents of EMT [Rupert (2009); Adams and Aizawa (2009),Weiskopf (2008), 
just to name a few], who have conversely claimed that differences between internal, 
biological processes and putatively extended ones not only apply but may actually be 
crucial to undermine the idea that inner and outer are functionally equivalent. I conclude 
this section by acknowledging that functionalist defences of the extended mind apparently 
stall, being plagued by the criticism moved against the very idea of functional 
isomorphism. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)]. 
In section 4, I suggest a way to get out of this apparent impasse by appealing to what 
Sprevak (2009) has labelled the Martian Intuition, “the thought that creatures that are 
physiologically different from us can nevertheless share the same types of mental states 
with us” [Kiverstein and Farina (2011), p.38]. In agreement with Sprevak (2009) 
however, I notice that the Martian Intuition is not sufficient to grant the existence of 
extended cognition and that playing this card may come with a cost. In conflating the 
constraints on extended cognition originally provided by Clark & Chalmers (1998), the 
Martian Intuition seems to license an overly permissive version of the extended mind, one 
so rampantly liberal that it doesn’t seem to stand any change of being true. 
In this scenario, who is to say who is right and which side of the debate is correct? Shall 
we endorse the “overly” liberal criteria formulated by proponents of EMT, or rather 
embrace the “stricter” conservative provisos presented by many of its opponents? 
[Rowlands (2009)]. I argue that a solution to what I shall call “our Goldilocks problem2”, 
though ardently craved, hasn’t yet been readily forthcoming and therefore acknowledge 
the impasse in which the debate about the functional roles has fallen. The critical 
appraisal of the stalemate between extended and embedded accounts of cognition shall 
ultimately provide me with a solid background, which I intend to use in the next chapters 
as a starting point to overcome the stand-off I sketch here. I conclude the section and the 
chapter by hinting at Wheeler’s (2010) recent revival of microfunctionalism as a possible 
                                                             
2 Weiskopf (2010) also discusses a Goldilocks problem. His Goldilocks problem however doesn’t entirely 
coincide with the one I discuss here. In this chapter, I just borrow this cool and neat label from him.  
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way to tame the Martian Intuition. Although I find Wheeler’s venture most intriguing and 
promising, I rather prefer to fight the battle for the extended mind on an untraditional turf 
and thus turn my attention to an alternative and somehow neglected line of argument for 
EMT that appeals to Complementarity. 
1.2 The Situated Cognition Movement: a very Condensed 
Chronicle 
 
The situated cognition movement in the cognitive sciences holds that doing is essential 
for knowing and claims that all our knowledge is structured, scaffolded and profoundly 
entrenched in physical and socio-cultural contexts. In essence, the situated programme 
invites an in situ understanding of cognition and favours forms of thinking on the fly 
while encouraging the offloading of cognitive resources in the environment. The 
movement comprises a number of different antecedents, including philosophical and 
psychological ones. However, it has organically developed as a coherent paradigm only 
after the ‘70s, to provide a profitable alternative to dominant accounts in cognitive 
psychology that described cognition in isolation from the body and the world. For this 
reason, the situated movement has been often characterised as anti-Cartesian, embodied 
and embedded. In this section, I shall link this movement to externalist claims about 
cognition. In doing so, I shall ultimately highlight the relevance and the significance of the 
“situated angle” to these emergent and quite original understandings of our cognitive 
abilities. 
Nowadays views that describe cognition as generated from the actions and activities of 
physical individuals situated in specific environments have become increasingly popular. 
However, it hasn’t always been like this. During the late ‘70s and early ‘80s in fact the 
more prominent and widely respected account of the human mind was one that envisaged 
a sort of “methodological solipsism” in the cognitive sciences [Fodor (1980)]. This 
account suggested that a successful description of our mental states and cognitive 
functions could have been only achieved internally, without the need to study the 
interactions of the individual with her body and the world. Accounts as such are 
nowadays referred as individualist conceptions of mind and cognition. [Wilson (1995), 
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(2004)]. For these strong individualistic conceptions, cognition can only take place inside 
the head as it is “wedged between perception (on the input side) and action (on the 
output side). [Wilson & Clark (2009), p. 56]  In this kind of cognitive sandwich [Hurley 
(1998)] cognition merely occurs as computational and is always achieved through 
processing of mental representations. Crucially, this processing of mental representations 
is language-like, meaning that it is produced and governed by means of an underlying 
mental syntax. This underlying, innate mental syntax hinges upon formal manipulation of 
symbols and depends on the rules that govern their production rather than on broader 
patterns of interdependence between individuals and their environs. Views that explain 
the emergence of cognition in these terms tend to describe the human cognitive 
architecture as universal across individuals from different populations and innately or 
genetically specified. Fodor’s The Language of Thought (1975) and The Modularity of 
Mind (1983) are likely to be the most striking expressions of this kind of view in 
philosophy. Other prominent specimens are the works of Noam Chomsky (1968) in 
linguistics, of Pylyshyn (1984) in the cognitive sciences and of Newell and Simon (1976) 
in artificial intelligence. [Wilson and Clark (2009)].   
Philosophical concerns about individualistic accounts of cognition were first raised by 
Burge (1979) and Putnam (1975), who strongly questioned the ability of these 
disembodied models to satisfactorily account for mental content. In truth, Putnam’s twin 
earth argument it’s an argument against the claim that linguistic content is fixed wholly by 
internal factors but then it has been extended to mental content too. [McGinn (1977)]. 
Putnam’s most famous argument against linguist content is probably the so-called “Twin 
Earth” argument [Putnam (1975)]. Twin Earth, according to Putnam, is a planet that is 
exactly like our Earth except for the fact that on Twin Earth there is no water but another 
liquid, which looks superficially identical but is indeed chemically different. Putnam 
randomly abbreviates the complex formula describing the structure of this liquid as 
‘XYZ’ and subsequently specifies that the inhabitants of Twin Earth, whose language is 
English, call this liquid “water”. Now, Putnam invites us to set the date of our 
Gedankenexperiment somewhere in the past, at a time (1750) in which both the 
inhabitants of Earth and those of Twin Earth did not possess the theoretical and empirical 
knowledge necessary to know that the liquids they both were calling water were H2O and 
18 
 
XYZ respectively. From this, Putnam continues, it follows that the experience of both 
people on Earth and Twin Earth with water are identical. [Putnam (1975)].  
Now an important question arises here: does a resident on Earth (call him Oscar) and his 
homologous twin on Twin Earth (call him TOscar) mean the same thing when they say 
the word “water”? Ex hypothesis, Oscar and TOscar brains should be perfectly 
(molecule-for-molecule) identical3. Yet, Putnam argues, when Oscar utters the word 
“water”, this word refers to “H2O”. On the contrary, when his twin on Twin Earth says 
the same word, the very same word refers to “XYZ”. This seems to suggest that the 
contents of an individual's brain do not suffice to decide the reference of terms they use. 
“Since Earthling Oscar and Twin Oscar have exactly the same intrinsic properties, yet 
refer to different substances when they use their ‘water’-words, their intrinsic properties 
cannot suffice to determine what they refer to”. This invites us to think that “If the 
meaning of a word suffices to determine its reference, then meaning cannot be 
determined by intrinsic properties either”. [Curtis (2011), Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy]. As Putnam famously puts it, “meanings’ just ain't in the head!” [Putnam 
(1975), p. 227]. 
These philosophical challenges to disembodied models of mind and cognition were 
launched to undermine the idea that intentional states could be exhaustively taxonomised 
in accordance with the constraint of individualism. [Wilson (2010)]. The philosophical 
positions that cast these series of original challenges are now widely known as 
“traditional externalism” or “passive externalism”4. In the last few decades, the idea that 
intentional states require broader content because they constitutively depend on some 
sort of external context has spread like a bushfire, leading to a number of revolutionary 
approaches on situated cognition5 and to more radical forms of externalism about the 
                                                             
3 An enormous amount of objections have been raised against this reading. In this section, I will mention just 
one of these objections and this shall suffice, as the “Twin Earth” case is not supposed to play any 
argumentative role in this chapter. A good objection to show that this example is in some ways unfortunate is 
for instance to note that the human body contains between 58% and 78% of “water”. So, the Twin Oscar 
cannot be an exact duplicate of his earthling twin unless Twin Oscar’s body also consists largely of “water”. 
[Curtis (2011)]. 
4 [see Wilson (2000)] and Clark & Chalmers (1998) for an in depth analysis of these positions]. 
5 Work conducted on situated cognition has had a very strong impact on different fields, including perception 
[Gibson (1986)], memory [Clancey (1997)], cognitive anthropology [Hutchins (1995), 2010] and in many 
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mind. [Hurley (2010)]. These radical forms of externalism have assumed a number of 
different labels, including locational externalism [Wilson (2000)], environmentalism 
[Rowlands (1999)], vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998) and the extended mind thesis 
[Clark & Chalmers (1998)].  One way or another, all these expressions have come to 
support the idea that our mental states aren’t merely confined within the physical 
boundary of the organism but that at least some of them occasionally span the brain, body 
and world boundary. The extended mind thesis has more than any other view engaged 
individualistic accounts of mind and cognition. This persistent engagement has produced 
an impressive number of works that have led EMT to acquire a prominent status in the 
philosophy of cognitive sciences. It is to such a theory that I turn now.  
1.3 The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) 
 
EMT asserts that mental states and cognitive functions may sometimes supervene on 
organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the boundary of brain, 
body and world. [Clark (2008)]. EMT therefore aims at individuating “the specific 
conditions under which the material vehicles that realize cognition are distributed over 
brain, body and world in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors 
concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status” [Wheeler (2010), p. 245], 
and cognitive systems are taken “as reaching beyond individuals into their physical and 
social environments”. [Clark and Wilson (2009), p.58]. The crucial idea underlying EMT 
is therefore that some of our cognitive processes can and do actually extend outside our 
heads. For EMT cognition doesn’t exclusively take place inside the biological boundary 
of the individual but, on the contrary, can arise in the dynamical interplay between neural 
structures, body and world. EMT claims that these pervasive, intimate, action-orienting 
and behaviour-guiding interactions result in external features actively participating in an 
organism’s mental activity, becoming functionally integrated in its cognitive 
superstructure. A laptop, an iPhone, even a notebook or a diary may thus become 
(because of the function they perform) active parts of the substratum of one’s mental 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sub-(related)-areas such as affordances [Greeno (1998)] and effectivities [Shaw, Turvey and Mace (1982), 
just to name a few]. 
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activity6. As Sutton has put it: “external systems and other cognitive artifacts are not 
always simply commodities, for the use and profit of the active mind: rather, in certain 
circumstances, along with the brain and body which interacts with them, they are the 
mind” [Sutton (2010), p.190]; with this clearly meaning that the realm of the mental can 
occasionally spread across the brain, body and world boundary. In sum, the claim is that 
“cognition ain’t (all) in the head” [Clark &Chalmers (1998)]; but “rather that it can 
embrace bits of the extracranial body and items in the world beyond”. [Farina 
(2010),p.226].  
 
Following Rowlands (2009), I propose to understand EMT as an ontic thesis of partial 
and contingent composition of some mental processes”.[Rowlands (2009), p.54]. In 
what follows I quickly expand upon these bullet points, highlighting the crucial aspects 
underlying this hypothesis. I conclude this section with a brief analysis of the different 
forms that extended cognition can assume.  In the previous paragraph I have said that 
EMT is an ontic thesis. To repeat, EMT is first and foremost a claim about the nature and 
the location of our mental states and cognitive processes. I believe EMT is an ontic thesis 
because it attempts to describe what these states and processes are, where they are 
located and eventually tries to group, relate and individuate them. But EMT is also a 
partial and contingent hypothesis. It is a partial thesis because it affirms that some of our 
mental states are (partly) “made up of the manipulation, exploitation, or transformation 
of environmental structures”. [Rowlands (2009), p.630]. It is a contingent theory 
because it leaves open the possibility of different ways of realising the same (type of) 
mental process. This follows from its direct commitment to mainstream functionalist 
approaches to information-processing. In endorsing the multiple realisability thesis, EMT 
naturally embraces the idea that sometimes an external, non-biological factor is required 
for the realization of some of our distinctive kinds of cognition. Despite its strong 
commitment to externalisation, no version of the extended mind thesis has ever given up 
the idea of internal assistance; no form has ever questioned the importance of the on-
board neural circuitry for the production of cognitive behaviour-quite the opposite. On an 
                                                             
6 This is a direct consequence of what has come to be known as the Parity Principle. I will not discuss  
Parity and its implications in this section but will return to this controversial issue in the next one, where I 
shall critically tackle this crucial point in much greater detail. 
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extended account of cognition none of the factors that constitute and make up an 
extended cognitive system possess an ontological priority over another. EMT is thus a 
partial and contingent thesis about the contribution brought forth by the environment 
towards the emergence of certain cognitive processes.  But EMT is also a thesis about 
the constitution, or better about the composition of mental states and shall not be 
mistaken for the thesis of the embedded mind. The principal difference with the 
embedded view is that embedded accounts of cognition typically think of the boundaries 
of the mind as the boundaries of the biological organism with mental processes standing 
in a relation of causal dependence on the environment. This difference is nicely captured 
by the adoption of two convenient short hands that are used to describe the ongoing 
organism-environment interactions. It is usually said that extended cognition is 
“organism-centred”, whereas embedded cognition is “organism-bounded”. Finally, it 
might appear redundant or preposterous to say, but it is important to clarify that EMT 
does not claim that all mental states are constituted (wholly or partly) by processes of 
environmental manipulation; it rather asserts that only some of them are. When I 
remember where I forgot my keys, by mentally reconstructing the image of myself 
dropping them into the bedroom’s drawer, I do not suppose that some environmentally 
enriched manoeuvring is taking place to justify the emergence of such a state! “Thus, 
contrary to popular belief, EMT is compatible with the possibility of a brain in a vat. It 
is just that, if EMT is true, the mental life exhibited by the brain would be somewhat 
truncated”. [Rowlands (2009b),p.56].  
Before I turn my attention to the main business of this chapter, which is to point to the 
stalemate between extended and embedded by focusing on parity and on the question 
about how to individuate the functional roles, I would like to conclude this section with 
an analysis of the different forms that extended cognition can assume. Wilson and Clark 
(2009) have distinguished three realms (natural, technological and socio-cultural) within 
which extended cognition can emerge and have offered for each of these realms an 
accurate taxonomy. It is to such taxonomy that I now quickly turn.   
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The first realm gathers all those systems comprising natural resources that can impact 
upon the behaviours, dispositions and cognitive activities of the cogniser. Oxygen is a 
natural resource for human respiration as well as meat is a primary resource for nutrition. 
However neither oxygen nor meat can be said to extend the capabilities of the cogniser. 
Yet, under certain circumstances, specific natural resources can be used not only to 
"refuel" a pre-existing system (the respiratory apparatus in the case of oxygen or the 
digestive system in the case of meat), but also to extend the abilities that such a system 
possesses. A shell is a resource as such for a little octopus. When threatened, the octopus 
closes himself up inside the shell, so that the shell can save his life. Although the shell is a 
non cognitive tool, it nevertheless physically and functionally changes the capacities of 
the little octopus and so in a way, it seems reasonable to describe the octopus  + shell 
system as an enriched integrated system, one in which the octopus’s capacities to survive 
would be consistently reduced if it were to be a shell-less octopus.  
There is also a second and perhaps more powerful form of extended cognition. This 
form, Wilson and Clark continue, occurs in the technological domain where cognitive 
agents recruit technological resources. Unlike natural resources, technological ones are 
mostly manmade and therefore almost entirely artificial. Despite their status, 
technological resources encompass a wide range of apparatuses, which include both 
dedicated cognitive artefacts and special devices with more general functions that can 
eventually be used for cognitive augmentation7. In the former category fall all those 
“instruments” (such as software for recording of data, prosthetic limbs or laptops) that 
represent permanent features of our everyday life, tools that merely contribute to lighten 
the computational burden of our brain. To the latter category belong instead more 
                                                             
7 I use the term augmentation in the meaning often utilized in the research field at the frontier between human-
computer interaction, psychology, ergonomics and neuroscience. To this extent, augmentation indicates the 
real time integration of inner and outer resources pursued, iterated and substantiated over time to maximize a 
user performance in a potentially hostile environment. With regard to the couplings with the technological 
domain, particularly with respect to sensory substitution devices (SSDs), augmentation comes to define some 
form of enriched perceiving and (perhaps) of enhanced experiencing that is achieved only because of the 
constitutive contribution obtained by means of the couplings between the human cogniser and such external 
interactive features. I will return to SSDs specifying these controversial claims in chapter 4, 5 and 6 of this 
dissertation. Let me briefly notice here however, that augmentation needn’t be confined solely to technology. 
Augmentation, or cognitive transformation as I shall call it, is sometimes also realised through repeated 
engagement with different socio-cultural activities, which mould, forge and transform our cognitive functions. 
I shall return to this issue in chapter 2.  
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sophisticated features (such as IPhones or sensory substitution devices) that become 
deeply integrated into the perceptual processing of our brain and ultimately give rise to 
forms of cognitive augmentation. Like natural resources, some technological ones 
(namely those that act as mere instruments) can serve the organism as inputs to an 
organismic-bounded activity; but there is a range of cases in which these technological 
features (especially those that act as cognitive supplementations) seem to go beyond mere 
causal aid and become functionally integrated into a larger cognitive system. Sensory 
substitution devices belong to this latter category and their case is striking and 
particularly instructive. I shall return to this issue in much greater detail in the next 
chapters of this dissertation as sensory substitution will constitute one of the empirical 
case studies I will analyse to set up my defence of EMT. For now, let me complete this 
taxonomy and look at the third and final example of extended cognition that Wilson and 
Clark invite us to consider. 
A third form of extended cognition emerges in the socio-cultural sphere. Socio-cultural 
systems are established where there is a stable and persistent reliance between single 
individuals and their activities and other individuals, and their cultural, intellectual and 
ethnic products. These products and actions serve as a basis for a wide range of other 
cognitive activities. One of the most prominent examples of an extended socio-cultural 
cognitive system is probably the writing system. The writing system has not just fed into 
some pre-existing cognitive abilities that agents possessed but has rather contributed to 
modify the very mechanisms that govern, for instance, short – long term memory while at 
the same time constituting, a reliable and relatively durable cognitive resource that has 
forged education, influenced commerce practises and determined military conquest in the 
Western world for millennia. [Wilson and Clark (2009)].  Other prominent cases of 
extended socio-cultural cognitive systems are those involving mathematical notions, 
gestures, parental care and group relations. In all these cases the cultural resource 
becomes factored in the individual neural circuitry so as to sculpt the individual’s 
functions and capacities. As Wilson and Clark have noticed, “for many individuals, such 
socio-cultural resources are like natural cognitive resources in that they can be taken 
for granted as part of the normal conditions under which their cognitive abilities 
develop, they acquire specific skills, and they learn particular facts”. Wilson & Clark 
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(2009), p.63]. Socio-cultural resources are therefore worth a mention in this taxonomy 
because they play a crucial role in many of the abilities that characterise us as humans. 
Socio-cultural resources make it possible, for instance, to distinguish human culture from 
primate cognition. Although “there may be animal cultures, it is only in Homo Sapiens 
that we find diverse cultures of cognition, social structures, and products that whatever, 
their own origins, now significantly augment the cognitive capacities of individuals who 
are embedded in them”. [Wilson & Clark (2009), p.64]. 
Let me conclude this section with a brief recap. Extended cognition arises as a synthesis 
of activities of individual lifetime learning, technological couplings, and collective socio-
cultural practises. It occurs when any internal or external resource becomes so finely 
tuned, so deeply integrated into the human bio-physical architecture that it triggers the 
formation of a larger system able to cope and engage in new forms of intelligent problem-
solving behaviour. This persistent engagement leads to the emergence of cognitive 
machines “intrinsically geared to self-transformation, artefact-based expansion, and to 
bootstrapping processes of computational and representational growth”. [Wheeler & 
Clark (2008), p.3588]. 
1.4 Parity and Problems with Parity 
 
In the previous section I have introduced the hypothesis of extended cognition and quickly 
familiarised the reader with the dimensions in which it seems to occur. In this section I 
critically discuss EMT by focussing on the debate about how to individuate the functional 
roles. I begin by quickly revisiting Clark and Chalmers’ seminal Gedankenexperiment 
(1998), the springboard for much of the debate surrounding the extended mind today. I use 
their mental experiment to explain the idea of parity of function. Having explained Parity, I 
then present some of the criticism that has been cast to undermine the idea of functional 
equivalence. [Weiskopf (2008); Adams and Aizawa (2009); Rupert (2009)]. In short, 
friends of EMT seem to understand the functional roles that define a mental state in a 
coarse-grained way. By contrast, opponents of EMT assert that these functional roles must 
be understood in a fine-grained way. In this section, I review the rich dialectic underlying 
this debate and focus on Weiskopf’s, Rupert’s and Adams and Aizawa’s arguments against 
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functional equivalence. I conclude this section by suggesting that the series of arguments 
opponents have developed make standard-functionalist defences of EMT stall. 
In their 1998 paper, Clark and Chalmers famously ask us to consider two different forms a 
standing belief might take by comparing the strategies that Otto and Inga deploy to visit an 
exhibition at New York’s MoMA. Inga, a healthy subject, hears about a new exhibition at 
the Museum of Modern Arts in New York and realises that she wishes to see it. Upon 
hearing this information, Inga uses her biological memory to form/retrieve the belief that 
MoMa is on 53rd street, and makes her way downtown. At the same time, Otto hears about 
the very same exhibition. He also likes the exhibition’s theme and decides to visit it. 
Unfortunately, Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. His medical condition prevents Otto 
from reliably using his biological memory to form or retrieve the belief that MoMa is on 
53rd street. However, as a compensatory strategy Otto has learned to rely upon a 
notebook, in which he writes all the stuff he can no longer remember with his biological 
brain. Otto always keeps his notebook ready to hand, so that when he needs it, he can 
smoothly retrieve the crucial information from it. In the case at stake here, Otto uses the 
notebook to retrieve information about the location of MoMA and then sets off. 
Having introduced their thought experiment, Clark and Chalmers now ask us to compare 
the cases of Otto and Inga and invite us to reflect on whether we should attribute to both 
Otto and Inga a standing belief about the physical location of New York’s MoMA. Clark 
and Chalmers believe that “the information contained in Otto’s notebook plays the same 
causal role in guiding his actions as Inga’s biological memory does in the guidance of 
her actions”. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011), p.37]. For this reason, Clark and Chalmers 
count Otto’s notebook as part of the causal machinery that instantiates his standing beliefs. 
We shouldn’t treat Otto’s case differently from Inga’s case, they argue, just because the 
states that drive Otto’s behaviour are partly offloaded onto the environment and therefore 
located outside of Otto’s physical boundary. This thought stands behind what has come to 
be known as the “Parity Principle”. In Clark and Chalmers’ original treatment, PP runs as 
follow: 
 
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it done in the head, we would have no 
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hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then 
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive 
process”. [Clark & Chalmers (1998), p.2]. 
 
PP therefore invites us to assess whether a state can count as a belief, in part, on the basis 
of the causal role it performs. For Clark and Chalmers it doesn’t really matter where the 
lodger of this causal role is housed. It can be located within the confines of the biological 
body, or rather span the brain, body and world boundary. What makes something a belief is 
for them a matter of the causal relations that this lodger entertains to inputs and outputs 
and to other mental states. In other words, Clark and Chalmers do not believe that the 
physical details of a state that stands in these causal relations can matter when it comes to 
decide whether the very same state counts as a belief or not. The case of Otto and Inga is 
thus quite instructive because it seems to provide strong theoretical support for the claim 
that beliefs, a paradigmatic case of mental states, can supervene on mechanisms that are 
distributed across brain, body, and world. The more general thesis I have introduced in the 
previous section, the one that asserts that mental states in our actual world occasionally 
supervene on organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the 
boundary of brain, body and world seems to be the straightforward implication of this 
mental experiment too. “EMT in fact looks like a thesis that any philosopher of mind 
committed to functionalism should sign up for”. For it seems to be a direct implication of 
the core assumption of functionalism that it is a state of mind’s causal role that makes it the 
type of state that it is. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011), p.37-38].  As Clark has noticed: 
 
“All one needs is the very weak functionalism captured in the 
Parity Principle: roughly, if a state plays the same causal role in 
the cognitive network as a mental state, then there is a 
presumption of mentality, one that can only be defeated by 
displaying a relevant difference between the two (and not merely 
the brute difference between inner and outer)”. [Clark (2008), 
p.15]. 
 
Inner and outer, biological and non-biological, mental and artefactual can therefore 
combine, merge and amalgamate to realise a type of mental state. This realisation can 
sometimes only occur if internal and external work in partnership to make the right kinds 
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of causal contribution in the instantiation, production and guidance of successful 
purposeful behaviour. Where the material vehicles that make this causal contribution 
possible are housed is for EMT only incidental, what is relevant is instead the job, the 
function that these material vehicles perform. Quite often these jobs and functions can be 
performed better when biological agents work in close, symbiotic partnership with the 
resources located in their milieu, recruiting items that are stored beyond the physical 
boundary of their skin and skull. In some other cases however, and more on this in chapter 
two of this dissertation, the relevant task cannot be accomplished unless we rely on 
processes that are situated outside the biological skinbag of the organism.  
Although Parity was undoubtedly central in the argument that Clark and Chalmers have 
developed for EMT, it has so far proven far from being obvious. Much of the criticism 
about EMT has in fact been generated by the related question of whether to individuate 
functional roles in a coarse-grained or fine-grained way. This crucial concern has been the 
real stumbling block on the path toward a successful and complete corroboration of EMT. 
Opponents of EMT have repeatedly engaged Clark and Chalmers on this issue while 
famously arguing that the functional roles that define a mental state must be understood in 
a fine-grained way. There are, they have argued, substantial differences between inner and 
outer and it is precisely these differences that ultimately undermine any attempt to use 
Parity to develop an argument for EMT. It is to this persistent criticism that I now want to 
turn.    
Opponents of EMT have repeatedly claimed that the differences between internal 
biological processes and allegedly extended ones are so crucial and significant to 
undermine the idea that inner and outer are functionally equivalent.  In the discussion of 
Parity presented above, I have however shown that it is precisely this functional 
equivalence that is required for functionalist defences of EMT. If opponents of EMT can 
successfully demonstrate that the idea of functional equivalence is deeply flawed then it 
would seem that they have a strong argument to resist EMT. In a recent paper, Daniel 
Weiskopf (2008) has contended that putative cases of extended beliefs such as those 




“Beliefs are normally informationally integrated with, and 
updated in concert with, other beliefs (and further mental states 
of the subject, such as desires). But most alleged cases of 
externally located mental states do not share this feature. So, by 
the functionalist principle, they cannot be beliefs”. [Weiskopf 
(2008), p. 268]. 
 
 
In a similar vein, Rupert (2004, 2009) and Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2009) have 
questioned the very idea of extended memory by contending that extended memories 
don’t fill the right kind of functional roles to count as proper and genuine memories. 
[Kiverstein and Farina (2011)]. They have contested that alleged cases of extended 
memories can be rated as genuine cases of memory, on the grounds that extended 
memories don’t behave anything like internal, biological ones. Extended memories in fact 
do not exhibit a wide range of phenomena {such as negative transfer [Rupert (2004), p. 
413] or recency, primacy, or chunking effects [Adams and Aizawa (2001),p. 91; (2009), 
p. 61],  that are instead typical of internal, biological ones. Extended memories do not 
exhibit key signature features of human semantic memory. [Kiverstein and Farina 
(2011)]. Extended memories thus significantly differ from internal ones and cannot be 
assimilated or compared to them. On the top of this, Adams and Aizawa have also 
highlighted the fact that Otto’s use of motor and visual skills to access the contents of his 
notebook radically differs from Inga’s mode of access of her biological memory. [Adams 
and Aizawa (2009), p.68-70]. Crucially in fact, Inga needs to deploy neither motor nor 
visual skills to retrieve the important information she needs to reach New York’s MoMa. 
 
The argument for EMT I presented above was based on parity and precisely needed for 
its corroboration the functional equivalence of internal biological processes and extended 
ones. Following Clark and Chalmers I suggested that if these two types of processes 
(external and internal) are functionally equivalent then both should be accorded equal 
treatment when assessing their status as beliefs. The considerations rehearsed in the 
previous paragraph however seem to point to important functional differences between 
inner and outer. These crucial differences in turn seem to indicate that internal biological 
processes and putatively extended ones cannot be functionally equivalent. Without this 
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functional equivalence in place however, any respectable functionalist defence of EMT is 
dismantled and devitalised. It is dismantled and devitalised because it is deprived of its 
major argument for treating extended processes as cognitive ones. Couldn’t we, say, re-
engineer our external resources so as to render these functional differences less pervasive 
and make these extra-biological features work more like the internal ones do? 
 
Suppose Otto was to modify his notebook so as to make it work more like our internal 
biological memory. [Sprevak (2009), p.508]. His notebook would at some point become 
so different from any of the notebooks we are accustomed to in our actual world that we 
could not reasonably deduce from Otto’s case anything about the mind and its functions 
in the real world. The most we would probably be allowed to surmise would be the 
logical possibility of EMT. EMT would be logically possible in the sense that there 
wouldn’t be any contradiction in supposing possible worlds in which memories can 
actually extend. All opponents of EMT are however prone to concede this much. What is 
at stake in this debate is rather to decide whether the mind physically extends in the actual 
world we inhabit, and a suitably re-engineered notebook seems to be totally powerless to 
tell us anything about this.To repeat, the objections moved by critics of EMT point to the 
existence of significant, fine-grained differences between the functional roles of internal 
biological processes and those of putatively extended ones. Furthermore, all these 
differences seem to be factual and grounded in our actual world. Are thus opponents of 
EMT right to insist on such a fine-grained functional equivalence and does its denial 
entail a rejection of EMT? Clark remains sceptical about the prospects of this criticism. 
Here is what he writes as a preliminary response to placate his opponents: “[the] claim 
was not that the processes in Otto and Inga are identical, or even similar, in terms of 
their detailed implementation. It is simply that, with respect to the role that the long-
term encodings play in guiding current response, both modes of storage can be seen as 
supporting dispositional beliefs. It is the way the information is poised to guide 
reasoning...and behaviour that counts”. [Clark (2008), p.96)]. In short, Clark doesn’t 
deny the fact that intracranial and extra-cranial processes differ in terms of fine-grained 
functional roles, he completely agrees with his critics on this. Clark simply rejects the 
assumption that such differences should necessarily matter when it comes to assessing the 
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parity of inner and outer. The sort of functional equivalence that Clark is seeking to 
establish is rather determined at a fairly coarse-grained level.[Clark (2001)]. Clark thus 
believes that drawing the boundary between the cognitive and the non-cognitive this 
finely would only cause us to scale new heights of anthropocentrism and neuro-centrism. 
[Clark (2008)]. 
 
Opponents of EMT remain unconvinced by this response and demand more clarity. They 
insist and focus on the fine-grained understanding of the differences between internal and 
external, as this focus they believe, contribute to undermine the case for EMT. So, here 
we face an apparent stand-off. Who is to say who is right and how do we possibly get out 
of this impasse?  
 
1.5 The Stalemate 
 
Clark has suggested a way to get out of this apparent stand-off. To do so, he has 
appealed to what Sprevak (2009) has called: “The Martian Intuition”- “the thought that 
creatures that are physiologically different from us can nevertheless share the same 
types of mental states with us” [Kiverstein and Farina (2011), p.38]. The Martian 
Intuition not only grants the possibility for a variation in physiology, but it also endorses 
a degree of variability in the attribution of psychological states. Just as we can abstract 
away from physiological differences in evaluating whether a living being shares identical 
types of mental states with us, so we can also abstract away from some (but of course not 
all) psychological differences. The Martian intuition thus entails that it is possible for an 
organism with psychological states to exist, even if such an organism has a diverse 
corporeal and biological architecture. An intelligent morphon might well have green stuff 
instead of neurons, it might be made out of aluminium rather than say titanium or carbon, 
and it might not even have axons or synapses but rather possess some other kind of 
electrochemical transmitters travelling along the body to connect the fibers. There 
wouldn’t be any reason, however, to argue that such an organism does not possess 
mentality. [Sprevak (2009)]. A Martian may well be able to remember facts and events 
even if in its performances in psychological tests it did not consistently show negative 
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transfer, neither recency, primacy or chunking effects [Wheeler (2010), p.261-264]. 
Adams & Aizawa, as we have seen above, have emphasised the fact that Otto uses his 
visual and motor systems in the retrieval of crucial information from his notebook. We 
can however conceive Martians using their visual and motor systems to access stored 
sources of information because their memories are stored in either a motor or a visual 
format [Sprevak (2009), p.511]. The Martian Intuition thus seems to suggest that despite 
non-standard methods of retrieval, and crucial fine-grained differences found in the 
structure of the bio-physical architecture, the Martian’s mode of access to stored sources 
of information via visual and motor skills should still be counted as remembering. The 
Martian Intuition therefore provides proponents of EMT with a very powerful weapon to 
fend off most of their bitter enemies. 
 
The Martian Intuition seems in fact to grant the possibility that we can theoretically 
abstract away from fine-grained functional differences in determining whether a state 
qualifies as a mental state of a given type. At the same time the Martian Intuition also 
suggests that tying our mental states to the fine-grained details of human psychology is a 
hazardous move. It is a hazardous move because this move entails a biologically 
chauvinist understanding of our mental states. This chauvinist understanding is indeed 
manifestly in conflict with the spirit of inclusiveness that the Martian Intuition seems to 
encourage. Despite the fact that the Martian Intuition provides us with very powerful 
means to resist much of the bio-chauvinist criticism raised against functionalist defences 
of EMT, its deployment comes at a cost, a very high cost as I shall notice.  
 
In their seminal paper, Clark and Chalmers (1998) have appealed to the existence of 
some “glue and trust” conditions to justify their claim that the mind extends beyond the 
skin and skull of the organism. These conditions were formulated in order to prevent the 
mind from spreading rampantly into the world and offered as requirements needed for an 
external resource to effectively count as part of the mind. The glue and trust conditions 
say that an external resource counts as part of our mind if it is (1) portable (2) easily 
accessed and (3) automatically endorsed. While the first two constraints are quite 
unambiguous the third one remains a bit murky and seems to require additional attention. 
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Let me quickly explain what Clark and Chalmers meant with the locution “automatically 
endorsed”. An external resource is for Clark and Chalmers automatically endorsed when 
it is not subject to critical scrutiny or cross-checking, this meaning that “its mechanisms 
are sufficiently robust to ensure against deliberate tampering or arbitrary 
manipulation”. [Smart et al. (2008),p.15].   
 
Now, Mark Sprevak (2009) has noticed that for each of the glue and trust conditions 
proposed by Clark and Chalmers to grant the possibility for the mind to extend, we can 
effortlessly conceive a specific case of Martian cognition that fails to meet the 
requirements needed for effective mind extension. We can in fact imagine, Sprevak 
argues, an insomniac Martian whose memories are readily retrieved only if it has had a 
very relaxing night’s sleep. Being an insomniac however, this very rarely happens. We 
wouldn’t want to say, Sprevak continues, that the poor insomniac “Martian” fella does 
not experience memories just because the conditions for retrieving and accessing them 
are very seldomly met. Such a conclusion would in fact conflate with the spirit of 
inclusiveness advocated and endorsed by the Martian Intuition. It would equally well run 
against its central tenet that asserts that living beings that are psychologically different 
from us can nevertheless share our mental states. Now, Sprevak shows that we can 
successfully run similar arguments for the other two of the glue and trust conditions 
abovementioned [Sprevak (2009), § 5-6)]. This possibility, on his account, is sufficient to 
establish the inconsistency of the Martian Intuition with the constraints originally given 
on extended cognition by Clark and Chalmers8. Yet without such constraints in place, he 
concludes, the mind threatens to spread rampantly into the world. The kind of 
functionalism that licenses EMT therefore appears to be overly liberal and 
disproportionately permissive in its attribution of mental states; so permissive and liberal 
that it starts looking genuinely implausible. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)]. 
 
There are indeed a number of different responses that attempt to tame the so-called 
Martian intuition. Most of these responses try to avoid the radical counterintuitive 
consequences highlighted by Sprevak. The strategy these responses generally deploy aims 
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at individuating a number of criteria for the characterisation of functional roles that are 
neither too liberal nor too conservative. The problem of finding a level of granularity for 
the individuation of functional roles that is just right isn’t however a new problem for 
functionalist theories of the mind9. So far, the solution to this Goldilocks problem hasn’t 
unfortunately been the most forthcoming. 
 
The most efficacious attempt to tame the Martian intuition is, no doubt, due to Michael 
Wheeler [Wheeler (2010), (forthcoming)], who proposes to renounce the condition of a 
single level of granularity tailored to all our mental states and rather looks at what Clark 
(1989, 1999) has called “microfunctionalism” for a stable solution of our Goldilocks 
problem. Clark has noticed that “microfunctionalism specifies a system only in terms of 
input output profiles for individual units and thus is not crucially dependent on any 
particular biological substrate”. [Clark (1999), p.40] In a similar vein, Wheeler has 
argued that in microfunctionalism, “there are certain key properties of flexible 
generalization and graceful degradation that are at least partly realized beyond the 
skin”. [Wheeler (Manuscript), p. 26]. Wheeler has appealed to these properties, which he 
claims need to be displayed by any system worthy of the label “cognitive”, to elaborate an 
account of functional roles that is compatible with EMT. He has tried to demonstrate that 
these functional roles are fixed at a very fine level of grain, while at the same time arguing 
for the impossibility of realising them only internally.  
By keeping the formal characterization of these functional roles at a very fine-grained 
level he has hoped to find the proper structure capable of supporting the rich behavioural 
patterns needed for cognitive extension. [Wheeler (2010) §6]. It is therefore an 
implication of his microfunctionalism that a system must realise a certain fine-grained 
functional profile and this fine-grained functional profile is required if we want to label 
something as cognitive. This functional profile doesn’t however impede extended 
cognition nor precludes the existence of extended minds – quite the opposite. The 
Wheeler’s response to the Goldilocks problem looks quite consistent with assessing each 
cognitive process on a case-by-case strategy. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Clark could however object that these conditions were aimed at the claim about extended bases for 
dispositional beliefs. So taking them as fully general might be misleading. 
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thing we have to do is simply to look for the right functional profile. When we find it we 
can account for the cognitive.  
I certainly don’t mean to dismiss Wheeler’s venture and I surely find his 
microfunctionalist project most intriguing and perhaps even compatible with my 
approach. I am fascinated by his quest for functional isomorphism but I also believe that 
in order to strengthen the case for EMT we need to take into account the functional 
differences between internal and external. Functional differences do matter and contribute 
to buying cognitive transformation, while allowing for the production of the kind of 
augmented cognition that EMT ultimately seeks to establish. So, in order to establish this 
kind of cognition, I turn to a perhaps more fascinating line of argument; one that in the 
literature directed at EMT has quite often been neglected. This line of argument is 
concerned with so-called second wave, “Complementarity defences” of the extended 
mind. I find in this Complementarity understanding an equally illuminating and perhaps 
even more promising set of arguments for EMT. It is to this Complementarity approach 
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In the previous chapter I have introduced EMT and have discussed its crucial tenets. I 
have presented the Parity Principle, highlighted some criticism and acknowledged the 
stalemate in which the debate between embedded and extended has fallen. In this chapter, 
rather than combating the battle for the extended mind on a traditional, purely 
functionalist turf, I concede that there are significant and undeniable fine-grained 
differences between internal, biological processes and putatively extended ones. In 
agreement with opponents of EMT, I thus reckon that extended cognitive systems are 
endowed with quite different properties from systems that are “brain bound” but, contra 
them argue, that it is precisely these differences that allow human minds to transcend 
their biological limitations. I therefore look at a less explored line of argument for EMT 
that is to do with the idea of complementarity.  
So-called second wave, Complementarity defences of EMT assert that diverse 
constituents of a soft-assembled system10 can perform quite different role and possess 
different properties while interlocking to trigger complementary contributions that favour 
flexible thinking and acting. [Farina (2011)]. I thus defend this complementarity version 
of the extended mind thesis and argue that complementarity becomes crucial when it 
comes to describing the development and evolution of human cognitive behaviour. 
[Sutton (2002); Sutton et al. (2010)]. Opponents of EMT [such as Sprevak (2009) and 
Adams & Aizawa (2009)] but also some friends of it [Rowlands (2010) and Wheeler 
(forthcoming), to name a few] have noticed that Complementarity alone isn’t yet 
sufficient to establish extended cognition and that we need to add something to it if we 
want to address the causal-constitutional conflation. EMT is often accused to confuse the 
claim that “some problem solving behaviour is causally dependent on a part of the 
                                                             
10 Softly-assembled systems are provisionally assembled units working in the service of successful phenotypic 
transmission. Softly-assembled systems are made up via temporary bio-ecological operations of assemblage 
that occur between neural and non-neural resources. These operations deal with specific problems arising in 
the course of one’s experience. Softly-assembled systems lie at the core of the phenomenon of cortical 
plasticity in human development and to, Thelen and Smith(1994), they are the defining feature of a dynamic 
account of development. 
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external environment for the claim that a part of the external environment can form a 
part of a cognitive process”. [Farina (2010), p.227]. This is the causal-constitutional 
conflation. Second wave theorists have developed a number of responses to deal with this 
objection. Sutton (2010) for instance, wants the best argument for EMT to be 
independent of functionalism and  has tried to shift the debate away from Parity. He 
focuses on the rich scaffolding in the context of complementarity to show that once this 
rich scaffolding is established embedded pretty much collapses into extended. Menary 
(2006) instead explicitly rejects functionalism and adds to complementarity the dimension 
of integration11. In this section I look at the rich dialectic underlying the debate generated 
by Complementarity and try to bring out some of the differences within the 2nd wave 
camp. 
Having discussed complementarity and highlighted the differences within the 2nd wave 
camp, I then turn to the main business of the chapter, which is to show how 
complementarity allows us to escape the stand-off mentioned above. The goal of the 
chapter is thus to show how complementarity can provide a solid and robust response to 
embedded understandings of human intelligent behaviour. To do so, I firstly argue that 
plasticity is a pre-condition for EMT and then sketch an argument for EMT based on it. 
Plasticity is a pre-condition for EMT because it makes it possible for our cognitive 
processes to expand and extend into the environment so as to integrate and literally fuse 
into our own bodies the tools we use for thinking. Through plasticity in fact these tools 
become geared into working in symbiotic partnership with our brains and form an 
entangled, symbiotic and integrated system of cognitive analysis. But plasticity also 
determines, via continuous environmental engagements and repeated socio-cultural 
activities, the shaping and sculpting of our cognitive functions. In this chapter, I therefore 
make a developmental argument for EMT based on the ontogeny of cognitive systems. I 
argue that our on-board neural machineries come to be dovetailed to fit with the 
                                                             
11 I should stress here that Menary’s picture is probably closer to the more diachronically-based version of 
EMT on which I have been working with my supervisor Julian Kiverstein. Sutton is in no way opposed to 
diachronic explanations; just he thinks that they don’t deliver metaphysical constitution claims about current 
cognitive states and processes. His diagnosis, and more on this below, is that we should keep the diachronic 
explanations but drop the constitution claims. I’d be inclined to agree on this point with Sutton. In what 




particular socio-cultural environs to which they are exposed. This exposure allows 
humans to transform, transcend and quite often augment their cognitive functions and at 
the same time opens up to processes of deep intelligent self-engineering and 
restructuring. Plasticity therefore contributes to getting us something we wouldn’t get if 
we were to rely exclusively on our brains or on our biology. This point is crucial because 
it forges the connection between plasticity and Complementarity I was looking for. To 
further strengthen this connection and thus to reinforce my case for Complementarity and 
EMT, I conclude my argument by focussing on a series of empirical studies which 
confirm the profound enmeshing and dovetailing of internal and external, while crucially 
revealing the way in which biological and non-biological reciprocally intermingle in 
moulding and forging our cognitive functions.   
In the final section of this chapter, I eventually address some criticism. Critics have 
objected that it seems difficult to see how we can establish an argument for synchronic, 
here and now extensions on the grounds of diachronic, developmental considerations. 
They have typically contended that the kind of dovetailing I have been defending is 
powerless against the causal-constitutional charge that is always levelled against EMT. 
EMT, it is argued, confuses a perhaps necessary causal contribution from the external 
world for a cognitive one. I respond by showing that even though the developmental 
argument I made might not provide a knock-down argument against individualism, it 
surely calls into question any intracranial, brain-bounded understanding of human 
cognitive behavior as it seems to empirically undermine any view that thinks of the brain 
as the single, individual container of the mind. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)]. 
2.2 Complementarity: what is it? 
 
EMT, as we have seen before, asserts that some mental processes are symmetrically 
coupled, deeply interweaved, with external vehicles in the environment in a way that 
allows such states to extend outward from their cranial prison and form a system that is a 
cognitive system in its own right. To substantiate this claim, functionalist defences of 
EMT have appealed to the parity principle. By breaking down classical and individualist 
distinctions between brain, body, and world, Parity has attempted to challenge the very 
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idea that the core realiser of cognition is restricted, bounded and confined to the physical 
boundary of the organism. Significant objections to Parity have been moved and, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, all these objections (mostly related with the question of 
how to individuate the functional roles) have driven the debate into a treacherous stand-
off. In this stand-off the embedded conservatism has seemed to stand better changes of 
corroboration over its more contested, “extended” neighbour. The parity-based, purely 
functionalist understanding of EMT depicted in the previous chapter, isn’t however the 
only approach that proponents of EMT have been using to argue for cognitive extension.  
 
Another line of argument consistently deployed in the literature directed at EMT 
concerns what John Sutton has famously dubbed the Complementary contribution of 
inner and outer resources. [Sutton et al. (2002); Sutton et al. (2010)]. In agreement with 
critics of EMT, proponents of this approach concede that there are undeniable, fine-
grained functional differences between internal and external but argue that it is precisely 
these differences that allow human minds to transcend their biological limitations. As 
Menary has put it: there seems to be a: “Complementarity between what the biological 
brain can do and what the environment provides, such that inner processes and vehicles 
and outer processes and vehicles work together to complete a cognitive task”. [Menary 
(2006),p.341]. This understanding of EMT therefore entails that outer states or processes 
need not to replicate the functions and the roles of internal biological ones but rather that 
different components of a cognitive system can coalesce and reciprocally intermingle in 
the production of flexible cognitive behaviour. Second-wave defences of EMT are 
therefore based on what has come to be known as the ‘Complementarity Principle’. 
[Sutton (2010)]. This principle embraces both historical and developmental 
considerations and seems to invite us to try “to make the world smarter so that we can be 
dumb in peace”. [Clark (1997), p.180].  
 
In truth, complementarity themes can be found in Clark’s seminal work (1997). In Being 
There (1997), Clark highlights the crucial transformative power of artworks, pieces of 
technology, media, social networks and institutions for human cognitive behaviour, while 
illustrating the frequency with which we rely, in rich and interactive ways, on the 
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capacities of specific non-biological features. These extra-cranial features are, Clark 
argues, quite often “alien but complementary to the brain’s style of storage and 
computation. The brain need not waste its time replicating such capacities. Rather, it 
must learn to interface with them in ways that maximally exploit their peculiar virtues”. 
[Clark (1997), p. 220]. Thus, rather than causally aiding the production of cognitive 
behaviours, these complementary, non-biological/extra-neural factors become “equal 
(though different) partners in coordinated, coupled larger cognitive systems”. [Sutton et 
al. (2010), p.524]. The focus of complementarity approaches is therefore on the many 
different ways in which diverse components of a cognitive system, intermingle and 
function together in triggering, driving and forging complex and flexible kinds of 
cognition. Clark himself has envisioned in this complex process of reciprocal 
interweavements the roots for what he has argued to be the more stimulating, credible 
and attention-grabbing argument for EMT. As he put it: 
 
 
“The argument for the extended mind thus turns primarily on the way 
disparate inner and outer components may co-operate so as to yield 
integrated larger systems capable of supporting various (often quite 
advanced) forms of adaptive success. The external factors and 
operations, in this model, are most unlikely to be computationally 




Elsewhere12 Clark has further reinforced the idea that external factors can impact in 
multiple and significant ways upon our biology so as to create augmented systems whose 
cognitive power goes well beyond that of the naked brain alone. Complementarity is thus 
clearly a key theme, a trade mark label of his own work. Here however, it seems fair to 
do a bit more citation and crediting. While standard Complementarity themes are peculiar 
of Clark’s seminal works and can also be found in earlier treatments [such as Rowlands 
(1999) for instance] harking back to and building on Wilson (1994) and Haugeland 
(1998); the idea of picking out Complementarity as a clear alternative route to EMT that 
                                                             
 
12 See for instance, [Clark (2001), (2003), (2006), (2010)]. 
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differs from parity should be ascribed to Sutton (2002, 2006, 2010), whose treatment has 
subsequently forged the basis for Menary’s defence of extended cognition based on the 
idea of cognitive integration. [Menary (2006 2007, 2010)]. Complementarity has also 
recently become a central theme in Rowlands (2010).  
 
Although in the literature directed at EMT there is enormous and unambiguous evidence 
suggesting the relevance of Complementarity, most of the critics have only focussed on a 
functionalist understanding of cognitive extension. As a result, this second strand of 
thinking about EMT has been largely forgotten. It seems to me however, and much more 
on this in the next couple of sections, that the appeal to Complementarity and to its 
integrationist flavour, is liable to become instrumental when it comes to describing the 
way in which we accomplish many of our distinctive types of cognition. 
 
In what remains of this second section, I quickly look at the debate generated by 
Complementarity, answer the question of whether Complementarity alone is really 
sufficient to establish extended cognition and investigate the rich dialectic underlying the 
second wave camp, trying to bring out some differences between two of its leading 
proponents, namely Sutton and Menary. Before doing that let me however notice that the 
distinction between Parity and Complementarity, with the latter conceived as an 
alternative to the former, isn’t accepted by all. Clark for instance doesn’t buy this 
distinction. He doesn’t buy the two waves story because he thinks that both Parity and 
Complementarity work together and become reciprocally instrumental when it comes to 
defending EMT. So, on his account, there is nothing like a second wave, as the so-called 
second way is believed to be part of the original treatment. 
 
Other friends of EMT have however noticed that Complementarity alone isn’t yet 
sufficient to establish extended cognition. Both Rowlands (2009, 2010) and Wheeler 
(forthcoming) have argued that one can't get extended cognition from complementarity 
alone. Sure, they reckon, the differences argument deployed against parity defences of 
EMT is powerless against Complementarity because Complementarity precisely predicts 
and requires such differences. However, the focus on the many different ways in which 
45 
 
internal and external couple and intermingle leave the Complementarity version of EMT 
vulnerable to another objection. If EMT precisely needs these differences to account for 
cognitive processes, what reason do we have for thinking that external processes are 
really part of cognition? In other words, given the existence of specific undeniable 
differences why should we attribute to external processes a fully cognitive status? We 
certainly cannot do it by virtue of a simple analogical extension. If EMT wants to treat 
the external resources as cognitive, it therefore needs to offer a proper criterion for 
demarcating and distinguishing “factors that are genuinely parts of a cognitive system 
from factors that are only making a causal contribution”. [Farina(2010),p. 227-228]. In 
short, the Complementarity response seems to “deflect the differences argument only by 
leaving EMT vulnerable to the mark of the cognitive objection”. [Rowlands (2009),p.4]. 
This objection has been further pressed by critics of EMT, who have all argued, with 
different strategies, that what is external to the bio-physical architecture of the cogniser 
can only ever make a causal contribution. 
 
Proponents of EMT have responded in a variety of different ways. One strategy has tried 
to tame the mark of the cognitive objection by showing that EMT isn’t itself incompatible 
with any plausible criterion that wants to distinguish genuinely cognitive factors from 
merely causal ones. This is the strategy that both Rowlands (2009, 2010) and Wheeler 
(2005, forthcoming) have embraced. Let me look at this very briefly. Rowlands has 
argued that far from contradicting EMT, the mark of the cognitive can be used to support 
it and that we can find the conditions needed to establish such a mark in the scientific 
practise of cognitive scientists. He has individuated a set of conditions to determine 
whether something can count as cognitive. A process P, he believes, counts as cognitive 
if and only if: 
 
“(1) P involves information processing—the manipulation and 
transformation of information-bearing structures.(2) This information 
processing has the proper function of making available either to the 
subject or to subsequent processing operations information that was (or 
would have been) prior to (or without) this processing, unavailable. (3) 
This information is made available by way of the production, in the 
subject of P, of a representational state. (4) P is a process that belongs 





In a similar vein, Michael Wheeler (2010, forthcoming) has envisaged the need of a mark 
of the cognitive to set up a stable defence of EMT. EMT, he says, needs a functionalist, 
“scientifically informed, theory-loaded, locationally uncommitted account of the 
cognitive”. [Wheeler (2005, forthcoming)]. Clark (2010a, 2010b) however has explicitly 
rejected this idea and replied that the attempt to identify a mark of the cognitive is 
unlikely to bear any fruit because we already possess an intuitive grip on the kinds of 
coarse-grained behaviour patterns that we believe are characteristic of key cognitive 
processes, such as the holding of a standing (dispositional) belief. [Clark (2010a,b). Thus, 
a very basic and moderately liberal plea to folk psychology would, on his account, suffice 
to direct us in working out what counts as cognitive and what does not. [Farina (2011)]. 
 
Second-wave defences of EMT have implicitly embraced Clark’s understanding of the 
mark of the cognitive but have tried to deploy a series of different strategies to tame the 
causal-constitutional charge. Sutton13 (2010 and elsewhere) for instance, wants to shift 
the debate away from Parity and thinks that one should be able to reconstruct or retain 
functionalist-style parity claims within the mature, complementarity-based alternative 
version of EMT. Parity, he claims, doesn't get you far towards that best version. It is not 
really much of a methodological tool or guideline in practice, he notices, to ask whether 
we would accept a state or process as cognitive if it were in the head. For Sutton all the 
relevant methodological tools and guidelines should instead be directed to assessing the 
integrated/coupled performance and potential of hybrid inner-outer systems. For this 
reason, he has argued that Complementarity alone is enough to get extended cognition 
and that there is nothing to add to it on the condition that we understand 
Complementarity correctly – that is, on the condition that we define it as a label for a 
multidimensional framework in which rich scaffolding takes precedence over 
metaphysical claims.  
 
                                                             
 
13 I am deeply grateful to John Sutton for the discussion of this point. 
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Sutton therefore deals with the causal/ constitutive issues by first describing, in rich 
detail, the whole range of differently-influential causal processes within causally-
interactive or holistic systems. He then uses our descriptions to do science to manipulate 
and examine those causal factors which we suspect are in some sense (more) uniquely 
relevant. In other words, Sutton wants to avoid relying on a particular metaphysical 
theory of constitution or realization, because he thinks that is too fragile and too 
uncertain as a basis to build a science of extended cognition. Scientists, he notices, are 
dealing with differently-relevant causal factors and processes all the time and they are in 
general unworried about causal/constitutive issues. The sun or oxygen is excluded from 
being part of an extended cognitive process of mine because it makes no unique or 
differential or specific contribution to this cognitive process, that's distinct from its 
contribution to all other cognitive processes. So, to reiterate, Sutton thinks that we build 
our best framework by trying out and studying and (thus) assessing and revising the most 
relevant dimensions on which cognitive systems and cognitive states and processes differ, 
and in particular by studying cases which fall towards the more extended regions or 
corners of the resulting multidimensional spaces. Once we've done that, he claims, we 
then have the choice of remaining “embedded” but not at all any longer “merely” 
embedded, as we have seen how wildly different in nature those regions of the space are, 
and we have transformed psychology and science by studying them in detail; or, we can 
run with the Quinean/ Churchland (1982) philosophy of science that excellence of theory 
is our best measure of ontology, and decide that the label “extended cognition” really 
does well describe what happens in those regions. So, once we focus and accept how rich 
and strong scaffolding is in the context of complementarity, this is already to have 
conceded enough ground to undermine embedded, as embedded has pretty much 
collapsed into extended.  
 
To crude Complementarity Menary (2006,2007) has instead added the dimension of 
integration. Integrationism, he claims, favours “the co-ordination of bodily processes 
with salient features of the environment and allows the organism to perform cognitive 
functions that it would otherwise be unable to”. [Menary (2007) p. 3]. When the 
representational vehicles of these processes, he has claimed, are offloaded onto the 
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environment and adequately manipulated in the service of adaptive behaviour, those 
external features become literally parts of our extended cognitive system. While not 
rejecting the framework offered for Complementarity, Menary finds an answer for those 
metaphysical claims avoided by Sutton by focussing on Integrationism. The 
Complementarity understanding of EMT combined with this integrationist flavour 
therefore best describes my idea of cognitive enhancement/transformation. Cognitive 
transformation is precisely the flavour that I want to add to Complementarity in order to 
deal (if ever possible) with the metaphysical claims14. I call this transformation, realised 
via brain plasticity, with different names (such as Integrationism, cognitive dovetailing, 
enmeshing or symbiotic partnership between internal and external). In what follows I try 
to show how the idea of cognitive transformation can be used to highlight the distinctive, 
integrationist character of Complementarity. 
 
2.3 Neural Plasticity and EMT 
 
Having introduced Complementarity, quickly looked at the debate generated by it and 
discussed the rich dialectic underlying the 2nd wave camp, I now turn my attention to the 
main business of this chapter, which is to develop a complementarity argument for EMT 
based on the enmeshing of organisms and their cognitive developmental niches.  In 
human beings these cognitive developmental niches are entrenched, deeply rooted in 
socio-cultural activities and quite often implemented via technological enhancements. I 
will argue that a large part of our distinctive intelligent behaviour is the result of the 
enmeshing, on multiple timescales, of our on-board neural machineries with external 
resources (either technological or socio-cultural ones). I find evidence for this profound 
dovetailing of inner and outer and for the idea of cognitive transformation and 
enhancement, in work carried out on neural development by cognitive neuroscientists. 
This work on neural development reveals the distinctive “integrationist” character of 
Complementarity. It is to this fascinating line of experimental work that I now turn. 
                                                             
14 I remain extremely sympathetic with Sutton’s perspective and really think that his approach is probably the 
most effective to escape the causal-constitutional charge always levelled against EMT. As a philosopher, 
however, I am tempted to defeat my opponents on their own metaphysical territory. Whether I succeed, this 
remains to be seen. 
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The human brain begins its long journey toward maturation around the third week after 
conception with the formation of a neural tube atop the length of the embryo. By the 
fourth week, the brain’s formation actually begins with an extraordinary 250,000 cells 
growing every minute [Thompson (1993)]. From just very few cells the infant’s brain 
reaches, in a couple of years or so, about 80 per cent of the size of an adult’s brain. Our 
brain doesn’t just spontaneously ‘pop’ into existence but it is rather the outcome of an 
enduring process of neural growth and persistent development. What drives this process? 
The remarkable expansion of our brains is driven and boosted by the formation of 
synaptic connections among neurons. In a new-born infant, each of the neurons that made 
up her brain connects up to form a network of new synaptic connections with other 
neurons. This process is known as synaptogenesis and is reported to occur at an 
impressive average rate of 2500 connections per neuron. This number of connections 
further expands to reach an average of 15000 per neuron during the third year of life. 
[Eliot (1999)]. 
 
In the thick of this swarming activity, how do specific brain regions come to acquire 
specific cognitive functions? What is the dynamics underlying the developmental process? 
There are basically two alternative hypotheses that have been proposed to try to explain 
the process through which the brain acquires specific cognitive functions. One attractive 
hypothesis is the so-called proto-map view. The proto-map view has been famously 
endorsed by Pasko Rakic and his group of researchers in a series of pioneering studies 
[Rakic et al. (1988); Rakic (2009)], just to name a few]. According to Rakic, “neurons at 
their birth … contain the genetic instructions essential for finding their final place of 
residence in the cortex, where they form a basic species-specific pattern of subcortical 
and cortico-cortical connection. Although these connections can be refined by 
spontaneous and extrinsic activity after their formation and modified in response to 
injury, they are remarkably stereotyped in each species”. [Clowry et al. (2010), 
p.277].The idea is basically that neurons at birth set up a primordial map and this pre-
specified map is subsequently used by the brain to respond to external stimulation. The 
proto-map view therefore describes the human brain as a predetermined set of pre-
specified cognitive tools and neurons as fixed and constrained to develop specific 
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functions in specific cortical areas. This nativist understanding of development stands in 
opposition and is typically contrasted to an alternative hypothesis, the so-called proto-
cortex view. [O’Leary & Stanfield (1989)]. The proto-cortex view states that all our 
cortical neurons, at least at the onset of their cortical development, have the same 
potential. The proto-cortex view therefore describes the cortex as immature at birth and 
neural regionalization as largely driven and regulated by external influences. [de Haan & 
Johnson (2003)]. The functional organisation of the cortex, on this account, is not pre-
specified but rather “constructed” and “scaffolded” on the basis of experience. [Quartz & 
Sejnowski (1997); Mareschal et al. (2007)]. Our brains are moulded by the many 
different activities we engage in and forged by the different environs we come across. 
Our cognitive capabilities in turn depend upon the presence, frequency and timing of 
experiences undertaken in early stages of development. Cognitive development is thus, 
on such an account, best described as a process of progressive localisation and 
specialisation of cortical functions. 
 
There isn’t, at present, wide agreement among scientists on which of these accounts of 
cognitive development we should favour. There isn’t such an agreement because 
scientists lack definitive evidence and empirical findings are contradictory. In what remain 
of this section however, I will try to link up the constructivist account of neural 
development mentioned above with the idea of cognitive integration and will argue that 
the former provides vital front-line support for the latter. The constructivist view quickly 
outlined in precedence in fact, highlights the power of humans to re-engineer their brains 
by factoring non-biological, extra-cranial resources into their very functioning. This 
process of self-engineering is of particular interest for us because it points us to a 
profound dovetailing between the biological and the cultural, the sort of Integrationism 
sought by Complementarity, and this can be certainly used to mount a solid defence of 
EMT on the basis of empirical grounds. 
 
Let me start my discussion by showing how neural growth is experience dependent. I will 
then widen and generalise the range of my considerations so as to include our higher 
cognitive functions.  Before doing that however, I need to establish my claim at a lower 
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level. So, let me look at the neurons first. In a nice study conducted in the late ‘50s, 
Chow and colleagues demonstrated a degeneration of retinal ganglion cells in infant 
chimps reared in darkness. [Chow et al. (1957)]. The retinal ganglion cells are basically 
the cells that are responsible for transmitting visual information from the retina to other 
brain areas, such as the thalamus and the hypothalamus. This study by Chow is worth a 
mention because it laid down the groundwork for another, perhaps more important study, 
carried out by Rasch and co-workers only few years later. In 1961, Rasch and colleagues 
not only confirmed the findings found by Chow and his group but proved that the actual 
number of retinal ganglion cells is reduced by 10% of normal when the chimps are 
fostered in darkness. Pretty much in the same period, other studies conducted on 
monkeys discovered variability in the number and size of the cell contained in the lateral 
geniculate nucleus, the area of the brain that firstly receives the visual information from 
the eyes. These studies testified to a consistent cells-reduction (of the order of 40%) in 
chimps divested of visual input in early stages of development and showed that adults 
monkeys could only experience forms of gross perception. [Von Noorden et al. (1970); 
Baker et al. (1974)]. Analogous results were discovered for olfaction. [Kupfer et al. 
(1964)]. Unilateral occlusion of the nostril of a rat pup in early stages of development 
permanently restricts the rat’s access to olfactory cues, decreases the size of its olfactory 
bulb and causes significant cell death. [Pinilla et al. (1989)].  
 
Further empirical evidence for the claim that neural growth is experience dependent 
comes from another study by Hubel and Wiesel (1963). Hubel and Wiesel analysed 
response properties in cat cortex, by recording the electrical activity in the visual cortex 
of kittens that had one eye lid sewed after birth, just before eye opening. The kittens, in 
the Hubel and Wiesel experiment, were reared in this monocular condition up until their 
third month of age. At that point, the sewed-eye was open and the relevant 
electrophysiological measures undertaken. Hubel and Wiesel found that in general the 
visual receptive properties of neurons located in the lateral geniculate nucleus were 
similar in size to those of adult cats, but remarkably discovered a significant shrinkage in 
cells receiving inputs from the deprived eye. [Paton (2008), Hubel and Wiesel (1963)]. In 
particular, 85% of these cells were found to respond to the non-sewed eye, very few 
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were instead responsive to the deprived eye. Their experiment therefore revealed that the 
visual input to the deprived eye didn’t change the pattern of cell sensitivity; “cells 
responding to the nondeprived eye continued to maintain their dominance, and it was 
only through the occlusion of the nondeprived eye at an early age that the balance was 
restored”. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011),p.43] [see also Wexler (2006)]. 
 
Having shown that neural growth is experience dependent, I now provide evidence for 
generalising my claim to perceptual functional specialisation. I start by looking at hearing 
and sight. In both these cases the specialisation of the cortex appears to be experience-
dependent. This much is established by a number of very relevant studies to which I now 
turn. In 1987, Neville and Lawson conducted an experiment in which they used 
electroencephalograph to compare the brains of congenitally deaf patients with those of 
subjects who became deaf after the age of 4. Neville and Lawson remarkably discovered 
substantial differences in the event related potential components of the congenitally deaf 
subjects. This has lead them to argue that a lack of auditory input in early stages of 
development determines, in congenitally deaf infants at least, a reallocation of the 
auditory cortex for other functions, such as sight. On these grounds, they have also 
argued that, due to this early lack of auditory stimulation, deaf subjects develop enhanced 
visual perceptual skills and perform better at visual tasks if compared to hearing subjects. 
[Neville and Lawson (1987)].   
 
Further support for the fascinating idea of functional reallocation outlined above comes 
from a study on Braille reading carried out by Sadato and colleagues (1996). Sadato and 
co-workers scanned with positron emission tomography (PET) the brains of a mixed 
group of congenitally and early blind subjects in order to measure the activation of their 
primary visual cortex during tactile discrimination tasks in Braille reading. In line with the 
findings discovered by Neville and Lawson, Sadato and his group found further empirical 
evidence for the hypothesis that cortical areas are reallocated and rearranged to deal with 
different functions when they fail to process their standard, typical inputs. In particular, 
Sadato and colleagues showed that the occipital cortex in blind Braille readers is subject 
to reorganization and that this reorganization supports the processing of non-visual 
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sensorimotor information. Analogous findings were also reported in a subsequent study 
by Cohen et al. (1999).    
 
Is it this capacity of functional reorganisation confined to early stages of development or 
solely emerging when there is a permanent loss of a sensory modality? In other words, 
does cross-modal plasticity extend or persist into adulthood? “Could the brains of 
typically developing adults also reorganise in this way so as to support different 
functions?” [Kiverstein and Farina (2011), p.44]. There is good empirical evidence that 
seems to point to this direction. In 2001 Pascual-Leone and Hamilton published “The 
Metamodal Brain”, a milestone for everyone interested in plasticity. Among other things, 
in this study Pascual-Leone and Hamilton presented the results of an experiment they 
conducted on a group of adult subjects.  
 
Pascual-Leone and Hamilton gathered a group of normal-sighted adults and blindfolded 
them for a “training” period of 5 days, from Monday morning until Friday evening. 
During these five days the subjects: 1) couldn’t leave the hospital, 2) had to navigate 
through the hospital while blindfolded, 3) had to learn how to read Braille. At the end of 
the fifth day- that is, on Friday evening, the participants’ brains were scanned using fMRI. 
fMRI remarkably revealed an activation of the visual cortex when the participants were 
asked to discriminate sameness or difference of Braille symbols or to distinguish, for 
instance, the pitch of tones. These results have led the authors to conclude that, no matter 
of the age, after a relatively extended period of sensory deprivation, particular areas of 
our brain (the visual cortex in the case of instance) can take on new functions (auditory 
or tactile ones). This result is quite striking because it reveals that cortical plasticity isn’t 
merely confined to childhood, but extends into adulthood. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)]. 
 
At the beginning of this section, I have introduced the idea of synaptogenesis. 
Synaptogenesis enables, via synaptic proliferation, the remarkable expansion of our brain 
during early stages of development. This remarkable expansion is due to an explosion of 
connections among different neurons. The term explosion may appear a bit excessive but 
it actually gives us a good idea of the specific evolutionary function that this process is 
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able to grant. Synaptogenesis in fact guarantees to our brains to settle seamlessly and 
adapt comfortably to virtually any environment by forming a vast number of connections 
that result in being instrumental for the child’s survival. This explosive proliferation 
comes however to an end. It reaches its peak around the third year of the child’s life. 
After the third year of life, this overabundance of synapses becomes no longer 
evolutionarily beneficial. Each synapse to be active and responsive in fact requires a 
certain amount of energy. When the child has engaged with the surrounding environment 
and has developed the set of skills necessary for his existence, the overabundance of these 
synapses no longer favour his evolution but rather threatens his survival (because of the 
synapses’ energetic consumption). So, after the production has reached its peak, synapses 
gradually begin to recede as the brain undergoes the so-called process of “synaptic 
pruning”. Synaptic pruning, otherwise known as controlled cell death or apoptosis is a 
process that is performed to reduce the excessive number of connections formed in the 
brain and therefore is executed by the organism to maintain its functional efficiency. 
During this process an unspecified number of unnecessary, dormant and redundant 
connections are pruned and die off. [[Huttenlocher (1979); LeDoux (2002); Sousa 
(2006)]. According to a conservative estimate [Eliot (2001)] the infant can lose up to 20 
billion synapses during maturation. [Wasserman (2007)]. Here a natural question arises: 
what happens to the other synapses? 
The connections that are not dormant but regularly activated in the many different 
engagements in which the child is involved gradually become instrumental for the 
organism and are obviously kept. But here comes the interesting point. These 
connections are not only kept but with training and reiterated practice they are 
strengthened and reinforced. Every time the kid learns to do something new, say from her 
caregivers or from her peers, new synaptic connections are formed and every time that 
the kid repeats the activities she has just learned, the relevant neural circuitry gets 
reinforced. Synaptic elimination therefore occurs through the adoption of the use it or 
lose it principle. [Kiverstein & Farina (2011)]. 
The neurons that are frequently deployed in motor-engagements survive and flourish, but 
those clusters that are not used become neglected and soon wither and die out. Synaptic 
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pruning thus nicely illustrates the experience-dependent character of the brain’s functional 
organisation. It is the experiences we undertake in the world that in fact forge our brains. 
But how do we form these experiences? Most of these experiences are formed via 
continuous engagements and training in socio-cultural activities and these activities quite 
often involve the skilful use of cultural artefacts [Iriki and Sakura (2008); Renfrew & 
Malafouris (2009); Malafouris (2010); Vaesen (2011)]. Socio-cultural activities and 
skilful mastery of cultural and technological artefacts therefore mould and direct the 
development of our brain. [Park and Huang (2010); Kitayama and Park (2010)]. Any 
dexterous activity we recurrently engage in the wider world changes the structure and the 
functions of our brains. Brains like ours, are altered by these activities so much that we 
can be said to possess a “culturally modified brain”. Not by chance, many neuroscientists 
have appealed to this expression to highlight the plastic adaptability of our minds that 
work by incessantly absorbing new stimuli and changing as culture evolves. [Kiverstein 
and Farina (2011)]. The neuroscientist Michael Merzenich warns: 
“Our brains are vastly different, in fine detail, from the brains of our 
ancestors…In each stage of cultural development…the average human 
had to learn complex new skills and abilities that all involve massive 
brain change…Each one of us can actually learn an incredibly elaborate 
set of ancestrally developed skills and abilities in our lifetimes, in a sense 
generating a re-creation of this history of cultural evolution via brain 
plasticity.” [Doidge, (2007), p.288]. 
 
In the final part of this section, I focus on the idea of culturally modified brain as briefly 
exposed above and find good empirical evidence to support my claim in research 
undertaken on language acquisition. [Meltzoff et al. (2009),Kuhl et al. (2007)]. A number 
of studies on language acquisition in fact show the importance of socio-cultural 
engagements in moulding and forging our higher cognitive functions. It is widely known 
that in early stages of development infants possess the outstanding capacity for 
distinguishing sounds across the languages of the world. [Kuhl et al (1975)]. This truly 
outstanding capacity appears to be universal as it is spread at birth among different 
people and cultures across the globe. This capacity however gradually narrows with age 
and development. In particular, it is reported to narrow around the eleventh month of 
age. [Kuhl et al. (2006)]. But why does it narrow? Studies say it narrows because of 1) 
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the particular socio-cultural environments in which the child is immersed and because of 
2) the specific language, her native language, that the child is trained to learn. This 
particular socio-cultural exposure triggers the activation of certain brain areas which 
determine an activation of specific brain functions and these in turn cause the shrinkage 
abovementioned. Other prominent studies have stressed the importance of social 
interaction for learning capacities, and experiments have further shown that language 
learning is profoundly gated by social processes [Kuhl et al. (2007)]. All these findings 
eventually seem to corroborate the idea that culture makes humans as much as the 
reverse and at the same time they suggest the possibility for our on-board neural 
circuitries to become dovetailed to fit with the particular socio-cultural environment in 
which our brains grow. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)]. 
It is therefore the actions and the engagements we undertake in the world that determine 
which cluster of neurons is likely to thrive and flourish. Connections that are repeatedly 
activated get reinforced and prosper; those that lie dormant are simply cut off and soon 
whiter.  The connections that are reinforced are typically those that are capable of fusing 
with external resources and factoring them into their very functioning. This fusion of 
internal and external transforms and enhances our cognitive functions and occurs by 
means of active coupling via manipulation and cognitive integration. All the studies 
mentioned in this section testify to the profound impact of culture and technology on our 
brains and nicely unveil the way in which the internal machinery is sculpted and tailored 
by the different resources we use in the course of our development. Culture is therefore 
“embrained”. Our internal machineries are assembled and constantly refined through 
development and this process of refinement appears to be the reflection of the symbiotic 
partnership we develop with the milieu since the very instant we step into the world. 
What is crucial and distinctive about the development of our plastic brains is therefore 
that they develop to work in partnership with the external environment. This is the idea of 
cognitive integration I was after. As a result of continuous engagements our brains 
progressively learn to play a role within densely coupled systems and treat the extra-
cranial resources we use as reliable structures. These non-biological structures eventually 
become different (extra-neural) but complementary parts of the machinery that realises 
our cognitive capacities. [Clark (2003)]. 
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2.4 Extended Cognition or Extended Cognitive Systems 
 
I want to conclude this chapter by addressing some criticism and discussing a series of 
concerns that have been recently raised against EMT by Adams and Aizawa (2009). 
Adams and Aizawa have argued that a cognitive system can have among its parts 
components that are located in the external world. From this it doesn’t however follow 
that the contribution these components are making to the overall cognitive system is a 
cognitive one. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)]. Extended cognitive systems, they have 
claimed, are one thing; extended cognition quite another.  To endorse their view, they 
invite us to consider the following example: an air conditioning system, they say, is a 
system in which very different components (e.g. the compressor, the condenser, the 
thermostat, the fan, the evaporation coil and so on) are all profoundly interwoven via 
simple but steadfast connections. However, Adams and Aizawa notice, not every 
components of the air conditioning system can be regarded as performing the function for 
which the system has been originally assembled – the cooling of the air. [Adams and 
Aizawa (2009), pp. 116-117]. The evaporation coil, they maintain, is causally responsible 
for cooling the air but the condenser and the fan certainly do not play any role in this 
process. Analogous consideration can be run for a sound system. Not every element in a 
sound system produces sound: “The speakers do, but the receiver, amplifiers, volume 
controls, tone controls, resistors, capacitors, and wires do not”. [Adams and Aizawa 
(2009), p. 118]. Adams and Aizawa have argued that the same principle applies to 
cognitive systems and that therefore the external constituents of a cognitive system can at 
best be causally necessary, but can never become cognitive. [Adams and Aizawa (2009), 
pp. 130-132]. 
A preliminary response to this worry is to say that it does sound a little odd to hear that 
the evaporation coil is, all on its own, causally responsible for cooling the air in the 
house. Take the evaporation coil out of the larger system in which it is installed and the 
house isn’t certainly going to feel any cooler [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)].  It does 
sound equally strange to me to affirm that the speakers are, once again on their own, 
uniquely accountable for the production of the sound. Again take out the speakers of the 
larger system in which they are integrated, the sound system that includes the receiver, 
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the resistors, the volume controls, the tone controls, the amplifiers, the capacitors and the 
wires, and you ain’t going to hear any sound.  Both the air conditioning system and the 
sound system are made up of different components each of which is assigned a particular 
function in performing a highly specific role. However, it is only when all these 
components are finely tuned and properly interacting one other that you can get cooler 
air in the apartment and proper sound in your room. If cornered I would be inclined to 
concede that the evaporating coil or the speakers are perhaps special and that they might 
actually play a particularly crucial role in the process that leads to the production of the 
sound and to the cooling of the air. Adams and Aizawa might therefore have a point 
when they argue that the evaporation coil and the speakers are the “core realisers” of air 
condition and sound production: without them in fact there wouldn’t be any cooler air or 
fancy sound in the room. But this consideration doesn’t have a grip on my argument, 
because I don’t deny this. What I am saying instead is that these core realisers cannot do 
the entire job on their own. It is only by entering in a symbiotic partnership with all the 
relevant components that characterise their system that these “core realisers” come to 
perform their “allegedly” special or unique function.  
Now in the next few paragraphs, I want to argue that this is true also of the external 
components of an extended cognitive system and that through development we get 
something genuinely new that we wouldn't otherwise get from the naked brain on its 
own. For this reasons, I will now try to show that our on-board neural circuitries, the 
internal components of an extended cognitive system, successfully achieve their functions 
only when they enter in a quasi-symbiotic relationship of partnership with the external 
resources. So, my next step is to show that we get extended cognition only when all the 
components of the system are properly integrated and finely tuned to each other so as to 
form a single, entangled unit of cognitive analysis. The strategy I deploy aims at 
demonstrating that cases of extended cognition are quite different from those cases 
proposed by Adams and Aizawa (the air conditioning and the sound system). Substantial 
differences not only apply but might actually be crucial to decide the dispute in favour of 
EMT. A closer look at these differences might help us better address this point.  
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An extended cognitive system is a system that is subject to transformative processes of 
re-structuring; an open unit whose properties are constantly transformed and refined by 
the many activities to which it is exposed. An extended cognitive system is therefore an 
entangled unit of analysis in which the relevant functions come to perform their 
distinctive role through development and learning. By contrast, the elements that 
comprise the sound system or the air conditioning system (or any other system of this 
kind) are pre-designed and rigorously assembled to perform a fixed function and this 
function cannot be changed nor modified. They are built in a particular way and their 
mechanical architecture doesn’t allow for any change. One can easily boost the 
performances of a sound system or increase those of an air condition system by 
reengineering some of their components but the functions that these components perform 
are fixed in stone and cannot be switched. The speakers can’t be used to plug in the 
system, nor can the wires be utilised to regulate its volume. Furthermore, extended 
cognitive systems are systems in which our brains continuously learn new functions and 
gradually factor external resources into their processing operations. The sound system or 
the air conditioning system clearly cannot learn any new function. In sum, extended 
cognitive systems are ensembles in which different components are jointly deployed to 
construct, refine, transmit and pass specific strategies or knowledge. On the contrary, the 
air conditioning system, the sound system and any other system of this kind are just 
bolted onto a room and their functions are not subject to any form of restructuring or 
development. In short, extended cognitive systems are unities in which our brains are 
“geared into working in partnership with external resources and these external 
resources become grafted into the workings of the internal neural circuitry so that at 
least some of their cognitive functions can only be accomplished through the symbiotic 
partnership that the internal have formed with the external”. [Kiverstein and Farina 
(2011), p.47]. In such systems, the inner comes to perform the function it does only 
because of the regular exchanges it entertains with the many different components that 
characterise its structure. Air conditioning systems, sound systems or systems alike do 
not display any of these properties; ergo the analogy with extended cognitive systems 
doesn’t hold up. It thus follows that the considerations that Adams and Aizawa have 
made to undermine EMT fail to apply to extended cognitive systems and this clearly 
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means that extended cognition remains unaffected by them. Adams and Aizawa’s worry 
seems to be substantially undermined. An opponent of EMT could still resist my claim 
and object that the developmental considerations I have made are powerless when it 
comes to establishing synchronic extension. EMT, she might argue, is a thesis about here 
and now extension not a claim about diachronic evolution. Cognitive dovetailing of the 
kind I have been defending at best grants diachronic evolution but fails to establish 
synchronic extension and therefore doesn’t seem to escape the causal-constitution 
conflation that plagues functionalist defences of EMT.  
An opponent may thus be prone to concede that I have demonstrated that the 
environment can make a necessary contribution to cognition; yet, she will deny that I 
have shown that such a contribution is cognitive. Ken Aizawa (in private 
correspondence) has replied to my previous response by challenging my argument with 
the following counter example. He has asked me to consider the way in which the 
stomach gets adapted to processing alcohol in regular drinkers. The stomach, he has 
argued, is certainly caught up in the processing of alcohol and gradually gets adapted to 
dealing with this environmental input; however, we don’t want to say that the bottle of 
grappa in the drinks cabinet becomes part of the subject’s digestive system. Aizawa has 
highlighted the fact that diachronic considerations do not establish anything stronger than 
causal necessity and has then challenged me to show the way in which his counter 
example differs from the developmental cases I have presented above. A crucial 
difference can be found, I believe, if we look at the relevant outputs. When an external 
factor becomes geared to work in symbiotic partnership with our internal neural 
machinery, the output the subject is producing is not only artefact involving but is rather 
recycled by the brain as an input of its processing in a way that Clark (2006) has 
described as anarchic cognitive self-stimulation. In the examples of dovetailing I am 
interested in we have got an external structure, which is part and parcel of a coupled-
neural-bodily unfolding [Clark (2008), p.126] , whose outputs and effects are organism-
involving; in the sense that they are being recycled to trigger new kind of self-generated 
cognition that then “loop out beyond the purely neural realm” [Clark (2008),p.126]. The 
case of the digestive system proposed by Aizawa is arguably different, I believe. The 
outputs of the digestive system, I am sure the reader doesn’t want me to specify what 
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these outputs really are, do not include the bottle of grappa in my cabinet even if my 
digestive system is finely tuned to dealing with grappa. [Kiverstein and Farina (2011)].  
I don’t expect that this reply will placate the critics. I am sure they will confirm that I 
haven’t provided a knockdown argument against individualism. I might not have 
provided a knockdown argument against individualism but I think these developmental 
considerations make an elegant case for Complementarity, highlight its distinctive 
Integrationism character and provide strong empirical support for the view that describes 
our minds as hybrid and humans as peripatetic self-assemblers [Donald (2000)]. To the 
extent to which my view supports this understanding of human nature and cognition, it 
also inevitably calls into question and significantly undermines any bounded-intracranial 
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Phylogeny is a term of Greek origins characterised by a combination of two words 
(phylon and genesis), indicating race and birth respectively. Phylogeny can be defined as 
the study of evolutionary relatedness among species or taxonomic group of organisms in 
an ancestor/descendant relation. The study of the phylogeny of groups of organisms is 
crucial for the understanding of human evolution because it allows us to explore, through 
the history of the development of human cognitive abilities, the diversification of lineages, 
patterns and rates of trait evolution. It is no surprise that the study of phylogeny of 
organisms has therefore come to play a crucial role in the so-called nature/nurture debate. 
The expression nature versus nurture was originally coined by Richard Mulcaster (1582) 
when he wrote that “nature makes the boy toward, nurture sees him forward” 15. A few 
decades later, William Shakespeare used the same expression in his “The Tempest” where 
Prospero describes Caliban as "a devil, a born devil, on whose nature/nurture can never 
stick." [Shakespeare (1611) IV.l]. The debate around nature and nurture however gained 
increasing importance only after Francis Galton (1874), influenced by Darwin’s “Origins 
of Species” (1859), re-proposed the dichotomy to highlight the contrast between the 
contributions of genetic heredity and those of the environment toward social 
advancement. Since then the nature-nurture debate has acquired a prominent status and a 
central role in different disciplines (including psychology16 and biology17). The word 
nature has been identified with the idea that people act as they do because of some sort of 
genetic predisposition. The word nurture instead has come to characterise the thought 
that people think and behave in certain ways only because they are taught or have learned 
to do so.   
 
                                                             
 
15 Colman and Woodhead (1989), however suggest that the originator of this dichotomy may have been 
Socrates or his amonuensis Plato (370s BC). 
16 A version of this debate has characterised the diatribe between nativists [such as Pinker (1994, 2002)] and 
behaviourists [such as Skinner (1938) or Guthrie (1952) to name just a few] for almost a century. 
17 This is what I will be investigating in this chapter. 
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The former idea has offered the basis for nativist theories in philosophy and psychology 
that describe the human brain as a sort of Swiss army knife; a collection of extremely 
specialised cognitive tools [Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby (1992)]. The latter claim has 
instead provided the conceptual palette necessary for alternative accounts of human 
evolution that try to re-locate and offload some of the constituents of cognition in the 
external environment. A recent and fast-growing body of research on the human genome 
has shed some light on this debate and has offered evidence to support both sides of the 
dispute. Nature, it is often claimed, endows the individual with a set of inborn abilities; 
nurture instead takes up these inherited abilities and forges them as we learn and mature. 
End of the story? Not really, the nature/nurture dichotomy still rages on and continues to 
set scientists, philosophers and psychologists on fire. The disagreement is mostly centred 
on the issue of how much of whom we are is inherited via genes and how much is instead 
forged and shaped by the milieu. Can Complementarity inform this debate? In which case, 
can it offer us the means to resist or challenge such a dichotomy by providing an 
alternative route to explain human evolution? 
 
Now recall, Complementarity is the idea that cultural and technological resources in the 
environment can sculpt our brains so as to give us cognitive abilities we would otherwise 
lack. In the previous chapter we have seen that sustained experiences may affect both 
brain structure and its cognitive functions [Park & Huang (2010)] and that brain 
processes are malleably forged by social practices and cultural tools, in a way that has led 
many researchers to speak of our brain as the encultured brain. If this process of rewiring 
and re-engineering of our internal biological circuitries is realised, via plasticity, by means 
of cultural exposure; couldn’t this process also entail a redefinition or better a 
reconceptualization of the way in which we think of our biological natures? In other 
words, couldn’t our biological natures be thoroughly plastic rather than fixed in stone and 
pre-determined at birth? 
 
If biology can provide us with an understanding of phylogeny that shows how our nature 
can be plastic this would provide further support for the idea of Complementarity that I 
have been defending.  Conversely if work on biology offers us an account of human 
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nature as fixed and biologically pre-determined – a genetic determinist account of 
phylogeny - this would significantly and inexorably undermine complementarity 
approaches and along with them destabilise any view that on Complementarity grounds 
attempts to re-locate human cognitive behaviour outside the boundaries of the skin and 
skull of the organism. In this chapter I explore the tension between gene-centrism and 
alternative accounts of evolution and investigate the rich dialectic underlying this 
fascinating debate.   
In section 1, I quickly introduce the gene-centric view of evolution and argue that this 
doesn’t fit with the idea, endorsed by Complementarity defences of EMT, that inner and 
outer work in symbiotic partnership. In section 2, I present another approach to 
describing evolution that is instead concerned with the idea of niche construction. I 
emphasise the prominence that this paradigm has acquired in contemporary biology, 
explain its crucial tenet (namely the notion of ecological inheritance) and sketch an 
analysis of the differences with gene-centrism. In section 3, I investigate the points of 
contact of the paradigm of niche construction with the cognitive sciences. In particular, I 
focus on the way in which niche construction has been used to argue for and against the 
extended mind thesis. In section 4, I argue that although niche construction provides a 
valid understanding of evolution, it doesn’t yet suffice to capture all the mechanisms that 
drive it and therefore introduce developmental systems theory as a way to account for the 
multiple dimensions that characterise the development of an organism. Evolution, I 
argue, is best understood as a change in the spectrum of developmental resources. This 
wide spectrum of resources doesn’t solely encompass genetic or cultural factors but 
rather embraces equally necessary and reliably replicated epigenetic, bodily, social, 
ecological, epistemic and symbolic resources. [Stotz (2010),p.483]. In section 5, I 
eventually propose to reconceptualise the notion of niche construction within the 
developmental context and suggest combining it with the developmental considerations 
endorsed by proponents of developmental systems theory. In agreement with Stotz, I 
thus propose to speak of ontogenetic niche construction. Ontogenetic niche construction, 
I argue, makes the transmission of biological information more reliable and its focus on 
the individual and on a context of plastic adaptability allows us to better account for the 
learning processes involved in development. I conclude the section and the chapter by 
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showing that ontogenetic niche construction ultimately provides us with the means to 
affirm that culture and biology are not only analogous but both complementary and 
instrumental for organisms to achieve biological fitness in the long run. 
3.2 The Gene-Centred View 
 
The gene-centred view otherwise known as the selfish gene theory attempts to describe 
evolution through the differential survival of competing genes. It essentially asserts that 
those genes whose phenotypic effects effectively promote the reproductive success of 
the organism throughout generations will be favourably selected in detriment to their 
competitors. This idea lies at the core of the following passage:  
 
“Genes are competing directly with their alleles for survival, since their 
alleles in the gene pool are rivals for their slot on the chromosomes of 
future generations. Any gene that behaves in such a way as to increase its 
own survival chances in the gene pool at the expense of its alleles will, by 
definition, tautologously, tend to survive. The gene is the basic unit of 
selfishness.” [Dawkins (1989),p.38]. 
 
Since hereditary information is assumed to be transmitted from generation to generation 
via genetic material, evolution is believed to be best understood from the perspective of 
genes. Proponents of this approach argue that genes are the driving force of evolution, 
which exclusively takes place by change in their frequency. As Dawkins nicely put it: “the 
special status of genetic factors is deserved for one reason only: genetic factors 
replicate themselves, blemishes and all, but non-genetic factors do not”. [Dawkins 
(1982), p. 99].  In a similar vein, evolutionary biologist Maynard Smith (1999) has 
bluntly argued that evolutionary changes are changes in nature not in nurture18. Since 
non-heritable factors do not possess the capacity to replicate themselves and lack the 
potential to produce the kind of variation upon which natural selection is taken to act, 
these non-genetic variants are barred from impacting upon the processes that drive 
natural selection. Neo-Darwinists thus rely on the concept of genetic inheritance to 
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account for trans-generational stability of traits and therefore explain evolution purely in 
terms of the changes that occur on genetic materials. In short, there is a master plan 
within the genes and this master plan drives the evolution of living things. The blueprint 
for the development of each of these living things is thus encoded in the genome and pre-
specified in a set of instructions that become available to the organism through the 
process of genetic transfer from parents to offspring. 
 
The Neo-Darwinian synthesis was a crucial hallmark in the history of contemporary 
biology; this hallmark however came with controversial after effects.  One of these after 
effects, as we have seen above, is gene-centrism and the understanding of evolution as 
the mere unfolding of the organism out of its programmed blueprint [Stotz (2006)]. 
Another is the correlated underestimation of the role of development and extra-genetic 
factors in the processes that drive natural selection. A third is to do with the revival of 
nativism and especially with the link quite often established between gene-centric 
accounts of evolution and domain specific theories in psychology and cognitive science19.  
 
In this chapter, I argue against Neo-Darwinian accounts by calling into question their 
gene-centric view of evolution. I also attempt to disentangle the link between gene-
centrism and nativism aforementioned, by rejecting the very idea of a fixed human nature 
restricted to specific biological constraints. The key to separating nativist claims about 
cognition from gene-centric accounts of evolution is to acknowledge that what 
individuals inherit from their ancestors is not a set of unchangeable developmental 
outcomes, but rather an ability; the ability to develop a mind. As Griffiths and Stotz 
(2000) put it: “it is possible to wholeheartedly endorse the idea that the mind is a 
product of evolution without necessarily accepting the claim that the mind is 
constrained to develop or to reason in certain, limited ways”. [Griffiths and Stotz 
(2000), p.31]. The sequence of arguments I will present will be based on a series of 
topical studies involving niche construction20 and developmental systems theory(DST 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 For similar understandings see also [Burt and Trivers (2006); Hull (2001); Kitcher (2000); Maynard Smith 
and Szathmáry (1999,1995); Haig (1997); Cronin (1991)]. 
19 [Pinker (1994); Keil (1989)] 
20 [Odling-Smee et al. (1996, 2003); Sterelny (2001, 2003, 2010); Wheeler and Clark (2008)] 
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henceforth)21 and shall find corroborative evidence in the overlapping of the two. 
Although significant differences can be found between these two approaches, in this 
chapter I will try to reconcile them together through the idea of an ontogenetic niche. I 
will try to show that appealing to developmental niche construction and to the notion of 
exo-genetic inheritance is not only possible but can also provide the means to support the 
hypothesis of extended cognition. The focus on the life cycle of the organism and on the 
enmeshing between genetic and non-genetic causes of development given by DST shall 
ultimately provide an argument for Complementarity. 
 
3.3 Niche Construction: a Primer 
 
In a series of ground breaking studies evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin has 
highlighted the intricate and multifarious variability of the bond between genotype and 
phenotype [Lewontin (1974, 1991, 2000)]. Along with his fierce critique of genetic 
determinism, Lewontin is also widely renowned for his strong rejection of adaptationism. 
[Levins and Lewontin (1985)]. Adaptationism is the research program in biology that 
“regards natural selection as so powerful and the constraints upon it as so few that 
direct production of adaptation through its operation becomes the primary cause of 
nearly all organic form, function and behaviour”. [Gould and Lewontin (1979), p. 584]. 
Gould and Lewontin (1978) have famously labelled the excesses of adaptationism the 
“Panglossian Paradigm” and have attempted to ridicule it off the stage of proper science 
[Dennett (1995)]. Not everything has been adapted to fit precise purposes, nor all traits 
are atomized features that had been naturally selected; rather “spandrels” play a vital role 
in the process that drives the evolution of living beings. Spandrels, as Gould call them, 
are side-effects of adaptations; by-products of evolution that did not originate by the 
direct action of natural selection but were instead later recruited and co-opted for 
secondary utility [Gould (1997); Pievani & Serrelli (2011)]. Adaptationism for Gould and 
Lewontin, doesn’t take into account the crucial role of these co-opted patterns. As a 
consequence, it seems to overemphasise the role of genes and natural selection while 
                                                             
21 [Gray (1992); Griffiths and Gray (1994, 1997, 2001, 2004); Oyama (1985, 1999, 2001) Jablonka and 
Lamb (2005), Godfrey Smith (2009), Stotz and Allen (2011)]. 
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undermining the function of phyletic and developmental constraints. Lewontin has further 
specified these ideas in a trilogy of papers that went to press in the early ‘80’s. It is to 
these papers that I now quickly turn. 
 
In these pioneering papers (1982, 1983a, 1983b), Lewontin has further characterised his 
rejection of adaptationism and has attacked the 'lock and key' metaphor that has been 
used by adaptationism to describe the process of natural selection. The so-called 'lock 
and key' metaphor sees adaptations as solutions (keys) to the problems posed by the 
environment (locks). [Griffiths and Gray (2001)]. Organisms, on a neo-darwinian 
account, are believed to adapt to their ways of life because they were made to fit those 
specific ways of life. Their genome, it is argued, already contains a set of pre-specified 
instructions and these instructions emerge by fitting into a series of unchangeable 
developmental outcomes. In place of this conventional model that describes adaptation as 
a 'fit', Lewontin has proposed the metaphor of construction. Organisms, he maintains, do 
not just accommodate to their environs but rather select and actively construct them in 
ways that increase their chances of survival. Organisms do not merely obey the genetic 
code they inherit but act and impact upon their milieus [Sterelny (2001)] and therefore 
determine which features in the external world are relevant to their evolution by 
assembling them into a modified environment. Along with genetic inheritance this 
modified environment then triggers evolutionary mechanisms and adaptations that are 
crucial for survival. This idea of co-construction seems to be quite inconsistent with 
gene-centric accounts of development as endorsed by pure adaptationists. 
 
It is inconsistent, because the adaptationist explains evolution as a gradual process in 
which genetic information guides the organism through a series of unchangeable 
developmental outcomes and describes the emergence of salient evolutionary changes 
purely in terms of accumulation of small and random mutations that happen at the genetic 
level. On their account, as we have seen above, the organism is conceived as a static unit 
and is precluded from playing any relevant role in the evolutionary chain. The idea of co-
construction realised by virtue of active environmental engineering profoundly challenges 
this view. To standard adaptationism that envisages only one dimension of (genetic) 
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inheritance, this view contrasts the performative role of the environment in shaping most 
of our evolutionary traits. Lewontin’s metaphor of construction therefore endorses a 
considerably revisited model of the actual process of natural selection. It in fact entails a 
redefinition of the causal relations that evolutionary biology must seek to model. 
[Griffiths and Gray (2001)]. The most detailed and efficacious attempt to develop this 
new metaphor into a well-defined paradigm capable of accounting for biological 
evolution has been undertaken by Odling-Smee and his collaborators. Their work on 
niche construction is contained in a series of pioneering papers that went to press during 
the last decade. [Odling-Smee et al. (1996), see also Laland et al. (2001), to name a few]. 
The current prominence of the term niche-construction in the literature is due to the work 
of this group of researchers. It is to their work that I now turn. 
 
Niche construction, as defined by Laland et al. refers to: “the activities, choices and 
metabolic processes of organisms, through which they define, choose, modify and partly 
create their own niches”. [Laland et al. (2000, pp.132-3)]. More recently, Odling-Smee, 
Odling Smee et al. (2003) have broadened further the range of this definition and argued 
that organisms can transform natural selection pressures by incorporating ontogenetic 
processes and cultural practises into their evolutionary dynamic. This definition endows 
the metaphor of construction proposed by Lewontin with a transformative content and 
therefore further contributes to differentiate this account from neo-Darwinian views 
about evolution. Neo-Darwinists in fact do not believe that cultural practises and 
ontogenetic processes are instrumental in human evolution. Cultural activities, on their 
account, just mirror variations in the milieu in which different populations of humans 
have evolved but do not possess any transformative power on their own. Niche 
construction instead grants cultural activities with a selective power and it is this power 
that humans exploit to alter and actively scaffold their environs. Cultural activities 
therefore “add a second knowledge inheritance system to the evolutionary process 
through which socially learned information is accrued, stored, and transmitted between 
individuals both within and between generations” [Odling-Smee et al. (2003),p.258]. 
Unlike Neo-Darwinian accounts of development, proponents of niche construction thus 
add to the dimension of genes another dimension; the dimension of cultural inheritance. 
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This new dimension of cultural inheritance allows theorists of niche construction to 
account for the phyletic and developmental constraints that adaptationists want to 
neglect. However, for advocates of niche construction, cultural inheritance isn’t on a pair 
with genetic inheritance. There is certainly an analogy between the two, but they are 
separate and the latter quite often takes primacy over the former. Although theorists of 
niche construction call for a more integrated perspective, one in which (unlike 
adaptationism) genes are not the only causes of development; they still understand 
evolution with the gene’s eye and therefore still attribute to genes a special role. 
 
In order to clarify their position, Odling-Smee and colleagues (2003) discuss a series of 
cases illustrating the power of niche construction in heterogeneous taxonomic groups. 
One of these cases, perhaps the most famous, is the spider’s web. The presence of the 
web, they argue, alters the sources of natural selection within the spider’s selective niche 
and allows (for instance) the consequent emergence of new web-based strategies for 
communication and camouflage. [Wheeler and Clark (2008)]. Other prominent case 
studies are those involving the insect pupae cocoons and the caddis fly larvae houses. In 
all these cases animals engineer the selective environments of the constructors. But there 
are other, perhaps most striking cases of niche construction in which the animals not only 
change the selective environments of the constructors but also alter the environments of 
the constructor’s descendants. [Laland et al. (2001)]. Among these cases, the most cited 
is probably that of the earthworms that modify the structure and the chemistry of soils 
through their burrowing behaviour. [Lee (1985)]. As a result of restless digging activity 
of previous generations, successive generations of earthworms are exposed to altered 
environments and these modified environments in turn trigger the emergence of new 
selective pressures in subsequent generations. [Ihara and Feldman (2003)]. Bird’s nests, 
female insect’s oviposition site choices and beaver’s dams are other good examples. All 
these cases in fact, nicely illustrate the so-called phenomenon of ecological inheritance by 





Before discussing some of the dialectic underlying the debate between neo-Darwinists 
and advocates of niche construction with regards to the examples abovementioned, let 
me explain the notion of ecological inheritance. The so-called ecological inheritance is 
one of the crucial tenets underlying the phenomenon of niche construction. Odling-Smee 
(1988) describes ecological inheritance as the legacy of modified selection pressures. 
Ecological inheritance is therefore to do with the inheritance of a modified ecological 
environment or as Laland and colleagues (2000) have put it: “it refers to a modified 
functional relationship that the organism experiences between itself and its environment 
as a consequence of niche constructing activities that involve its genetic or ecological 
ancestors”. [Laland et al. (2000), p.23]. Niche construction thus not only alters selective 
environments but also changes developmental environments. That is, niche construction 
not only generates ecological inheritance but also forges genetic legacy and in doing so it 
causes what Sterelny (2010) has called evolutionary feedback loops. “The key to the 
niche construction approach therefore is the inclusion of organism-induced 
environmental modification bequeathed from the modifying generation to its off-
spring.” [Riede, Semiotic Encyclopaedia Online, 
(http://www.semioticon.com/seo/N/niche.html#)]. 
 
Having specified the idea of ecological inheritance I can now focus on one of the 
examples I mentioned above, namely the case of the beaver’s dam, and see how a neo-
darwinist (such as Dawkins) would interpret such a case. Having presented Dawkins’ 
understanding I will then quickly try to show why his interpretation fails. Dawkins 
(2004), a leading proponent of the gene-centric view and a critic of niche-construction, 
has dismissed the possibility that evolution can impact upon or across whole ecological 
systems. He has famously argued that natural selection can only operate against 
variations of replicators. In particular, in the case of the beaver’s dam Dawkins has 
pointed out that these variations of replicators cannot assume the form of mechanisms of 
selective pressures operating on beaver genes. [Hunter (2009)]. “A beaver that lives by a 
stream quickly exhausts the supply of food trees lying along the stream bank within a 
reasonable distance. By building a dam across the stream the beaver creates a large 
shoreline which is available for safe and easy foraging without the beaver having to 
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make long and difficult journeys overland…..In order to explain such a phenomenon, 
Dawkins however continues, we do not necessarily need to appeal to niche construction 
because “we can understand the dam, and the lake, as part of the (extended) phenotypic 
expression of beaver genes. In sum, it is enough that we accept that beaver dams must 
have evolved by Darwinian natural selection”. [Dawkins (1982), p. 200]. On these 
grounds, Dawkins has therefore claimed that the idea of active scaffolding endorsed by 
proponents of niche construction to account for variation of phenotypic traits is 
problematic at best, deeply flawed at worst. 
 
Now, it seems to me that Dawkins’ understanding of the phenomenon of niche 
construction is somehow limited and a bit too restricted. In particular, it occurs to me 
that Dawkins doesn’t seem to fully appreciate the evolutionary significance of beaver 
dams. These dams are not just the products of the activity of a single organism; rather 
they are the result of consistent efforts of an entire community of beavers. These dams in 
fact last for many years being used by several different generations of beavers and 
therefore seem to possess a generational length that stands above that of beaver genes. 
[Reid, Semiotic Encyclopaedia Online]. By constructing these dams, beavers directly 
engage in downstream niche construction, reshaping the developmental environment of 
the next generation. [Sterelny (2009)]. In particular, when a new generation of beavers 
comes into the world, it comes into a modified world; a world that has been successfully 
forged and manipulated by its previous ancestors. The construction of the dam therefore 
determines the beaver’s survival by providing the means to access new sources of 
nutrition, influencing mating behaviours and increasing the biological fitness of the new-
borns. It therefore seems to me that beavers dams significantly impact upon the existence 
of many generations of beavers. To the extent that the dam impacts upon beavers’ 
existence, it also becomes a resource for triggering genes and alleles selection. This 
ultimately shows that niche construction is not just a by-product of natural evolution but 
rather that it is a driving force behind it, a force that can operate at a longer range by 




This understanding of niche construction as a driving force of evolution is also endorsed 
by Eva Jablonka (2004), who also believes that epigenetic mechanisms can play a crucial 
role in selecting phenotypic traits. She warns: "ecological inheritance may be facilitated 
or dependent on epigenetic inheritance mechanisms. Clearly, co-developing partners 
may induce epigenetic variations in each other. For example, nutrition-based 
developmental programming by the mother during her pregnancy can lead to offspring 
with the same preferences, which aids the construction of the same food-related 
environment". [Jablonka (2004), cited in Hunter (2009), p.214].  In this scenario, the 
environment capable of endowing the individual with the greatest fitness advantage 
becomes quickly instrumental and therefore preferred for the development and 
transmission of the relevant epigenetic changes through successive generations. 
 
Although niche construction is a pervasive phenomenon of great evolutionary relevance, 
its importance has been neglected for a long time. Only very recently (in the last decade 
or so) it has acquired a prominent status in biology and has become the centre of a vast 
interdisciplinary debate. Among the disciplines that have benefited of this debate, there 
are the cognitive sciences. In the cognitive sciences the idea of enhancing cognition 
through manipulations and external couplings with environmental resources has been 
received and widely acknowledged. [Clark (2008); Menary (2007)]. The notion of niche 
construction and the idea of ecological inheritance (also known by philosophers as 
“cumulative downstream epistemic engineering”) have become crucial in the debate 
dedicated to the hypothesis of extended cognition [Sterelny (2003, 2010); Wilson (2004); 
Stotz (2010), Wheeler (2007) to name a few]. Additionally, the discussion of niche 
construction into the realm of cognitive ecological niches has profoundly impacted on the 
dispute between embodied cognition and evolutionary psychology. [Wheeler and Clark 
(2008)]. It is to such a dispute that I now quickly turn. 
3.4 Niche Construction and the Extended Mind Thesis 
 
Wheeler and Clark (2008), two of the most important advocates of niche construction in 
the cognitive sciences, have highlighted the tension between an understanding of 
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evolution and cognition as embodied and a view that describes them as encoded. From 
the former, they say, we get a model of cognitive development that stresses the 
kaleidoscopic effects of thought and action. From the latter, we obtain a view that instead 
emphasises the selective fit of the biological into the external. This view, they continue, 
largely coincides with evolutionary psychology. [Pinker (1994); Cosmides and Tooby 
(2000)]. Whereas embodied cognition theorists believe that the brain is forged and 
sculpted by the dynamic interplay between body and world at different time-scales; 
proponents of evolutionary psychology tend to privilege an “intracranialist” 
understanding of cognition that assumes the existence of enduring structures in the brain, 
moulded by natural selection and encoded in fixed genetic architectures. In their Triple 
Helix paper, Wheeler and Clark side with proponents of embodied cognition and criticise 
much of the work related with evolutionary psychology [Pinker (2002); Cosmides & 
Tooby (2000)]. In particular they focus on the idea of modularity.  
Modularity describes the mind as composed of independent, separated and domain 
specific modules and suggests that any treatment of the brain must necessarily draw its 
attention on these domain-specific modules because they have established evolutionarily 
developed functional purposes. By focusing on work conducted on ‘modularization’ 
[such as Kamiloff-Smith (1992)] - that is by taking a neuroconstructivist perspective 
[Mareshal et al (2007)], Wheeler and Clark attempt to reject this strong modularity thesis 
and rather argue for what they call “emergent modularity”; a model capable of accounting 
both for brain neural specialisation and functional isolation without the involvement of 
excessive pre-determination or design. Unlike many evolutionary psychologists Wheeler 
and Clark therefore acknowledge the potential role of the environment, or of 
environmentally driven mechanisms, in triggering or alternatively disabling the emergence 
of specific functional modules. Wheeler and Clark thus endorse the idea that innate 
developmental programs may intermingle with flexible environmental resources to 
produce the rich cultural, cognitive, and behavioural variation observed in mankind. 
In the previous paragraph I said that Wheeler and Clark reject a certain understanding of 
modularity, one favoured by some prominent evolutionary psychologists. Modularity is a 
view that describes human nature as constrained to develop in accordance with a range of 
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cognitive modules. These modules may “mature” during development but are pre-
determined and pre-destined to give rise to specific functions. Now, modularity in 
biology says that the information necessary for the emergence of these functions is fixed 
and already contained in a sequence of genetic codes prior to birth. Modularity is 
therefore a claim that envisages discrete genetic specification and strong hierarchical 
organization among different modules. [Raff (1996)]. These modules govern evolution 
and direct development in accordance with a set of genetic, pre-specified instructions that 
are contained within them and that emerge through the contact with the environment. 
The neuroconstructivist perspective endorsed by Wheeler and Clark stands in opposition 
to this view. Wheeler and Clark don’t envisage the existence of pre-specified modules 
and rather treat genes as one constraint on the developmental process. As a consequence, 
they  tend to favour attempts to individuate emergent and horizontally extended modules, 
whose nature lies in the continual openness to radical cognitive change. [Wheeler and 
Clark (2008)]. The rejection of modularity by Wheeler and Clark does not however entail 
a rejection of the “special” role played by the genes in evolution. Wheeler and Clark 
(2008) do not deny the importance of genes. The target of their critique is rather a 
narrow view of development, which they label as “strong instructionism”. [Wheeler and 
Clark (1999); Wheeler (2003, 2006, 2010)].   
 
Strong instructionism “is the claim that what it means for some element to code for an 
outcome is for that element to fully specify the distinctive features of that outcome, 
where ‘full specification’ requires that the kind of exhaustive predictive power just 
indicated may, in principle, be achieved on the basis purely of what may be known about 
the putatively representational factor”. [Wheeler (2007), p.377]. In the context of 
natural selection, strong instructionism therefore indicates the view that asserts that the 
genotype is the blueprint for the organism, the holy grail of biology, the recipe for 
development. [Condit et al. (2002); van der Weele (2005); Dupre (2005)]. Strong 
instructionism is compatible with those views of evolution that deny the role of 
developmental and phyletic constraints and rather affirms that phenotypic traits are 
entirely encoded in genes. Thus, strong instructionism largely coincides with Neo-
Darwinian accounts of evolution as it seems to impose the so-called full-specification 
81 
 
condition. The idea is that coding for traits means just specifying the form of those traits. 
According to strong instructionism, the distinctive feature of phenotypical traits can be 
always predicted on the basis of internal coding factors that on their own orchestrate the 
journey from genotype to phenotype. The problem with this view, Wheeler and Clark 
argue, is that it lacks what they call the developmental explanatory spread. There is a 
complex network of interactions that determines the phenotypic form that a trait can 
assume and this network of interactions, they argue, cannot be explained by simply 
appealing to a sequence, a pre-formed string of DNA. Strong Instructionism therefore 
naively confuses essential participation with unique responsibility22. [Maturana and 
Varela (1987)]. 
 
Wheeler and Clark’s denial of those views (abovementioned) that see the human brain as 
a sort of Swiss Army Knife made up of pre-determined, genetically specified cognitive 
tools does not however entail their automatic endorsement to alternative accounts of 
evolution that promise to reduce the “power of genes” and consider traits to be simply 
dynamic or developmental tout court23. Wheeler and Clark in fact try to combine the 
neuroconstructivist idea of emergent modularity abovementioned with the notion of 
ecological inheritance derived from niche construction and attempt to show how this 
combination can be used to argue, from an evolutionary perspective, for cognitive niches. 
Having demonstrated the primacy of the neuroconstructivist perspective, their next step 
is to show the extent to which niche construction can impact upon embodied cognition.  
 
Wheeler and Clark argue that scholars wishing to pursue research on the field of 
embodied cognition can find strong allies among the theorists of niche construction24: in 
particular, they continue, among those who extend niche construction into the realm of 
cognitive ecological niches. The cumulative ecological niche, on their account, is in fact 
both a cause of developmental inputs for the growing modules in the brain and a medium, 
                                                             
22 Although strong instructionism might sound like an odd position, a straw position that no serious researcher 
would be committed to defend, it is however still quite common to hear, as Dupre has noticed, eminent 
experts talking of  the genome as the factor uniquely responsible for the development of the organism.[Dupre 
(2005); Wheeler & Clark (2008)].  
23 I will analyse DST and its ramifications in the next section. 
24 For a list of relevant studies please refer to section 2. 
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or better a vector of cultural transmission25. The link between the neuroconstructivist 
perspective they chose to adopt at the brain level and the idea of niche construction they 
decide to embrace at the evolutionary one is established by phenotypic plasticity and 
ecological inheritance. Here is what they say:  
 
“Rampant niche construction yields a rapid succession of selective 
environments, and hence favours the (biological) evolution of phenotypic 
plasticity. Hominid minds, Sterelny suggests, are adapted to the spread of 
variation itself. To cope with such variability, we are said to have evolved 
powerful forms of developmental plasticity. These allow early learning to 
induce persisting and stable forms of neural reorganization, impacting our 
range of automatic skills, affective responses and generally reorganizing 
human cognition in deep and profound ways”. [Wheeler and Clark (2008), 
pp.3565]. The upshot is that ‘the same initial set of developmental 
resources can differentiate into quite different final cognitive products’. 
[Sterelny (2003), p. 166]. 
 
In short, Wheeler and Clark emphasise the cumulative and transformative power of self-
engineered operations conducted upon environments via developmental plasticity. These 
operations quite often assume the form of new feedback cycle loops. These new feedback 
cycle loops include cultural transmission of knowledge. Cultural transmission of 
knowledge actively contributes to alter both the selective landscape for biological 
evolution and the individual lifetime learning. Following Sterelny (2003), Wheeler and 
Clark call this capacity of impacting upon evolution, cumulative downstream epistemic 
engineering. Cumulative downstream epistemic engineering, they continue, works 
alongside with genetic inheritance and contributes to reorganise human cognition in deep 
and profound ways. It is through this downstream effect that organisms scaffold their 
physical structures in ways that can change their fitness. These altered physical structures 
are then combined with reliably replicated cultural practises in order to realise problem-
solving regimes that favour the emergence of flexible thought and reasoning. This 
maximally highlights the power of what Wheeler and Clark call cognitive niche 
construction. In particular, it does so by shifting the focus of our attention from mere 
genetic specification to scaffolded matrices of co-determining factors. But what does this 
tell us about the notion of human nature?   
                                                             
25 Thanks to Greg Downey for the discussion of this point on his blog. 
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Cognitive niche construction seems to show us that what is truly special about our nature 
is its distinctive ability (acquired through an extended developmental period) to openly 
enter into profound and ultimately modules-changing relationships with a jumbled 
mixture of culturally inherited practices and non-organic constructs. These practises and 
constructs are the preferable vehicles of an ecological inheritance that not only 
complements our intellectual skills but also intimately forges the next generation’s (and 
our own) cognitive development.  [Clark (2008)]. The Wheeler and Clark perspective 
therefore entails a redefinition of the notion of human nature because it emphasises the 
adaptability of our plastic minds to external structures. In order to clarify this point, I 
invite the reader to consider the following example26. The methods and skills I absorb 
during the course of my life to solve some calculations not only impact on my own brain. 
These techniques are passed and converted into the lessons that I will visit upon my 
children’s brains when they will be in critical formative stages of development. These 
techniques for expanding mental abilities assume the form of a cultural inheritance that is 
transmitted to my children and thus becomes my kid’s environmental niche for honing 
intellectual skills. We could consider many other examples of this kind. Among the many, 
one could also include mind-shaping cultural artefacts (such as language or art), 
technological enhancements or tool usage. Under certain circumstances, a tool can in fact 
be used to reduce the computational load of the brain and in doing so it may become 
active part of our cognitive ecological niche. Unlike internalists in modularity, embodied 
theorists therefore remain fully open to the possibility of “artefact-based expansion and 
snowballing / bootstrapping process of computational and representational growth”. 
[Wheeler and Clark (2008) p. 3572]. In other words, “under certain conditions non-
organic props and aids, many of which are either culturally inherited tools or structures 
manipulated by culturally transmitted  practices, might themselves count as proper parts 
of extended cognitive processes”. [Wheeler and Clark (2008), p.3566].  
The notion of cumulative downstream epistemic engineering has, however, also been 
used to criticise EMT. In particular in a series of recent papers, Sterelny (2003, 2010) has 
used this notion to mount a sustained attack on  EMT. I want to conclude this section by 
quickly glancing at his work on scaffolding. 
                                                             




Sterelny (2010) has recently defended, in analogy with Wheeler and Clark, a model of 
cognition that places a great emphasis on the role of the milieu in supporting, expanding 
and amplifying our cognitive abilities. He has called such a model “the scaffolded mind”. 
Focusing on the nature of the functional relationship between a cognitive agent and an 
external resource and building on the idea of niche construction and on its relevance for 
social learning, Sterelny has elaborated a multidimensional framework for thinking about 
this scaffolded cognition. [Theiner (forthcoming)]. More precisely, he has individuated 
three dimensions in which, he has claimed, human cognition can be scaffolded. These 
three dimensions are: 1) Trust and Reliability; 2) Interchangeability and Entrenchment; 3) 
the Individual and the Collective. 
 
The first dimension, trust and reliability, is based on the availability, reliability and access 
of specific resources in a given environment. The second dimension, interchangeability 
and entrenchment, concerns the degree to which an external resource can become 
personalized to fit an agent‘s skills or needs. The third dimension, the individual and the 
collective, instead investigates the power of cognition-enhancing mechanisms (such as 
language, mathematical notations or cultural and technological innovations) over many 
generations and in cooperative situations. On the grounds of this distinction, Sterelny 
goes on to claim that the framework provided by EMT seems acceptable with extremely 
entrenched or personalised cognitive artefacts, (artefacts that belong to the second 
dimension such as the chef’s set of knives and the cricket batter’s individualised bat) 
[Sterelny (2010)], but “points out that the sciences of mind also need to study more 
transportable or interchangeable resources, and the stable capacities which mobile 
agents bring to each interaction”. [Sutton (2010), p.536]. 
 
In particular, Sterelny chooses to focus on the third dimension. The third dimension 
involves the acquisition of collective cognitive resources. This acquisition, Sterelny 
claims “follows a distinctive intergenerational pattern that is markedly different from the 
individualistic stock examples of the extended mind literature”. [Theiner (forthcoming), 




§2.2]. In cases of collective cognitive resources in fact, the inheritance is passed though 
cultural rather than through genetic means. As a consequence, the transmission of these 
patterns of inheritance does not run vertically from parents to offspring, but obliquely 
draws on the different activities of the many members of previous generations. These 
collective activities of social groups, he maintains, mature through unique trans-
generational trails and are normally mastered by skilled experts in their use by way of 
continuous and unrelenting coaching. [Sutton et al. (2010)]. In developing considerations 
on trans-generational effects in cognitive niche construction, Sterelny therefore classifies 
“these cumulative built, collectively provided tools for thinking” as the most “critical, 
mind-and-brain-shaping environmental supports for cognition”. [Sterelny (2010), 
p.537]. Scaffolding for Sterelny is thus supposed to score highly on multiple dimensions. 
So, while the extended mind picture27 is not false, extended mind cases can be interpreted 
as limiting cases of environmental scaffolding.   
 
A canny reader might have noticed the points of contact between Sterelny’s idea of 
scaffolding cognition on multiple dimensions and the idea of complementarity that I have 
presented in the previous chapter of this dissertation. Placing different empirical cases 
within a multidimensional context is precisely what Complementarity is after. Rather than 
being an argument against EMT, the idea of cognition as scoring on multiple dimensions 
therefore results as a precious ally for its Complementarity defences28. This empirical 
project is, I believe, far more fruitful than continuing to debate on whether cognition is 
really extended or merely embedded. As Sutton has noticed, we should guide our 
“scientific focus on the identification and exploration of this multidimensional space of 
agent–environment interactions which amplify or transform cognitive capacities and 
practices, rather than any metaphysical claim about whether mind in general does or 
does not extend into the world”. [Sutton (2010),p.537]. 
 
In this section we have seen that the idea of niche construction and the notion of 
ecological inheritance can be used to argue for EMT or to undermine its relevance within 
                                                             
27 At least the parity-based version endorsed by Clark and Wheeler. 
28 For more details, please refer to the discussion of Sutton’s Complementarity in the Complementarity section 
of chapter 2. 
86 
 
a context in which scaffolding takes precedence. But are we sure that we can’t find any 
form of support for EMT elsewhere? That is, are we really sure that the framework 
provided by niche construction is the only one within which we can defend EMT? I 
believe that a more powerful and potent defence of EMT can be mounted on the basis of 
developmental considerations. It is to such considerations that I now want to turn. 
3.5 Is it a Revolution? Developmental Systems Theory (DST) 
 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, mainstream biology quite often describes 
evolution in terms of changes in gene frequency. Neo-Darwinian accounts envisage the 
existence of a profound dichotomy between nature and nurture characteristics of 
development and take genes to program and code for phenotypical traits. DST is a 
radical challenge to dichotomous accounts as such. Proponents of developmental systems 
theory endorse a view that renounces the ontological priority of any particular entity (the 
genes in the case of neo-darwinian accounts of development) and favour an 
understanding of evolution in which developmental information is not isolated in small 
sequences of DNA but can be equally well applied to other factors required for 
development [Gray (1992); Griffiths & Gray (1994), (2001)]. Unlike gene-centric view 
of development, DST describes evolution as a process of co-variation in which 
evolutionary changes emerge from interactive and interdependent developmental relations 
between external resources, organisms and their environments. 
 
As Oyama, Griffiths and Gray have put it: DST is “a way of thinking about development 
that does not rely on a distinction between privileged, essential causes and merely 
supporting or interfering causes”. [Oyama, Griffiths and Gray (2001), p.1]29. Oyama 
(1985, 1999) has extensively endorsed this thesis while arguing that one cannot 
distinguish between nature-based and nurture-based characteristics in development 
because both nature and nurture carry information necessary for the development of the 
resulting characteristics. This principle has come to be known as the Parity Thesis. The 
Parity Thesis has been also embraced by other developmental systems theorists (such as 
                                                             
 
29 For a critical assessment of DST see also Godfrey-Smith (2009). 
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Griffiths and Gray) who have claimed that “the role of the genes is no more unique than 
the role of many other factors”. [Griffith ‘s and Gray (1994), p.277]. The Parity Thesis is 
one of the central tenets of DST.   
 
DST defends a view of evolution in which the nature/nurture dichotomy collapses, a 
perspective that embraces a wider conception of the developmental system, an account in 
which differences in traits and also differences in fitness are quite often triggered by the 
kinds of environments one inherits. Development, as Shaffner noticed, is “an 
extraordinarily complicated orchestra – but one with no conductor” [Schaffner (1998), 
p. 247]. DST therefore describes the developmental system as emerging from the delicate 
interplay between the genes and the rich matrices of resources available outside the 
genome [Griffiths and Gray (2004); (2005)] and therefore calls into question the idea  of 
a fixed pre-specified genetic program that endogenously drives our evolution. 
 
Many geneticists have rejected DST on the grounds that it seems an unviable theory. 
Developmental Systems Theory, they say, gets us close to an unworkable holism, where 
is it impossible to draw a line and successfully distinguish between genetic and extra-
genetic contributions. Sure, they continue, the whole universe is reflected in the complex 
relations that characterise the organism-environment relation, but science can’t be 
undertaken on such vague premises.  Science, they maintain, is based on reductionism 
and it is all about problem solving and simplification. Science should carve off relevant 
information from a few sets of elements and then should measure and test such 
information in a controlled context. Since developmental systems theorists seem to give 
up on such a context, many geneticists have interpreted DST as a mere theoretical 
exercise, a fascinating speculation which however cannot be operationalized or rendered 
scientific. DST, they have claimed, is just philosophy, and from it we cannot extract 
testable hypotheses. [This objection is discussed in Protevi, (2008)]. 
 
In order to avoid such criticism, developmental systems theorists have designed a specific 
criterion to discriminate between factors that are and factors that are not part of the 
matrix of resources that characterises the developmental system. Key is the reliable and 
consistent cross-generational availability of each resource: in short, extended inheritance. 
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[Stotz (2010)]. The notion of extended inheritance is a consequence of the Parity Thesis 
and is to do with the idea that what an organism inherits is a wide spectrum of 
developmental resources that mutually interact to construct its life cycle. This spectrum 
of resources includes necessary genetic features but also encompasses equally necessary 
and reliably replicated extra-genetic factors. These include bodily, social, behavioural, 
ecological, symbolic and epistemic ones. [Stotz (2010)]. The idea behind the notion of 
extended inheritance is therefore that genetic factors are not only causally dependent on 
extra-genetic resources for their development but rather that the latter complement the 
former and trigger new mechanisms of evolutionary significance. In other words, 
environmental resources such as “diet, temperature, oxygen levels, humidity, light cycles, 
and the presence of mutagens can all impact upon the way in which an animal’s genes 
are expressed, ultimately affecting the animal’s phenotype. [Ralston & Shaw 
(2008),§ 2]. A couple of examples might help us better understand this claim. 
 
Consider the case of eucalyptus seeds. In order to germinate, many types of eucalyptus 
seeds need to be scorched by bushfires. Eucalypts increase the frequency of bushfires by 
creating woodlands “scattered with resinous litter and hung with bark ribbons, which 
are carried aloft by the updraft as blazing torches and spread the fire to new areas”. 
[Mount (1964); Griffiths & Gray (2004), p.410]. Another interesting example that nicely 
reveals the importance of the environment in determining an organism’s characteristics 
concerns the way in which sex is determined in crocodiles30. The sex of the baby 
crocodile is fully determined at the time of hatching and naturally irreversible thereafter 
by the temperature in which the eggs are incubated. Temperatures equal to or below 
30°C generates females. Temperatures equal to or above 34 °C generate males. 
[Ferguson & Joanen (1982)]. 
 
Having introduced DST and the idea of extended inheritance as a way to counter genetic 
determinism, I can now present the pars construens of DST. DST in fact is also 
characterised by a positive proposal. The positive proposal is the idea that the 
fundamental unit of evolution is the life cycle. The developmental process or life cycle of 
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an organism is the structured set of reliably replicated cross-generational developmental 
resources that are assembled together and intermingle in such a way that the life cycle is 
reconstructed in each generation and reflected in descendant cycles. The developmental 
process is thus understood as a complex sequence of developmental events which form 
and select a unit of repetition in a lineage. [Griffith and Gray (2001), p.296]. For 
proponents of DST the life cycle of an organism is always developmentally scaffolded 
and never endogenously pre-determined or genetically preformed. The life cycle is thus 
the unit of natural selection and the main force that drives evolution. By understanding 
the individual as a complex matrix of developmental resources – that is by appealing to 
the life cycle of an organism, DST attempts to liberate biology from the grip of 
dichotomous accounts of development abovementioned.  “Traits need not be either 
genetic or environmental, either evolved or socially constructed”. [Griffiths and Gray 
(1994), p.304]. Evolution is rather understood as the result of interactive and 
interdependent processes of amalgamation and co-construction of different, reliably 
replicated but complementary factors; the sort of environmental resources to which I 
have appealed above. 
 
In DST the emphasis is therefore put on the developmental sequence of events that leads 
to the selection and formation of the atomic unit of repetition in a lineage. Despite this 
extreme commitment to developmental factors and to organism-environments 
interactions, DST doesn’t refuse to acknowledge the transformative power of genetic 
mechanisms in the processes that drive evolution. Proponents of DST just resist the gene-
selectionist drift of that idea. Not by chance, Griffths and Gray have embraced 
Lewontin’s criticism of genetic determinism. In their papers, they refer to Lewontin as 
one of the intellectual precursors of DST and quote him in asserting that "if anything in 
the world can be said to be self-replicating, it is not the gene, but the entire organism as 
a complex system" [Lewontin (1991), p.48]. 
 
In the previous sections, we have seen that Lewontin’s criticism of gene-centric accounts 
of natural selection is also shared by proponents of niche construction. To be precise, the 




critique of the selfish gene theory was the starting point of the considerations that led to 
the paradigm of niche construction. The reader might have also noticed a coarse analogy 
between the notion of ecological inheritance as proposed by Odling-Smee and colleagues 
and the idea of extended inheritance as endorsed by developmental theorists. At this 
point, a canny reader might legitimately raise a question. If these two paradigms have so 
much in common, what are the real differences between them? That is, to what extent 
does a developmental account of evolution diverge from a constructivist one? This is 
certainly a good question, one that deserves full exploration. Although niche construction 
seems to converge toward a developmental conception of evolution, constructivist claims 
are much more conservative than developmental ones. Let us look at this issue more 
closely.  
 
The major difference between niche construction and DST is to do with the fact that 
niche construction still presents a dichotomous account of development. For those who 
endorse such a view there are two different systems of heredity – one that embraces 
genetic inheritance and the other that encompasses ecological inheritance. Although 
genes are not the only cause of development, proponents of niche construction tend to 
attribute to genes a special role in driving evolutionary changes. Developmental theorists 
instead simply deny that genes play any special role in natural selection and equate their 
contributions to that of the other developmental factors.   
A second difference between the two accounts emerges if we look at the role of cross-
generational influence. Whereas proponents of niche construction limit the role of trans-
generational effects to biology and culture, developmental theorists broaden it so as to 
encompass the contribution of bodily, social, symbolic and behaviour factors.[Laland et 
al. (2000)]. This is particularly evident in Odling-Smee (1994) for instance. Odling-Smee 
treats genetic inheritance as the flow of information and extra-genetic factors as the 
provision for such a flow. [Sterelny (2001)]. Developmental theorists reject the very 
notion of information and rather equate biological and extra-genetic contributions in the 
production of the final construct.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 Analogous considerations apply to some species of turtles and also to many other types of reptiles. 
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Additionally, for niche construction theorists there are also two different causal processes 
in development. One triggered by the niche that drives natural selection, the other 
established by the organism which influences the construction of the niche. DST rejects 
both these distinctions and rather emphasises the integrative power of developmental 
resources as given by the entire matrix of interactants involved in a life cycle.  So yes, 
there appear to be substantial differences between these two paradigms, but are these 
differences sufficient to prevent reconciliation? In other words, should we think of niche 
construction and DST as competing (perhaps alternative) projects or can we rather 
reconceptualise them into a more general and powerful context? 
 
Earlier on in this chapter I have shown how niche construction can be used to support 
non-standard approaches to cognitive science (such as the extended mind thesis). I have 
focused my attention on the notion of cumulative epistemic engineering in relation to the 
extended mind thesis and have shown how this notion can be used to argue both for and 
against it. [Wheeler and Clark (2008); Sterelny (2003, 2010)]  In this last section I have 
introduced DST, have analysed its crucial tenets and pointed out the critical differences 
between DST and niche construction. I will now try to reconcile DST with its more 
conservative cousin and will therefore implement the developmental considerations 
endorsed in this section (in particular the notion of extended inheritance) within the 
framework provided by niche construction. In line with West and King (1987) and Stotz 
[2010], I therefore propose to speak of ontogenetic or developmental niche construction. 
The idea is to reconceptualise niche construction into a developmental context, one 
where adaptive plasticity and learning play a crucial role. To do so, I will have to 
resituate the notion of ecological inheritance from an evolutionary framework to a fully 
developmental one. Expanding the notion of ecological inheritance would constitute a 
beneficial move, inasmuch as it will allow us to acknowledge the transformative role that 
plasticity and learning play in evolution. These considerations on ontogenetic niche 
applied to the cognitive sciences and especially to the extended mind thesis should 
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eventually provide an argument for complementarity and for the enmeshing of organisms 
and their cognitive developmental niches31. 
 
3.6 Developmental Niche Construction and Complementarity 
 
The ecological process that actively guides and scaffolds the evolution of many species 
by means of reliable and extended trans-generational effects has first been described by 
West and King in a ground-breaking paper from 1987 [West and King (1987]. This paper 
was issued a year before the release of the first publication on niche construction [Odling-
Smee (1988)]. While niche construction has since then acquired a prominent status both 
in biology and in the cognitive sciences, the idea of the ontogenetic or developmental 
niche has gradually fallen into oblivion. In a series of recent papers, Karola Stotz (2006, 
2008, 2010) has proposed a revival of this theory. In bringing the ontogenetic niche back 
to the fore she has meritoriously caught the attention of the philosophical community and 
has offered a new framework to reconceptualise it. It is to her work that I now turn. 
According to Stotz, ontogenetic niche construction provides a very powerful framework 
to understand evolution: it in fact successfully combines the idea of active organisms 
scaffolding their environs (idea that derives from niche construction) with the 
developmental claims about extended inheritance. To this explosive combination the 
developmental niche also adds a special focus on learning and plasticity. The result is 
quite striking as the theory prescribes that any scientific understanding of the nature of 
living things must depend on an understanding of the developmental process that drives 
it. Stotz defines the ontogenetic niche “as the set of ecological, social, epigenetic, 
epistemic, cultural and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms, functioning to guide 
the expression of the genetic potential”. [Stotz (2010),p.483] The ontogenetic niche thus 
consistently relies on the notion of exo-genetic inheritance. Exo-genetic inheritance not 
only involves the heterogeneous contribution of extra-genetic resources, as extended 
                                                             
 
31 It is worth noting here that Cognitive niche construction can be argued to come real close to Ontogenetic 




inheritance in DST, but also encompasses social learning and parental care for the 
offspring. Unlike genetic inheritance, exo-genetic inheritance thus provides a much more 
reliable and flexible way for transmitting evolutionarily relevant features from parents to 
offspring. It does so because it puts the individual into a context of adaptive plasticity in 
which learning processes are involved in the development. In such a context, exo-genetic 
legacies are not only inherited but also learned via behavioural and developmental 
plasticity. The ontogenetic niche thus enables the offspring to undergo necessary 
experiences of future relevance and therefore functions as an informational hub that 
decides which experiences are developmentally bioavailable and which are not. 
Exo-genetic inheritance has however another important role. It also allows parents to 
control the offspring’s gene expression. This function is particularly evident in after birth 
rearing practises that occur in many species of animals. The licking of puppies by rat 
mothers not only modifies the protein components of chromatin in the nucleus of the 
puppies’ cell but it also triggers new mechanisms of imprinting, which in turn influence 
the gene expression of their puppies in the long run. Analogous observations can be made 
for humans. Recent studies have revealed that parental care and environmental cues have 
profound influences on the trajectory of prenatal development. The fetal programming 
hypothesis formulated by Baker (2001) and subsequently developed by Nathanielsz and 
Thornburg (2003) is a perfect example of this profound influence. Studies on this topic 
reveal that environmental exposure during critical periods in early development may 
impact upon the fetus’ development. For instance, the exposure to specific hormonal 
factors in the intrauterine environment triggers a series of vascular and endocrine 
adaptations in the fetus that determines its weight at birth. This nicely shows that 
epigenetic mechanisms are induced by environmental cues mediated by the placenta 
[Gluckman et al. (2007)] and that these factors have important repercussion on the 
trajectory of prenatal development. [Stotz (2010); O’Malley and Stotz (2011)]. 
While genetic inheritance is characterised by a sequence of fixed and static features, exo-
genetic inheritance remains in continuous interaction with the genome by means of 
epigenetic mechanisms that regulate gene potential. [Stotz (2008)]. Exo-genetic 
inheritance thus provides more powerful pathways to transmit the effects of experience 
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from parents to their descendants. [Lamm and Jablonka (2008)]. Via exo-genetic 
inheritance, the ontogenetic niche instantiates successful links among different 
generations. It not only reveals a general interdependence between different generations, 
but rather highlights “their proximate dependence via mechanisms that promote orderly 
transitions in species-typical development for both adult and young” [West et al. 
(1988),p. 47)]. Exo-genetic inheritance thus gives rise to “cross-generational phenotypic 
plasticity”, [Maestripieri and Mateo (2009)] in as much as it induces epigenetic variations 
in phenotypes through development and changes in their environment. [(Stotz (2010)]. 
The ontogenetic niche therefore seems to provide a more powerful framework within 
which is possible to comprehend the mechanisms that drive evolution. The ontogenetic 
niche is not only a selective self-engineered niche, as the selective niche in niche 
construction, but rather configures itself as a problem-solving mechanism that actively 
constructs individual development and learning processes. 
In the footnote at the end of the last section I mentioned that cognitive niche construction 
can be argued to come very close to the idea of ontogenetic niche construction32. Having 
introduced ontogenetic niche construction I am now in the position to compare these two 
approaches and quickly investigate the dialectic between them33. Wheeler and Clark’s 
cognitive niche construction is done, as we have seen above, in analogy with the niche 
construction paradigm developed by Laland, Odling Smee and Feldman and also taken on 
by Sterelny and DST, where the cognitive niche is understood as the selective niche. 
Within this framework the evolutionary significance of the cognitive niche contributes to 
create selection pressures partially constructed by the organism itself. The ontogenetic 
niche theory proposed by West & King and Stotz possesses instead a different 
evolutionary significance, which is achieved not merely through the adoption of specific 
selection pressures but via active deployment of developmental resources that are capable 
of generating evolutionary novelty.   
Unlike cognitive niche construction, ontogenetic niche construction therefore fully 
recognises the fact that we generate an environment, the ontogenetic niche, which 
                                                             
32 Thanks to Andy Clark for pressing this worry in the workshop “Extended Cognition and Distributed 
Cognition” held at the University of Edinburgh in July 2011. 
33 Thanks also to Karola Stotz for having drawn my attention on this point.  
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provides us with the necessary resources to develop in new ways, and these new ways 
provide the necessary material for further evolution as real morphological, cognitive and 
behavioural novelties. These novelties are inherited through the legacy of these niches 
which recreate, in successive generations, the conditions necessary to re-develop in the 
same way. A case in point is bird song learning: birds very reliably inherit a song via its 
developmental exposure to its father’s singing. Another helpful example is the case of the 
mother’s egg. We reliably get from the mother not only genes but a whole egg ready with 
all the machinery to express genes, including lots of gene products from the mother such 
as transcription factors without which the inherited genome would forever be dormant. 
The exact kinds of gene products the mother gives to her offspring depend on the 
environment encountered by the mother with which she is able to change the future 
developmental trajectory in expectation of a future environment. Most mothers then go 
on providing child care which can, among other things, up- or down-regulate the 
expression of certain genes not just at that particular time but on the long run, which 
again influences the trajectory of the phenotype.  
None of these things seem to be explicitly acknowledged in the writing of Wheeler and 
Clark when they talk about the evolutionary significance of niche construction. Niche 
construction does not therefore simply matter both to development (through ontogenetic 
niche construction) and evolution (through selective niche construction) independently. It 
matters to evolution by influencing development. Although Wheeler and Clark could 
claim to have come very close to the idea of ontogenetic niche construction, I reckon this 
is a possibility; it seems to me that in the end they both try too hard to stick to the 
paradigm of selection niche construction.   
Formulated as the theory that determines evolution by influencing development, the 
theory of ontogenetic niche becomes highly relevant also for the cognitive sciences. The 
ontogenetic niche theory in fact offers a profitable alternative to the persistent yet 
unsatisfactory debate about nature and nurture and therefore contributes to a 
transcending of both nativist and empiricist views about ontogeny. As such, the 
ontogenetic niche theory also provides very useful insights to understand the nature of 
cognition in human beings. The ontogenetic niche theory tells us in fact that there isn’t a 
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real dichotomy between genetic, biological and cultural inheritance and invites us to 
reconceptualise their relationship into a developmental context. Culture and biology don’t 
travel either on separate nor on parallel trails but mutually interlock to favour new 
mechanisms of adaptations which in turn trigger new cognitive strategies. The theory of 
ontogenetic niche thus nicely shows us that inner and outer become entangled and 
enmeshed to produce an extended process that characterises human cognitive 
development and evolution. 
For the theory of ontogenetic niche culture and biology therefore represent two types of 
interactants; only two types among the many available in the matrix of developmental 
resources. These interactants (which also include epigenetic, behavioural, symbolic, 
parental and ecological factors) become developmental causes only by interacting with 
each other. This interaction allows their reliable transmission over generations and at the 
same time explains how the life cycle of the organism is reconstructed. To say that these 
interactants form an entangled unit isn’t however to say that there aren’t differences 
among them – quite the opposite. There are differences, in terms of variability and 
reliability for instance, but the appealing to the whole matrix of reliably replicated 
developmental factors allows us to see how these dissimilar interactants co-operate in 
producing the conditions for development. Genetic and exo-genetic contributions are not 
only analogous, much less antagonistic. Over cultural-evolutionary time, the properties of 
biological and non-biological rather intermingle and change each other to give rise to a 
more dynamical account of the relationships that span the brain, body and world 
boundary. An account where there aren’t hard constraints on development but only soft 
constraints. It is therefore only by being genuinely active elements and truly multipart 
nodes in the assembly process that these external vehicles become incorporated into the 
extended system that regulates them. This system rejects the solidification produced by 
nativists around fixed properties or hard constraints of the human mind and rather reveals 
to us a strong commitment to organism-environment interactions with which the milieu 




The existence of these soft constraints highlights the plastic nature of our brains and 
suggests that processes of reorganization take place in the cerebral architecture due to 
reconversion of specific structural properties by material-culture and non-biological 
elements. This multi-layered process of manipulation opens up the space for cultural 
transformation and for mind-enhancement through technology. The formation of these 
soft-constraints in fact makes it possible for culture and niche construction to transform, 
via development, the dynamics of the cognitive system and the kinds of possibilities that 
are open to us as cognisers. This is basically, once again, the idea of complementarity that 
I have been defending in the previous chapter. Complementarity comes into play when 
we realize and acknowledge that even though different resources are similarly reliable, 
they differ in their copying fidelity, and in this they complement each other: the genetic 
resource stays remarkably similar for extensive generations, while non-genetic inheritance 
is dependent on changing environmental conditions and therefore provides plasticity and 
quick adaptability to these new conditions. In other words, the coupling, the active 
partnership, the enmeshing and dovetailing of the on-board neural machinery with the 
external environment not only moulds and shapes our cognitive functions but gets us 
cognitive results that we wouldn’t be able to achieve without this active partnership being 
realised through the extended reliance on the external structures in the environment. 
Inner and outer thus work together and in doing so become instrumental for organisms to 
accomplish biological fitness and their unique nature in the long run. It is therefore out of 
this multi-layered process of interaction that the abilities of human beings emerge. As 
Ingold has noticed: 
“…There is, in truth, no species-specific, essential form of humanity, no 
way of saying what an ‘anatomically modern human’ is apart from the 
manifold ways in which humans actually become. These variations of 
developmental circumstance, not of genetic inheritance, make us 
organisms of different kinds”. [Ingold (1995), pp. 207, 212]. 
 
Hence, the properties of the on-board neural machinery should neither be privileged nor 
favoured over non biological ones, because the activities of self-engineering that 
characterise downstream niche construction by means of trans-generational effects may 
indeed be driving the process of cognitive assemblage that makes us humans. The 
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‘nature’ of an organism is therefore nurtured through the fluid and open-ended unfolding 
of development that is steered by developmental ontogenetic niche construction. This 
idea is also present (embryonally at least) in Clifford Geertz’s writing and reflected in the 
following quote, with which I want to conclude the chapter: 
"the accepted view that mental functioning is essentially an intracerebral 
process, which can only be secondarily assisted or amplified by the 
various artificial devices which that process has enabled man to invent, 
appears to be quite wrong … [T]he human brain is fully dependent upon 
cultural resources for its very operation; and those resources are, 
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In the previous chapters I made an argument for EMT and Complementarity on the basis 
of developmental considerations. I have shown that at least some of our cognitive 
functions can be sculpted by the environments in which we grow. I have demonstrated 
that through plasticity humans become geared into working in symbiotic partnership with 
external resources (such as socio-cultural practises or technological tools) and on these 
grounds, have called into question any understanding of their nature as fixed and 
endogenously pre-determined. I have therefore sided with proponents of DST [Oyama 
(1999); Griffiths & Gray (2001)] and ontogenetic niche construction [West and King 
(1987); Stotz (2010)] and made a case for cognitive extension and complementarity on 
the basis of the enmeshing of the organisms and their cognitive developmental niches. In 
this chapter I take sensory substitution devices (SSDs henceforth) as my empirical case 
study and discuss them to illustrate and explore the ramifications of Complementarity.  
In section 1, I put forward the idea that SSDs are, for visually impaired subjects at least, 
an example of perceptual enhancement made possible by cortical plasticity and then 
outline a challenge to this idea. The challenge is that SSDs don’t count as real 
enhancements because the SSD user, through the coupling with the device, is just getting 
information from the world via a sense she already has. In sections 2 and 3, I lay out two 
analogous but not homologous versions of this challenge that say that the information the 
user is processing remains eminently tactile and then critically discuss the arguments 
offered to support this idea. In section 4, I look at a different challenge. Hurley and Noë 
agree that SSDs are an example of perceptual enhancement but I disagree with them 
about the nature of this enhancement. In section 5, I eventually put forward my own view 




4.2 SSDs and Plasticity 
 
Sensory substitution refers to the use of a sensory modality to supply environmental 
information normally gathered by another sense. SSDs therefore provide through an 
unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality) access to items of the world that are 
generally experienced through another sensory modality (the substituted modality). 
[Bach-y-Rita & Kercel (2003); Auvray & Myin (2009)]. The principles of sensory 
substitution have been aptly formulated approximately forty years ago by Paul Bach-y-
Rita, [Bach-y-Rita et al. (1969)], who conducted experiments with the potential of the 
skin as a medium for transmitting pictorial material. The goal of Bach-y-Rita’s pioneering 
work was to convey real time images coming from a fixed overhead video camera to the 
skin of a visually impaired patient, via electro-or vibro-tactile stimulation, in order to 
allow for spatial navigation. The first systems converted such images onto a 20 by 20 
matrix of solenoid vibrators. This rudimentary matrix was embedded on the back of a 
dentist chair where impaired subjects were seated. These primitive artefacts however 
presented a series of crucial disadvantages for their users (including lack of mobility and 
manoeuvrability). In order to overcome these deficits, scientists have since then invested 
much more efforts in developing devices capable of improving the mobility of the blind 
and significant achievements have been accomplished. Those rudimentary systems have 
now been replaced by pieces of contemporary engineering that reflect the more modern 
advances in technology34. As a consequence, many portable, non-invasive and adaptive 
                                                             
34 Bach-y-Rita’s remarkable endeavours have led to the development of two main categories of systems 
specifically designed to compensate for loss or impaired sensory channel. These are visual-to-tactile 
substitution devices that convert images into tactile stimuli and visual-to-auditory substitution systems that 
transform images into sounds. [Auvray & Myin (2009)]. Under the umbrella of tactile substitution fall a large 
number of different machineries, such as tactile auditory substitution devices [Schurmann et al. (2006)], 
tactile vestibular substitution features [Tyler et al. (2003)], tactile feedback systems for prosthetic limbs [Rise 
(1999)], tactile-visual substitution apparatuses [Kaczmarek & Bach-Y-Rita (1995)] and tactile–tactile 
substitution devices to restore peripheral sensation [Bach-y-Rita (1995)]. The class of visual-to-auditory 
substitution systems is equally broad as it comprises an equivalent number of conversion features. These 
include, the vOICe established by Meijer (1992), the PSVA developed by Capelle and his colleagues at UCL 
[Capelle et al. (1998)], the device known as “SeeHear" chip from Caltech [Nielson et al. (1989)], the 
prototype designed by Cronly-Dillon and his group [Cronly-Dillon, Persaud, & Blore (2000)], the Vibe 
developed by Hanneton and his colleagues [Auvray, Hanneton, Lenay, & O’Regan, 2005] and the 
Kromophone, recently built by Zach Capalbo (2009) at Gordon College, MIT. For a series of old fashioned 
devices refer to [Goldish & Taylor (1974); Kleiner & Kurzweil (1977); Kay & Kay (1983); Heyes (1984)]. 
For another cool attempt of substitution the reader might refer to Jack Loomis’ work (2001 for instance) and 
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interfaces have become available and the possibility now exists to offer vision or quasi-
visual abilities to impaired individuals by means of either auditory or tactile systems35. 
So, sensory substitution devices have been designed to restore or better to compensate, 
as I shall argue later on, for a loss of a sensory channel by providing impaired patients 
with an alternative mode of access to the world36. For visually impaired patients SSDs 
have therefore assumed the form of perceptual enhancements. Visually impaired subjects 
clearly lack a sense (vision) but once they use the device this can take up some of the 
slack and their perceptual systems get transformed by the device they are using. In SSD 
perception in fact the device performs some of the functions of the lost sense partially 
compensating for the impairment. This seems to constitute, for the visually impaired at 
least, a form of enhancement and it is the reason why I have chosen to focus on these 
SSDs to set up my empirical defence of Complementarity. 
Can we really consider SSDs as cognitive and perceptual enhancements? Recent work in 
neuroscience has investigated the extent to which SSDs transform the cerebral 
architecture of the impaired users shedding more light on the mechanisms that drive this 
change. “In the last decades, studies investigating neural processing of blind individuals 
have shown that sensory loss triggers robust modifications of functioning across entire 
brain networks”. [Bubic et al. (2010), p.357]. PET, MEG and fMRI studies have 
revealed the remarkable plasticity of our brains and led scientists to explore the degree of 
functional adaptive reorganisation in cortical areas after couplings with these pieces of 
manmade wetware. Results have highlighted that SSDs effectively exploit the remarkable 
plasticity of our brains and their capacity to form intermodal connections get factored 
into the processing of perceptual information. This has been reported to trigger, in 
impaired users at least, occurrences that are characterised by an interregional correlation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to his project which run from 1985 to 2008 and was concerned with developing and assessing “GPS-based 
navigation systems for visually impaired people”. 
35[Sampaio et al. (2001); Arno et al. (2001); Kupers & Ptito (2004); Ptito et al. (2005); Auvray et al. (2005); 
Renier & de Volder (2005); Poirier et al. (2006); Chebat et al. (2007); Amedi et al. (2007); Proulx et al. 
(2008); Merabet et al. (2009); Bird et al. (2009)]. For reviews of current technologies and remaining 
challenges see, [Merabet et al. (2004); Weiland et al. (2005); Rizzo et al. (2007); Dagnelie (2008); Dowling 
(2008); Bubic et al. (2010)]. A very interesting question to speculate about is, why aren’t these devices doing 
better? Despite enormous potentialities, the benefits of SSDs for blind people remain largely untapped. 
[Durette et al. (2008)].  
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between diverse sensory modalities. [Ptito et al. (2005, 2008); Bubic, Amit & Amedi 
(2010)]. This phenomenon of interregional correlation is also known as cross-modal 
plasticity.   
Cross-modal plasticity precisely refers to the capacity of reorganisation of some areas of 
our brain after permanent impairment. The compensatory mechanisms underlying this 
capacity are in the case of SSDs triggered by the use of the device and this means that 
SSDs implement the functioning of the internal biological circuitry by becoming 
integrated and enmeshed into the users’ processing of cognitive and perceptual 
information. [Pascual-Leone (2005]. A nice study by Ptito and colleagues (2005) has 
further corroborated this idea by showing that in sensory substitution the tongues can, by 
virtue of the remarkable plasticity of the brain, be used to act “as portals to convey 
somatosensory information to visual cortex”.[Ptito et al. (2005), p.606]. So, via 
plasticity these devices get integrated into the user’s perceptual repertoire and come to 
work in symbiotic partnership with their internal biological machineries so as to allow 
blind individuals to undergo some form of experience they would otherwise lack. Cortical 
plasticity is therefore a precondition for enhancement: without plasticity the user couldn't 
get the internal working in partnership with the external. It is therefore this plasticity that 
allows for the integration of bodily and cognitive, of inner and outer. So far so good, 
many could agree on this. There is another question that needs to be addressed 
nonetheless.  
 
The studies mentioned above do not yet specify the nature of this enhancement and 
whether this mode of access is really a new one or not. A sceptical reader might concede 
that SSDs could be counted, at least in a weak way, as enhancements for the blind users 
because they effectively enhance their perceptual systems. SSDs get in fact integrated 
into the perceptual repertoire of visually impaired patients and with training supply a 
perceptual modality that compensates for loss or impaired sensory channel. Sure, the 
opponent could contend, SSDs provide such a form of perceptual experience, a channel 
of information that the user couldn’t otherwise access; but the studies you mention don’t 
                                                                                                                                                                             
36 Note: I am not yet specifying what modality this new modality is. I will address this question in the next 
sections of this chapter. For an analysis of this point see also [Kiverstein, Farina & Clark (forthcoming)]. 
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yet demonstrate that SSDs bring about a new sensory modality, nor establish the strong 
form of enhancement that would be expected and required to endorse the empirical 
defence of complementarity you are after. 
 
So here comes the philosophical challenge. One could concede that SSDs are an example 
of weak enhancement (analogous to the kind of enhancement the impaired gets when 
using a cane for instance) but resist the idea that SSD perception brings about something 
really new. SSD perception, an opponent could say, doesn’t count as a form of strong 
enhancement because SSDs do not bring about a new mode of access to the world, do 
not transform the users’ impaired cognitive abilities and instead just use a pre-existing 
sense to decode some form of proximal stimulation (either tactile or auditory). SSDs, one 
could therefore continue, are a case of mere assistance and don’t actually count as a case 
for Complementarity because the blind perceiver is just using the device as she would use 
the cane. This is probably the right worry to press. This concern is so good that I will 
pick it up as my challenge in this chapter. 
 
The key-challenge of this chapter will be to show that SSDs constitute a strong case of 
enhancement and therefore count as shiny examples of cognitive and perceptual 
transformation. If I can successfully demonstrate that SSDs qualify as strong 
enhancements and if I can possibly specify the nature of this enhancement then I will have 
a very bright and strong case for EMT and Complementarity in place. In order to qualify 
as strong enhancements, SSDs however need to deliver to the visually impaired a new 
mode of access to the world, something they would otherwise lack if they weren’t using 
the device and were instead relying exclusively on their brains. Do SSDs really provide 
their impaired users with such a mode? It is here that all the problems begin. As noted 
above, SSDs can be regarded as mind enhancing tools only if they enhance their users’ 
cognitive functions according to complementarity. If on the contrary SSD perception 
remains for the visually impaired purely auditory/tactile then these devices would just 
perform the function of mere tools. In this case the SSD would just end up delivering 
information about the world via an existing sense and won’t be adding anything to the 
impaired perceiver that she didn’t already have.  
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It seems we face two ways of thinking about SSD perception: 1) SSDs just replace one 
sense with another; 2) SSDs compensate for the loss of a sensory channel, by providing a 
form of perceptual supplementation unknown before37. [Lenay (2003)] 
Since the appearance of the very first sensory substitution device, neuroscientists and 
philosophers of the cognitive sciences have debated over the nature of the coupling that 
characterises SSD perception. If SSDs count as strong enhancements then the challenge 
is legitimately entailed to raise the question about the mode of access that SSDs give to 
the perceiver. If these devices are effectively delivering to the visually impaired a new 
form of perceiving and experiencing, then to which sensory modality does this “acquired 
perception” belong? Is what we perceive touch? Is it vision? Or is it neither of them but 
something entirely new?    
A solution to these questions hasn’t unfortunately been the most forthcoming. In order to 
appropriately answer these queries we probably need to know more about the senses, 
elaborate an account of what constitute a sensory modality, and individuate the sensory 
modalities at stake when one perceives something. So far, many attempts have been made 
for providing such an account and although there is a vast number of criteria38 {sensory 
organ, stimuli and properties, qualitative experience [Grice (1962)], behavioural 
equivalence [Morgan (1977)], dedication [Keeley (2002)] and sensorimotor equivalence 
[O’Regan & Noe¨ (2001); Myin & O’Regan (2008)]} that are pertinent for characterising 
the senses, the notion of sensory modality still remains vague, controversial and in some 
sense undefined. [Auvray & Myin (2009)]. In this chapter I won’t attempt to taxonomise 
the senses39 but I shall instead focus on the relevance of some of the criteria mentioned 
above for SSD perception. In particular, I will now turn my attention to Keeley’s notion 
of dedication and will therefore discuss a version of the challenge to my thesis that says 
that SSD perception remains merely tactile. 
                                                             
37 There may also be a third possibility (favoured by Hurley & Noë (2003), Bach-y-Rita (2004) and Heil 
(1983) that says that the device allows the user to see via touch or hearing.  This is not a mere replacement of 
seeing by hearing but seeing through hearing or touch. I will discuss this possibility in much greater detail in 
section 4 of this chapter. 
38 For a nice review paper on this see also MacPherson (2011). 
39 For a series of very interesting works on this issue, the reader might refer to: [Leon (1988); Ross (2001, 




4.3 Keeley’s Dedication 
 
In a series of recent papers, Brian Keeley (2002, 2009, manuscript forthcoming) has 
described the senses as structures that have evolved to detect particular properties in the 
world. A crucial role on his account is played by the notion of dedication. Dedication is a 
concept that Keeley borrows from ethology and can be characterised as the “attempts to 
make philosophically relevant what is biologically important to an organism” [Keeley 
(2002), p.]. In studying animal behaviour ethologists quite often draw the distinction 
between “detection” and “reception”. The former describes the capacity to discriminate 
stimuli behaviourally, whereas the latter accounts for the ability to make such 
discriminations by virtue of an anatomically dedicated system that has evolved 
accordingly. In presenting his argument, Keeley compares the capacity of humans to 
detect weak electric stimuli with that of electric eels. Humans, he says, can successfully 
distinguish electric stimuli behaviourally (they can, for instance, discriminate fully charged 
batteries from dead ones simply by sticking them to their tongue). Unlike electric eels, 
however, humans do not have a wired-up organ dedicated to detect electric fields. The 
fact, he maintains, that a particular class of individuals (humans in the case of instance) 
can occasionally respond to a specific class of stimuli (electrical ones) does not 
necessarily entail the existence in those individuals of a sensory modality for that 
particular class of stimuli. No one in fact expects to attribute an electrical sensory 
modality to humans because, as a species, we do not go around measuring with our 
tongues the electrical properties of the environment.   
Humans, Keeley argues, did not get any significant advantage during their evolution from 
the electrical capacity of their tongues. As a consequence, such a capacity has not fully 
evolved. Electric eels, on the contrary, have been using their electrical skills to carry out a 
nocturnal lifestyle, and this capacity has become a determinant for their evolution and 
survival. [Keeley (2002].  Now, Keeley thinks that we can generalise the distinction 
between detection and reception and use it to provide a reasonable account of human’s 
sensory modalities. He believes that possessing an authentic sensory modality involves 
the acquisition of a genuine, wired-up sense organ that has phylogenetically developed to 
facilitate survival with respect to an identifiable class of phenomena and for this reason, 
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when assessing the sensory modality of an organism, he invites us to look at the 
evolutionary records of its species. 
On these grounds, he then goes on to test dedication on SSD perception. He does so by 
focussing on the tongue display unit (TDU). It seems odd, he notices, to attribute to an 
impaired SSD user a visual modality. It is odd, he maintains, because when using a TDU, 
the user can only experience visual detection but not visual reception. It is undoubtedly 
true that through the coupling the impaired user receives visual information about the 
world, but she discriminates such stimuli behaviourally, via a tactile capacity. Providing 
blind individuals with a TDU doesn’t therefore suffice to endow them with a sensory 
modality they did not have before40. Even if congenitally blind individuals are endowed 
with a TDU, Keeley continues, these subjects cannot experience vision because they lack 
the capacity to see. They don’t know what seeing is like; they don’t see things and never 
saw them before. For Keeley the eyes are necessary for seeing and nothing can see that 
doesn’t have a sense that has evolved for detecting properties via light. The coupling with 
the TDU on his account therefore only allows the agent to jerry-rig “a sensory system 
dedicated to the reception of mechanical distortion (his skin) into one capable of 
providing him with generally reliable information about the electromagnetic spectrum”. 
[Keeley (2002),p.20]. The TDU, he says, does indeed provide the impaired users with 
information but only via a dedicated (tactile) channel that has already evolved to detect 
properties in the world. Since the TDU has not been evolutionarily dedicated to seeing, 
the “acquired perception” obtained through the coupling with it does not swap from 
tactile to visual and the device cannot be said to count as a case of strong enhancement.  
Keeley’s argument looks promising and, prima facie, quite compelling. There are ways to 
respond however. It occurs to me41 that his position relies on the sort of nativist 
understanding of human development that I have been attacking in chapter 3. Keeley is 
basically saying that we have a fixed sensory nature. He indeed thinks that the kinds of 
senses we have are fixed in stone, pre-determined at birth and derived phylogenetically. 
On his account plasticity seems to play a very little role. It in fact seems that Keeley does 
not recognise plasticity at all, or at least if he does, it seems that he substantially 
                                                             
40 The case of SSD is for Keeley analogous to the case of electricity discussed in the previous paragraph. 
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underestimates the importance of it. In the previous two chapters however, we have seen 
that our brains are flexible, malleable and highly plastic systems and that they are capable 
of reorganising and constantly rewiring (no matter the age) so as to accommodate for 
environmental stimulation. We have also seen that this plasticity of our brains not only 
contributes to produce the conditions for development but also opens up new possibilities 
for us as cognisers; redefining the classical notion of human nature. So, given this 
extraordinary plasticity that characterises our brains and in light of the considerations 
presented in the previous chapters about cognitive reorganisation and functional 
restructuring, why should we accept Keeley’s deterministic account of the senses? This is 
a legitimate worry to raise, I guess. There is an empirical case (a sort of twin case for 
SSDs) that I believe can help us shedding additional light on this point. The case is to do 
with so-called human echolocators and I believe it nicely undermines Keeley’s nativist 
understanding of the senses42.   
We all know that many organisms in the animal kingdom (including bats and dolphins) 
rely on echolocation to get their bearings and to navigate in the world. Less well known 
is however, that humans can also echolocate. The process is quite simple; the person 
generates high frequency burst clicks by tickling the palate with the tip of her tongue and 
then interprets the sound waves that bounce off the objects located in the external 
environment around her. “By comparing the outgoing energy with the incoming 
reflection human echolocators can successfully map the environment surrounding 
them”. [Downey, blog post]. With substantial training, blind people can use this ability to 
do quite impressive stuff. Proficient blind echolocators (such as Daniel Kish) have been 
reported to use echolocation not only to navigate in the world but also to perform a 
series of incredible actions (including roller-skating, bicycling, playing fussball, basketball, 
pillow fights and even video games); all actions that would normally be precluded to 
other blind individuals.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
41 Thanks to my supervisor Julian Kiverstein for pointing me in this direction. 
42 Some of the material I use in the next couple of paragraphs  is borrowed (but obviously re-worked) from 
Greg Downey’s excellent blog “Neuroanthropology – understanding the encultured brain and body”. I thank 
Prof. Downey for running this site. The reply against Keeley contained in the last part of this section is 
however entirely original and has not been taken from Downey’s website. 
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Although the case of echolocators is now widely known43by the public opinion; very little 
research has been done on human echolocation, and nothing is known about the 
underlying brain mechanisms that govern it.   
A very recent study by Canadian researcher Lore Thaler at the University of Western 
Ontario has however attempted to bridge this gap and shed some light on this 
phenomenon. In order to understand the neurological correlates of this quite striking 
form of human sonar, Thaler and colleagues (2011) have conducted a series of fMRI 
scanning on the brains of two human echolocators that use click-based echolocation on a 
daily basis. The study has revealed that echolocation triggers the activation of regions of 
the brain that are normally devoted to transferring and processing retinal information 
(such as the calcarine sulcus in the primary visual cortex). This study also showed that 
blind echolocators can effectively use echolocation in ways that are analogous to vision. 
Crucially, the capacity to echolocate for seeing can be improved by training. The more 
experienced the echolocator is, the better she performs and the greater is the cortical 
activation displayed in area V1. The results obtained in this preliminary study have led the 
experimenters to conclude that:  
 
“echolocation enables blind people to do things otherwise thought to be 
impossible without vision and can provide blind and visually-impaired 
people with a high degree of independence”44 [Thaler ScienceDaily (May 
26, 2011), also cited in the Downey’s blog abovementioned]. 
 
What do echolocators tell us about the senses and how can their case help us against 
Keeley’s nativism? The case of echolocators can help us undermining Keeley’s 
genecentric account of the senses because it shows us the crucial role played by plasticity 
in human brains and “highlights the power of human beings to squeeze perception out of 
                                                             
43  Daniel Kish also runs a school in California in which he trains other blind people in the use of echolocation 
and in what he calls "Perceptual Mobility". More information can be found here: 
http://www.worldaccessfortheblind.org/. For a sample of the outstanding ability that these blind echolocators 
display, please refer to the following video: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpxEmD0gu0Q&feature=player_embedded (last accessed August 2011) 
44 Thanks to Greg Downey for posting this on his blog. The full report can be found here: 





a range of different streams of information”. [Downey again, blog post]. Basically, the 
case of echolocators demonstrates that our senses are not fixed in stone and that aptly 
trained brains can compensate for visual impairment by deploying a series of different 
perceptual strategies. Crucially, the echolocators also reveal that the organ devoted to 
seeing must not necessarily be dedicated, as Keeley suggest, nor genetically inherited or 
evolutionarily developed but can rather be the fruit of mechanisms of ontogenetic 
perceptual re-adjustments driven by cortical plasticity. Echolocators in fact are usually 
blind individuals that have either lost sight or had never possessed it before. These 
individuals however, come to develop a new skill, a skill that changes their brains. This 
skill endows them with a new perceptual capacity, one that blind non-trained 
echolocators could not achieve. Crucially, this new perceptual capacity is one that lies 
dormant in us and it is only disclosed and disinhibited after proper practise. So 
echolocators capable of recruiting the visual cortex and processing self-generated 
auditory clicks to do things otherwise thought to be impossible without vision definitely 
count as a good counter example to Keeley’s nativism about the senses. Rather than the 
eyes in fact these human echolocators use their tongues, which didn’t evolve for 
detecting properties via light, to see. Plasticity and echolocators therefore seems to offer 
a good ontogenetic way to resist dedication. To the extent that these considerations 
support the case against dedication they also contribute to undermine the idea that the 
impaired SSD perceiver can only experience visual detection and not visual reception45. 
(SSDs are in fact just an externalisation of what goes on internally in the echolocators; 
they are almost a twin case). However, there could still be a way to save the challenge, 
according to which SSD perception is merely tactile; and this is to say that SSDs just 
encode spatial contents via cognitive inferences. It is to this version of the challenge that I 
now turn. 
4.4 Cognitive Inference versus Distal Perceptual Awareness 
 
Block and Prinz both accept that the SSD perceiver has experiences with spatial 
significance but they deny that this spatial significance is visual in character. They both 
                                                             
45 Recall the argument Keeley says that because the TDU has not been dedicated to seeing, TDU user can 
only experience visual detection but not visual reception. 
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think that the SSD allows the subject to experience stuff in the wider world, but they 
believe that the experience the device delivers remains tactile in modality. They concede 
that SSDs encode spatial contents but argue that this only enables us to use some features 
of the proximal stimulus to make cognitive inferences on the basis of dedicated neural 
pathways. 
 
In his classical treatment of SSDs, Block (2003) attacks the claim that the 
phenomenology of TDU is exclusively visual. Findings, he claims, do not provide 
sufficient evidences to support this hypothesis and reports also sound quite ambiguous 
and contradictory. To confirm his claim, Block appeals to a study in which Bach-y-Rita 
himself (1996) reported TDU subjects to experience the image of their percept in space.  
“The agent, Bach-y-Rita said, only describes visual means of analysis (e.g. parallax) but 
not visual phenomenology” and “even during task performance with the sensory system, 
he continued, the subject can perceive purely tactile sensations when asked to 
concentrate on these sensations”. [Bach-y-Rita (1996), quote in Bach-y-Rita and Kercel 
(2003), p.543]. On these grounds Block has claimed that when perceiving with a TDU 
the experience that characterises this coupling doesn’t necessarily swap from tactile to 
visual and has therefore concluded that “TDU is a case of spatial perception via tactile 
sensation”. [(Block (2003),p.286]. In other words, on Block’s account SSDs do encode 
spatial contents but the experience they enable remains tactile in modality. This is a 
paradigmatic example of what I have earlier called “replacement”.  
 
In a similar vein, Prinz doubts that TDU users can ever experience anything visual. [Prinz 
(2006)]. He concedes that once the subjects have mastered the device, they can use the 
apparatus to avoid obstacles, locate items in the world or adjust their behavioural 
dispositions accordingly, but he remains sceptical about the possibilities of treating these 
responses as distinctively visual, for he claims, “there are conditions under which we can 
use touch to sense objects that are not in contact with our bodies. [Prinz (2006), p.4]. 
Tapping an item with a stick enables us to locate it in the world and permits us to feel its 
shape and size, driving a car allows us to experience the surface of the asphalt, moving 




towards a flame, gives us feedback about our approximate distance from it; yet, the 
qualities of all these experiences, cannot be said to be visual but rather remain eminently 
tactile. [Prinz (2006)]. 
 
Similar considerations, Prinz continues, apply to the Bach-y-Rita’s apparatus. None of 
the TDU reports seem to unequivocally testify to the emergence of visual experience and 
none of them actually rules out the possibility of tactile sensations. Prinz therefore argues 
that there seems to be very little reason to believe that a specific sense can instantiate 
perceptual states that are qualitatively analogous to those of some another sense simply 
by delivering the same type of information. [Prinz (2006)]. By using the TDU, Prinz 
notices, a late blind subject might begin to form or develop a visual imagery of the 
percept she is currently experiencing and of course the late blind subject can help this 
process of image reconstruction with the appealing to relevant memories or by relying on 
associated experiences undertaken in the past (when she had vision). However, this 
process of visual reconstruction via mental imagery cannot be found in congenitally blind 
subjects. If a congenitally blind subject testifies to the emergence of visual qualities after 
wearing the TDU we should be a little suspicious about her report and have little trust of 
her testimony, simply because the patient has never experienced vision or can 
discriminate visual experiences as such.46 “My best guess, he concludes, is that prosthetic 
vision devices simply allow subjects to make automatic inferences about where objects 
are located in space as a result of tactile information”.[Prinz (2006), p.5].  
 
In line with Block, Prinz therefore suggests that SSDs at best enable the encoding of 
spatial contents and that this encoding leads the impaired user to the production of high-
level cognitive inferences and associations. These high-level inferences and associations 
are based uniquely on experienced patterns in the proximal stimulation and are then used 
by the subjects to perceive the distal environment. Thus, spatial encoding of contents and 
distal cognitive inferences are, for Block and Prinz, the best an impaired user can get out 
of the couplings with these devices. In what remains of this section I will try to make the 
Prinz-Block objection as strong as possible by testing its philosophical accuracy against a 
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recent study conducted by neuroscientists at Brown University. So, is SSD perception 
limited to cognitive strategies made on the grounds of proximal stimulation? Siegle and 
Warren (2010) think not. 
 
In recent study, Siegle and Warren (2010) have argued that distal attribution occurs in 
sensory substitution and that this is based on distal perceptual awareness rather than on 
cognitive inferences. Contra Block and Prinz, Siegle and Warren have therefore claimed 
that “judgements of target location in sensory substitution are based on an awareness of 
distal objects, as opposed to cognitive inferences about the environment based on an 
awareness of proximal variables”. [Siegle and Warren (2010), p.212]. What empirical 
evidence can Siegle and Warren provide to support this hypothesis? They appeal to the 
findings of one of their experiments.   
 
In this experiment Siegle and Warren recruited thirty-one sighted participants. All of 
them were right-handed and had normal vision. The subjects taking part in this study 
were blindfolded and subsequently divided into two main groups. The first group was 
assigned a condition of distal attention (DA), the second was instead given a condition of 
proximal attention (PA). “In the distal attention (DA) condition, participants were told 
to attend to the target and to ignore their arm position when making distance judgments. 
Conversely, “in the proximal attention (PA) condition, participants were told to attend 
to their arm position and the tactile vibration and to explicitly triangulate the target 
location”. [Siegle and Warren (2010), p.212].  The sensory apparatus used in the 
experiment was a simple photodiode mounted on the participants’ finger. In using this 
apparatus, blindfolded subjects had to detect the presence or absence of a target light in a 
given direction. When the photodiode was successfully pointed at the target, a vibrating 
motor placed on the back seat of the subject delivered tactile sensations. [Siegle and 
Warren (2010)]. 
 
Siegle and Warren found “that instructions to attend to distal properties during learning 
resulted in improved performance and more precise judgments of target distance, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
46 This line of argument is quite common in philosophy. Keeley has also embraced analogous considerations 
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whereas instructions to attend to proximal arm position yielded no improvement in 
distance judgments”. [Siegle and Warren (2010), p.220]. In other words, subjects who 
were required to attend to the distal targets showed significant amelioration after only a 
few hours of practice. Those trained to attend to proximal variables instead displayed no 
considerable progress and their performances were lower-ranked. This suggests, 
according to the experimenters, that cognitive inferences limit and restrict performances, 
while perceptual strategies favour them through beneficial ameliorations. This study also 
testifies to the existence of distal perceptual awareness in sensory substitution and 
highlights its consistency with perceptual strategies. Overall, these results seem to 
provide empirical evidence for the claim that distal perceptual awareness can emerge 
rapidly through the coupling with an SSD and for the idea that while using one of these 
devices, users are not solely adopting some feature of the proximal stimulus to produce 
cognitive inferences but are rather deploying perceptual strategies distally. This, 
according to the experimenters, reveals that distal attribution does not ultimately depend 
on dedicated neural pathways, but that it rather emerges on appropriate relations between 
the perceiver’s actions and invariant patterns of stimulation. [Siegle and Warren (2010)]. 
 
Does this suffice to rule out the Prinz-Block reading of SSD perception? It probably 
doesn’t. The Siegle and Warren response doesn’t seem rule out the more conservative 
reading about SSD perception endorsed by Prinz and Block because both Prinz and 
Block could still interpret the findings found by Siegle and Warren in terms of 
automatized inference. Both Prinz and Block could in fact counter appeal to 
computational theories of perception [David Marr (1982) or Tomaso Poggio (1981)], 
theories that affirm that perception is always accompanied by some sort of cognitive 
inference, to demonstrate that these findings just show that the cognitive inference has 
gone unconscious through practice and that the perceivers just get really good at using 
sound and touch to perceive things in space. So, Prinz and Block could still say sure 
there is no inference of the conscious kind going on but there's plenty of non-conscious 
inference that gets automated when the perceiver gets more skilled. This would be still 
inference but from tactile sensations! 
                                                                                                                                                                             




In the absence of empirical evidence that allows disentangling unconscious inferences 
from direct access, the Prinz and Block understanding of SSD perception looks like a 
reasonable position to hold, perhaps even more reasonable than the one proposed by 
Siegle and Warren. Shall we accept the defeat and retreat from the battle? I suggest this 
might be too hasty. Having presented the challenge in the strongest possible way, I now 
focus on an alternative approach that provides me with the means to resist this challenge 
and invites us to think that SSD perception might be vision-like after all. I therefore turn 
my attention to Hurley and Noë and to the argument they have proposed to endorse the 
idea that SSD perception constitutes a form of enhancement, whose phenomenology is 
mainly visual. 
 
4.5 Is it rather Vision? 
 
Hurley and Noë have argued that after substantial training and adaptation the 
phenomenology of the perception obtained through the coupling with a TDU switches 
from tactile to visual. Contra Block and Prinz, they have therefore claimed that the 
similarities between TDU perception and natural vision go far beyond mere localisation 
or spatial encoding of information and rather extend to the distinctively visual way in 
which dynamic sensorimotor interactions with the environment provide information to 
the TVSS-perceiver”. [Hurley & Noë (2003), p.145].  In what way does TDU perception 
after adaptation resemble natural vision and in which structural respects is the TDU 
perception more like vision than touch? In this section, I critically look at the argument 
that Hurley and Noë have proposed to substantiate this controversial claim. Having 
shown their argument, I then ask whether Hurley and Noë's sensorimotor theory of the 
senses really holds up. Despite the points of contact found by Hurley and Noë between 
vision and SSD perception I make the argument that the differences between them are 
too great to call SSD perception simply vision. Shall we then fall back on the Prinz-Block 
position? Certainly not, I argue that the active coupling with the SSD leads the expert 
user to experience a new quality of perception, a new mode of phenomenal access to the 
world that is neither exactly tactile nor exclusively visual. I therefore agree with Hurley 
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and Noë that SSDs count as cases of enhancement but disagree with them about the 
nature of it.    
 
As I mentioned above, Hurley and Noë have claimed that after successful adaptation the 
TDU user undergoes an intermodal change in her experience (from tactile to visual). In 
order to substantiate this claim Hurley and Noë need to demonstrate that:  1) the subject 
while using the device experiences a visual form of perception or something that 
resembles vision very closely and 2) that this experience becomes visual in modality 
because of the user’s commitment to learn and connect the inputs she experiences with 
the motor responses that are characteristic of vision. “If learning motor responses 
converts touch into a sense that is qualitatively like vision, then motor responses may be 
constitutive of sensory qualities”. [Prinz (2006), p.4]. Let me address these two points 
separately. 
 
Point 1.[(Alleged)Similarities between Natural Vision and TDU Perception] 
Hurley and Noë have noticed that both in natural vision and in TDU perception, the user 
makes perceptual contact with objects at distance and that in neither of these forms of 
exploration of the world a physical familiarisation with the objects perceived is envisaged 
or required. Conversely, touch works by establishing the perceptual acquaintance 
required through direct contact between the object and a specific part of our body.  
Further similarities emerge, Hurley and Noë continue, when we look at users’ reports. 
TDU users consistently testify, they say, to the emergence of visual effects or of visual 
illusions after wearing the device. These effects and illusions typically include “parallax, 
perspective, looming, zooming and depth effects, and the waterfall illusion” [Hurley and 
Noë (2003), p.145; for an extended treatment see also Bach-y-Rita (1995); Bach-y-Rita 
et al. (1969)]. Furthermore, Hurley and Noë argue, that both natural vision and TDU 
perception seem to be governed and directed by specific laws of occlusion. “You see, or 
TVSS-perceive, objects around you only if they are not blocked from view by 
other opaque objects”. [Hurley and Noë (2003),p.144]. TDU perception is therefore, on 
their account, linked to natural vision in manners that are not exclusively captured by its 
spatial significance. These alleged similarities however are not sufficient to demonstrate 
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that TDU experience becomes, after training, distinctively visual. In order to establish this 
claim Hurley and Noë need to show something more. They need to show the role that 
motor responses play in converting tactile sensations into something that is qualitatively 
like vision.  
 
Point 2. Inputs and Motor responses: the experience becomes distinctively visual 
The distinctively visual character of TDU perception, Hurley and Noë  have argued, 
“stems from the way perceivers can acquire and use practical knowledge of the common 
laws of sensorimotor contingency that vision and TDU perception share” [Hurley and 
Noë  (2003), p.145; O’Regan and Noë (2001a,b); Noë (2002)].  One of the essential 
components on their account is therefore the concept of qualitative adaptation, which 
depends on processes of sensorimotor integration and is carried out via a motor element. 
 
In their seminal paper, O’Regan and Noë (2001) have conjectured that proficient users of 
the TDU are able to individuate and pick up on different patterns of contingencies that 
hold between the movements they make and what they are able to perceive. [Kiverstein 
(2007)]. O’Regan and Noë have called these patterns of dependencies “the sensorimotor 
dynamics” and these are believed to govern TDU perception. To explain the role of these 
patterns in TDU perception, Hurley and Noë (2003) invite us to imagine a situation in 
which the perceiver has to move around a given object. As the perceiver moves around 
the object, they claim, different portions of it become available to the camera and are 
automatically mapped into tactile sensations. When the perceiver approaches the object, 
the image related to the mapping expands, as if she were seeing properly. Conversely, 
when she moves away from the object the size of the related image shrinks. “Subjects, 
they argue, cannot become attuned to these rich sensorimotor dynamics if they are not in 
control of the device”. [Kiverstein (2007), p.130]. On these grounds, Hurley and Noë go 
on and claim that: “what it is like to see is similar to what it is like to perceive by TDU 
because seeing and TDU-perception are similar ways of exploring the environment: 
they are governed by similar sensorimotor constraints, draw on similar sensorimotor 
skills, and are directed toward similar visual properties, including perspectivally 
available occlusion properties such as apparent size and shape”. [Hurley and Noë 
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(2003), p. 145]. These similarities, Hurley and Noë conclude, go far beyond the mere 
spatial encoding of contents and therefore extend to encompass an experience that is 
visual in character. 
 
The nature of the SSD perception seems on their account to depend on the amount of 
sensorimotor contingencies that this acquired perception shares with natural vision. 
Crucially, the more the user masters the device, the more invariants her acquired 
perception shares with vision. The more invariants the acquired perception shares with 
natural vision the more it resembles it. [O’Regan, Myin, & Noë (2005)]. The importance 
of mastering the device to acquire the sensorimotor dependencies necessary to trigger 
visual skills and to develop visual-like spatial abilities is confirmed by some reports. It is 
to these reports that Hurley and Noë appeal. “Very soon after I had learned how to scan, 
the sensations no longer felt as if they were on my back, and I became less and less 
aware that vibrating pins were making contact with my skin”. [Guarniero (1974), p. 104 
- quoted in Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming), § 2]. Once the subject masters the tool, 
Hurley and Noë notice, one can for instance move the camera from the hand to a head-
mounted display or just reposition the tactile pins from the subject’s back to her abdomen 
or vice versa without any loss in the performance. [White et al. (1970)]. An explanation 
for this is that “trained users no longer feel the images on their skin but they acquire a 
direct perception of distal objects”. [Auvray & Myin (2009), p. 1047; Bach-y-Rita & 
Kercel (2003)]. Further confirmation for the idea that TDU perception is visual comes 
from another anecdotal report. Bach-y-Rita and colleagues (1969) recall that during an 
experiment involving a subject with a matrix of solenoid embedded in his back, Bach-y-
Rita caused, without the participant knowing, the camera to zoom abruptly. This 
triggered a rapid expansion of the size of the related tactile image on the subject’s back. 
As a consequence, “the participant had a rapid backward movement, as if an object was 
arriving in front of her”.47 [Auvray & Myin (2009), p. 1047; Bach-y-Rita (2002)].Now, 
does the Hurley and Noë sensorimotor theory of the senses really hold up? Do the 
arguments offered and the reports presented suffice to unequivocally establish the claim 
that SSD perception is visual? Does this really persuade us? There are indeed a number 
                                                             
47 For similar experiments see also [Bach-y-Rita (1972, 2004); Hanneton et al. (1999); Lenay et al. (2001)]. 
125 
 
of objections that one could move in order to undermine Hurley and Noë‘s understanding 
of SSD perception, namely the idea that such a perception is visual. First, one can look at 
some other empirical evidence. In a nice study Sampaio and colleagues (2001) measured, 
using a standard Ophthalmological test, the visual acuity of blind subjects perceiving with 
a TDU. Visual acuity was reported to be pretty poor, circa 40/860. This is indeed good 
empirical evidence that seems to suggest that TDU perception is substantially different 
from natural vision. [Sampaio, Maris & Bach-y-Rita (2001)]. 
 
But there are also a number of common-sense objections that could be used to mount an 
attack on Hurley and Noë's understanding. Leon (1988) has for instance argued that 
saying that the TDU enables sight in blind subjects makes little sense. He claims that this 
idea: “is not more persuasive than the suggestion that we would hear sounds and 
various properties by means of the eyes, simply because we observe an optical 
transformation of an aural input by using, say, an oscilloscope” [Leon (1988), p. 252]. 
Ross has further claimed that the use of a TDU does not qualify as vision because it is not 
a kind of direct perception. [Ross (2001)]. Additionally, Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) 
have noticed that the use of an SSD does not provide its user with characteristically 
visual sensations, like colours, the feeling of empty space or other modes of phenomenal 
presence of objects. [Deroy & Auvray (forthcoming), § 1]. These are all crucial and very 
important differences that seem to make consistent the point that SSD perception cannot 
be considered analogous to vision. So, there seems to be compelling reasons to say that 
SSD perception is not entirely visual.  
 
Does this reading automatically favour the alternative claim that SSD perception stays 
tactile? Not really, in what remains of this chapter I argue, in line with empirical findings, 
that the coupling with these devices leads the user to experience a new quality of 
perception. Crucially, this perception possesses both visual and tactile components and 
can therefore be said to be both seen and heard/felt. If this new mode of access to the 
world is not only tactile neither exclusively visual, what exactly is it? In the next section I 




4.6 Neither Touch nor Vision but something entirely new: 
Quasi-vision or Artificial Synaesthesia? 
 
In a recent study Malika Auvray and co-workers at CNRS Paris, gathered a group of 
normal sighted subjects and blindfolded them for a period of fifteen hours. [Auvray et al. 
(2007)]. During this period the participants were trained with the vOICe and asked to fill 
in a feedback questionnaire while using the device. In this questionnaire the 
experimenters asked the participants to describe the sensory modality involved in their 
perceiving and what it felt like to perceive with the device. The replies came as very 
varied and showed that the phenomenology of SSD perception was ultimately task-
dependent. Testimonies indicated that “localization tasks were more likely to be 
apprehended either as giving rise to visual experiences or as belonging to a new 
sense…Some participants also mentioned a resemblance with the auditory modality”. 
[Auvray & Myin (2009), p. 1048]. Most of the subjects however provided alternative 
descriptions of their qualitative experience when they were asked to describe what it felt 
like for recognition tasks. “One of the participants reported that his experience was felt 
as visual when he was locating an object in space and as auditory when he was 
recognizing the shape of the object”. [Deroy & Auvray (forthcoming), § 5]. Quite 
surprisingly, nearly all the subjects emphasized the fact that they simply had the feeling of 
mastering a new tool. While subjects could experience visual-like abilities, the very same 
people had nevertheless difficulties in developing full-blown visual awareness48. As a 
consequence, the conveyed qualitative experience was not automatically associated to 
either audition or vision but rather reported to occur as something entirely new, whose 
nature was essentially task-dependent.  
 
When a subject uses the TDU to perceive, its usage certainly delivers, via vibro-tactile 
pins placed on the body, a tactile representation of the space surrounding the subject. 
This tactile sensation persists over time until the subject learns how to decode the 
stimulus that causes it. After proper training however, the user gradually gains veridical 
representations of things out there in a three-dimensional space and her perception of 
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these items changes, leading to a new type of experience. Crucially, as noted in the 
previous paragraph, this new type of experience doesn’t entirely qualify as tactile nor 
exclusively as visual, but possesses both components.   
 
Maybe we could call this experience quasi-vision? Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) offer 
an interesting account of this idea of novel, quasi-visual perception in their new paper.  
SSD perception, they argue, is neither less than visual nor just pseudo-visual; but it is 
quasi-visual in the way that goes beyond vision. They say that SSD perception provides a 
novel mode of experience in the sense that when the device is integrated into the 
processing of perceptual info, and successfully incorporated into the user’s cognitive 
repertoire; the visually impaired gets a mode of access to the world that depends 
vertically on pre-existing modes of perception whilst nevertheless counting as something 
entirely new. This new mode of access therefore emerges from users’ pre-existing 
sensory modalities, and its novelty is determined by the fact that it no longer aligned with 
them. So SSD perception, according to Deroy and Auvray, stands at a new level above 
the pre-existing perceptual modalities and its various sensory divisions. [Deroy and 
Auvray (forthcoming)]. Unfortunately, Deroy and Auvray don’t really cash out this idea 
in more details49, but their account of SSD perception seems to be in line with the 
findings mentioned in the previous paragraph; where remember, we saw that the 
phenomenology of SSD perception doesn’t remain in one modality (either auditory/tactile 
or visual) but rather switches in accordance to the task given to the subject. However, if 
the phenomenology of SSD perception doesn’t stay in one modality but exploits the pre-
existing senses to give us something new, couldn’t we just speculate that SSD 
perception, in giving us something new, blends vision with hearing or touch? As 
preliminary evidence for this idea, consider the report cited in the previous paragraph in 
which the subject reported to have both visual and auditory experiences.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
48 It is important noting here that all the subjects of this experiment were normal sighted and therefore had 
consistent experience of natural vision in the course of their lives. 
49 As far as I know they are trying to work out the details of this idea in an another co-authored paper, which 
however is in its early stages. 
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But how can we cash out this idea of blending of the senses? In developing an interesting 
position on the senses which says that there are multiple factors and dimensions we have 
to take into account in thinking about the nature of them, Fiona MacPherson (2011) has 
recently noticed that “if the subjects have experiences with both vision-like and touch-
like representational characteristics then perhaps they have a sense that ordinary 
humans do not”. [MacPherson (2011),p.139]. One can in fact imagine such experiences, 
phenomenally at least, “to be partly like touch, partly like vision and partly distinctive. 
Thus, MacPherson argues, people who use a TDU device, at least once they have 
adapted to it, are using a sense partly like vision, partly like touch, and partly unique”. 
[MacPherson (2011), p.]. I fundamentally agree with this take and propose to label this 
new sense as a kind of artificial synaesthesia50. I find some empirical confirmation for this 
speculation in a series of very recent empirical studies conducted by neuroscientists on 
SSDs. It is to such evidence that I now turn.   
 
Before doing that however, let me spend few words describing the phenomenology of 
synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a neurologically-based condition in which stimulation of one 
sensory or cognitive pathway leads to automatic and unintentional occurrences in a 
second sensory or cognitive pathway. [Cytowic  (2003)]51. In synaesthesia, “sensory 
experiences, such as tastes, or concepts, such as numbers, automatically evoke 
additional percepts, such as colours”. [Kadosh & Walsh (2006), R963]. For example, a 
vision–touch synaesthete can experience the feeling of being touched when seeing other 
humans being touched as well as a grapheme–colour synaesthete can experience colour 
when reading a digit or a letter. [Blakemore et al. (2005)]. For this reason, synaesthesia is 
often described as a merging of the senses, a cross-modal union of different sensory 
modalities. Multisensory integration isn’t however a peculiarity of synaesthetes; it is 
something that quite commonly happens in non-synaesthetes as well; especially in the 
later-occipital-temporal cortex. [see, Beauchamp (2005) for instance].  
 
                                                             
50 I borrow this cool label from Ward and Meijer (2010). 
51 [see also Simner (forthcoming); Kadosh et al. (2009); Cytowic & Eagelman (2009); Simner and Ward 
(2008), Ward (2008); Kadosh & Avishai (2007); Mattingley & Ward (2006); Cytowic (2002): 
Ramachandran & Hubbard (2001a,b); Harrison & Cohen (1996)]. 
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Now, in the field of sensory substitution there is a lot of neuroscientific evidence that 
suggests that SSD users experience cross-modal occurrences and multisensory 
integration after immersive training with these devices. Amedi and co-workers (2007) for 
instance demonstrate that “the lateral-occipital-temporal cortex is primarily involved in 
the integration of visual and tactile information about objects” and show that long-term 
vOICe users use their visual cortex to “recognize objects by extracting shape 
information from visual-to-auditory sensory substitution soundscapes”. [Amedi et al. 
(2007), p.687].Interestingly, this is reported to trigger cross-modal experiences that go 
far beyond the usual range of the users’ limited residual vision. In two other studies 
Kupers and colleagues (2006, 2011) have further addressed this point and favoured an 
account of cross-modal plasticity in SSD users that involves disinhibition of existing 
pathways over a view that prescribes cortical reorganisation. A number of other 
neuroscientists working on synaesthesia (such as Walsh, Henik and Cohen Kadosh) have 
proposed a similar understanding to comprehend and describe the neurocognitive 
mechanisms that characterise this phenomenon. In particular, they have suggested that 
synaesthesia is due to disinhibition [Grossenbacher & Lovelace (2001)] or unmasking 
[Kadosh & Walsh (2006); Kadosh & Henik (2007)] between or within brain areas.  
 
Now, if cross-modal plasticity and multisensory integration in SSD users are explained in 
terms of disinhibition and this form of disinhibition or unmasking also characterises the 
phenomenon of synaesthesia, couldn’t we propose that the same thing happens in SSD 
users? The new type of perception that SSD users enjoy through cross-modal plasticity 
would just be a variety of synaesthesia, namely artificially induced syanesthesia. This 
hypothesis seems to be supported by numerous reports that attest to the emergence of 
synaesthetic experiences after prolonged use of an SSD. In an interesting study 
conducted by Jamie Ward and Peter Meijer on long-term SSD users (2010) a patient 
described his experience as:   
 
“Monochrome artificially induced synaesthesia, only in certain 
frequencies of sound. A small price to pay for very detailed vision, but 
the consultant's music next door sets me off as well (Bach Mass in B 
Minor)… The thing I experience is not in color, is in my mind's eye, and 
can be very distracting. The shapes are consistent and can be reproduced 
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by the same sound. It is not triggered by all sounds but by vOICe-like 
sounds (the program, not people's voices). It is almost as if you had a 
computer with two monitors running simultaneously different pictures, 
one was a very grey blurred version of the real world, and the other was 
a pure grey background with a big semi-circular light grey arc on it, and 
sometimes you switched your attention between both. The arc picture was 
triggered by the sound of a police car going by my office.” [Ward & 
Meijer (2010),p.497-498]. 
 
Another long term vOICe user also reported that at the first stages of the coupling she 
just heard sounds without attributing any meaning to them (as proximal stimulation). 
[Meijer  (1992)].  However, after training, “she was able to distinguish sounds made by 
the device from other sounds, and via these sounds she perceived objects as located in a 
three-dimensional space, thus distally”. [Fletcher (2002), cited in Auvray et al. (2005), 
p. 506]. What is particularly striking in these cases is that subjects claim to ‘see sounds’ 
even when not wearing the device. It looks like their brain has internalized the vOICe 
rules for mapping between hearing and vision and these rules are deployed both when the 
device is worn and when it is not by virtue of mental imagery. [Proulx (2010)]. This is a 
crucial point because it highlights the stability of this synaesthetic experience over time. 
Stability is a hallmark trait of developmental synaesthesia and therefore this further 
contributes to confirm the idea that SSD perception might resemble a form of artificial 
synaesthesia. 
 
So we have seen that some expert users of the vOICe attest to the experience of a 
synthetic/ artificial synaesthesia – that is, they attest to the capacity to perceive cross-
modal auditory evoked visual occurrences and this happens, after consistent training, 
even when not wearing the device. Although this novel sensorimotor coupling might 
resemble vision in many ways; the quality of the lived experience that it triggers seems 
nevertheless quite original and can be compared to the process that accompanies the 
learning of a new language. Such a process in fact requires new abilities to be mastered, 
new skills to be evolved, new capabilities to be acquired and eventually, new connections 




Thus, SSDs systematically transform the sensory experience of the impaired, by providing 
a novel perceptual modality that compensates for loss or impaired sensory channel. These 
devices bring forth novel, hybrid, variant and unfamiliar forms of perceptual sensorimotor 
interaction with the environment and as Clark has pointed out, they gradually become 
“mind enhancing tools”. [Clark (2003), Menary (2007)]. These mind enhancing tools 
move the confines of cognition and appear to relocate the bounds of perception as well. 
As Auvray and Myin have noticed (2009), “such devices should not be understood as 
merely external stand-ins for already existing purely internal processes ... but rather 
taken to transform cognition and perception in a qualitative way”[Auvray & Myin 
(2009), p.1051], in a way that would otherwise be precluded to the impaired non-SSD 
user. 
 
SSDs, via plasticity, thus provide the visually impaired with the means for expanding 
perception towards new horizons, in ways that would have been impossible without the 
proper coupling with them. SSD perception isn’t therefore a mere substitution but rather 
an addition, a supplementation or better a complement. The result of this 
complementation is a biotechnological synthesis that entails the creation of a new space 
of coupling between a human being and the world. [Lenay et al. (2003)]. SSDs are 
therefore an example of cognitive and perceptual transformation. Through learning in 
fact, they get factored and integrated into the impaired user’s perceptual processing and 
therefore become a different but complementary part of the machinery that realises her 
cognitive capacity. 
 
Now, the reader might disagree with me about the idea of artificial synaesthesia. This is, 
after all, just an empirically informed speculation and much more work is indeed needed 
in order to establish the relevant philosophical claim that SSD perception is analogous to 
a form of artificially induced synaesthesia. In this chapter, I nevertheless hope to have 
demonstrated that SSDs count as prima face cases of strong enhancement at least for the 
visually impaired, and that as a result they can be taken as strong empirical evidence for 
Complementarity, regardless of the precise way we cash out the details of the new 
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In the previous chapter I have made an argument for Complementarity on the basis of 
SSDs. In this chapter I want to take up the possibility that these mind enhancing tools 
don’t just relocate the boundaries of cognition, but may also stretch the bounds of 
perceptual awareness. I thus explore the possibility that perceivers, in using SSDs, come 
to experience forms of extended conscious awareness.   
Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? In the first section of this chapter I 
address this question by introducing the so-called neural correlates of consciousness 
(NCCs henceforth). I show the relevance of the NCCs for any intracranialist52, brain-
bounded understanding of phenomenal awareness and then quickly look at how various 
philosophers working on embodied cognition have resisted the idea that the biological 
machinery of consciousness is located entirely in the head of the individual. The 
machinery that supports phenomenal awareness, they have argued, isn’t just in the head 
but rather cuts across the brain-body-world division, supervening on the whole embodied 
subject in dynamic interaction with its milieu. [Hurley (2010, 2007); Noë (2009)]. 
In section 2, I look at the plasticity of our brain and introduce the distinction between 
neural dominance and neural deference. I then go on to explain how Hurley and Noë 
(2003) have used SSDs as an example of deference via external rerouting. The fact that 
both neural dominance and neural deference occur needs explanation. How can the same 
neural correlate support different experiences and why do some cases of neural rerouting 
result in dominance and others result in deference? This looks like a problem for the 
NCCs. 
In section 3, I expand on this point. I outline the so-called Variable Neural Correlates 
argument and then attempt to answer the questions mentioned above along the lines 
                                                             
52 I call Intracranialism or Internalism the view that asserts that the activation of dedicated neural 





proposed by Hurley and Noë. Very roughly, the Variable Neural Correlates argument 
affirms that the internalist fails to explain why the brain defers in some cases and 
dominates in others because the argument for NCCs fails to account for the different 
quality type realised. In order to account for the different quality type realised, Hurley 
and Noë have claimed, we need an argument for extended phenomenal awareness that 
focuses on the whole organism in its dynamic interaction with the environment, one that 
doesn’t take the brain in isolation from its extra-neural, bodily and environmental 
components. In this section I analyse this argument.   
Having outlined the Variable Neural Correlates argument I then focus on the criticism 
that Clark has cast to it. Clark (2009), a leading proponent of extended cognition has 
famously challenged the idea that the machinery of consciousness can extend beyond the 
boundaries of the brain and has rather claimed that the biology of phenomenal awareness 
doesn’t allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. In section 4, I 
therefore look at the argument presented by Clark to endorse his intracranialism about 
consciousness. I embrace Clark’s criticism and concede that the variable neural correlates 
argument can at best establish a stand-off between externalist claims about consciousness 
and internalist ones.  
In section 5, I notice a potential instability in Clark’s line of argument. Clark thinks that 
SSDs support the case for extended cognition, but refuses to count them as examples of 
extended consciousness. If SSDs count as extending the mind, I argue, then why 
shouldn’t we count them as extending consciousness? Given Clark’s commitment to 
EMT I initially claim that he ought to concede, at least when it comes to SSD experience, 
that these devices count as cases in which the conscious mind extends. I nevertheless 
conclude the section and the chapter with an objection that David Chalmers has raised to 
me in personal communication. This objection overturns my original thought and shows 
negatively that we can't probably make an argument for extended consciousness, at least 
based on plasticity and integration.  
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5.2 The Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
 
The problem of explaining how and why subjective feeling and phenomenal character can 
arise from physiochemical states and processes in the brain has vexed and intrigued 
philosophers and neuroscientists for decades; generating a debate that has led to an 
incredible number of theoretical speculations and empirical studies both in philosophy and 
in contemporary cognitive neuroscience. Many of these studies have attempted to address 
the explanatory gap - the question of why brain activity realises experiences with one 
phenomenal character rather than another - by locating and identifying the so called 
neural correlates of consciousness53. “NCCs are commonly defined as neural 
representational systems whose activation is sufficient to bring about the occurrence of 
a specific conscious percept” 54. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming), §1]. The idea is that 
the neural activity correlated to the activation of specific cortical areas in a conscious 
subject is not only necessary, but rather on its own sufficient, to bring about any kind of 
conscious experience. 
Comforted by work in cognitive neuroscience, proponents of NCCs have claimed that the 
brain is the locus of consciousness par excellence. Some scientists have in fact assumed 
that for every type of occurrence we experience, there must a locus in the brain such that 
experience of that type supervenes on neural activity at that locus. Such a locus has been 
called “the bridge locus”, [Teller and Pugh (1983)] and the neural activity recorded at 
that locus has been believed to be necessary or at least jointly sufficient to produce 
experience of the relevant type. Many philosophers have shared the same intuition and 
thought that the hard problem of consciousness could turn into a scientific problem. 
Among these philosophers there is certainly Ned Block. 
Block (2005a) has explained the idea of an NCC in terms of the minimal supervenience 
base sufficient to bring about an experience with a given content. In proposing his 
explanation, he has further distinguished between what he has called core and total 
                                                             
53 For more specific details on this research program, see: [Crick and Koch (1995, 1998); Chalmers (1996, 
2000); Metzinger (2000); Koch (2004); Block (2005b); Velmans and Schneider (2007); Bayne (2007); 
Tononi and Koch (2008): Hohwy (2007; 2010); Kiverstein (2009)].  
54 Other relevant studies on this topic include [Baars (1998, 2002); Logothetis (1999); Tononi and Edelman 
(2000); Revonsuo (2000); Kanwisher (2001); Gazzaniga (2004)]. 
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realisers. The core NCC is described as the metaphysically necessary part of a neural 
representational system that contributes to distinguish one conscious content from 
another. The total NCC is instead obtained by the sum of the background conditions and 
the core realiser itself. The total NCC is believed to be – all by itself- sufficient for 
perceptual experience and it is therefore defined as the metaphysically sufficient condition 
for consciousness. [Block (2005a,b)]. Given his hard commitment to a purely internalist 
understanding of phenomenal awareness, Noë has included Block among the leading 
proponents of what he has called “the Strong Neural Substrate Thesis”. [Noë (2007)]. 
The Strong Neural Substrate Thesis is a view about consciousness that uses the notion of 
NCCs to support a bounded, intracranial account of phenomenal awareness. Such an 
account highlights the presence of a strong relation of metaphysical necessitation holding 
between the core realiser and consciousness itself and predicts that brain activity is both 
necessary and sufficient for biological sentience. [Koch (2004)]. This account also 
attempts to address the explanatory gap by adopting an inward focus that aims at 
crossing that gap by explaining it in terms of the intrinsic properties associated with the 
neural correlates of consciousness. 
In recent years, however, a fast-growing number of critical thinkers working on the field 
of embodied cognition and several other philosophers quite sympathetic with the 
extended mind thesis have begun to cast doubt over the validity of this approach. The 
biological machinery supporting conscious experience, they have argued, cannot be 
restricted or confined within the skull of the individual cogniser. As a consequence, they 
have claimed, the brain cannot be said to generate – all by itself –conscious experiences. 
Among the philosophers who have embraced this position we find Susan Hurley.In a 
posthumous paper, Susan Hurley (2010) has questioned the idea that the skin and skull of 
the organism must play a privileged and somehow special role when it comes to 
explaining the occurrence of phenomenal awareness.  She reminds us that: “brains are in 
continuous causal interaction with their bodies and their environments” and so invites us 
to reflect on the following question: “why should dynamics distributed within a pre-
specified boundary be capable of explaining qualities, while those beyond it are in 
principle ineligible?” [Hurley 2010, p. 112]. 
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In a similar vein, Alva Noë (2009) has highlighted the crucial role of the whole organism 
in an environment in determining the biological substrate of consciousness. Phenomenal 
awareness, he has claimed, necessitates “the joint operation of the brain, body and 
world”; it is “an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context” [Noë 
(2009) p.10] and for this reason its correlates must be ecological and not solely neural. 
There is no magical membrane that retains all distributed phenomenal experiences; rather 
consciousness is a world-involving dynamic process, an explorative activity steered by 
implicit knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies linking action with its results in an 
incessant loop of reciprocal adjustment between the organism and its milieu. 
On these grounds, Hurley and Noë have argued that phenomenal awareness supervenes 
on an entire organism in action and have rejected the idea that fixed neural structures or 
processes can be entirely responsible for the production of conscious experience. They 
have therefore called into question the sufficiency (but not the necessity) of the so-called 
NCCs55. Neural activity, they have claimed, is of course both crucial and necessary for 
the production of consciousness but it does not suffice on its own. It is only when this 
activity is properly entrenched in the world and rightly coupled to a body that we can 
experience the kinds of conscious occurrences we normally enjoy. A brain that isn’t 
embodied or entrenched in the natural world in the same way as we are will never be able 
to experience the same kind of experiences we enjoy. If we are to find explanations for 
the qualitative character of one’s experience we should therefore embrace a broader 
ecological approach. Rather than searching for a minimal neural correlate of phenomenal 
awareness we ought to direct our gaze outward to encompass the dynamic relations 
between brain, body, and world. Proponents of extended consciousness have therefore 
denied that the minimal supervenience base is entirely neural and that its intrinsic 
properties are sufficient to produce conscious experience. 
The argument they have provided to support this claim has been traditionally included 
under the umbrella of the so-called Dynamic Sensorimotor Theory of Consciousness 
(DSM). Hurley and Noë (2003) have argued in favour of this theory partly on the 
grounds of considerations involving cortical plasticity. Their argument for DSM is known 
                                                             
55 An analogous strategy has been undertaken by Thompson and Varela (2001). 
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as the variable neural correlates argument. I have quickly introduced the ideas underlying 
this argument in the paragraph above. I will however return to it, in much greater detail, 
analysing and discussing the crucial tenets of it and its implications for consciousness, in 
the third section of this chapter. For now, let me just recall the considerations that 
motivate this argument and focus on how Hurley and Noë have come to formulate it. 
5.3 Neural Dominance and Neural Deference 
 
As I mentioned in the previous section, Hurley and Noë turn their attention to cortical 
plasticity and appeal to it to tackle one of the most puzzling questions related to the hard 
problem of consciousness – the question of why brain activity realises experiences with 
one phenomenal character rather than another. Brain plasticity, they claim, is extremely 
helpful because it shows us biological cases in which we encounter a real contrast in 
experience. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. But what is the contrast they are talking 
about? To describe this contrast, Hurley and Noë invite us to distinguish between two 
cases of plasticity in which the same function seems to be realised in distinct neural 
circuits. They call these two cases of plasticity, neural dominance and neural deference 
respectively. 
In neural dominance, cortical activity retains its normal qualitative expression despite the 
nonstandard, abnormal inputs to which it is exposed. In this case, there is a rewiring and 
the cortical area is activated by unusual inputs, but the neural activity continues to realise 
experiences of the same type. In neural deference instead, the rewiring is accompanied by 
a change in experience. Here there is a variation in the neural activity but this variation 
changes its qualitative expression borrowing its character from the nonstandard input 
source to which it is exposed. In short, in neural dominance cortical activity preserves its 
natural expression and its normal qualitative character dominates the nonstandard one. In 
neural deference instead, the qualitative expression of cortical activity defers to the new 
input source. 
Cortical dominance is nicely illustrated by phantom limb cases in which following 
amputation of a limb the subject continues to experience limb pain even though no signal 
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originates from it. Ramachandran and co-workers have speculated that phantom pain is 
the result of what they have called neural rewiring [Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998); 
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1998)]. The patting of a subject’s arm triggers the activation 
of a cortical region that is contiguous to the area that gets activated when someone taps 
someone else’s face. When the subject’s arm is amputated however, the cortical region 
that usually lights up when someone taps someone else’s face invades its deprived 
neighbouring area (the area normally devoted to receive the stimuli from the arm) and 
takes on its functions. The consequence is that the stroking of the subject’s face triggers 
the activation of the cortical area previously associated with tactile stimulations in the 
subject’s arm. Stroking the face is thus felt and perceived as the stroking of a phantom 
arm, as well as a stroking of the face [Hurley and Noë (2003)]. The cortex in this case is 
said to dominate its non-standard inputs. That is, the cortex continues to realise an 
experience in an arm, even though the arm is no longer there.   
Something very similar happens in colored-hearing synaesthesia. In colored-hearing 
synaesthesia the sound of a word or of a specific letter, triggers the experience of a 
specific colour. [Hurley (2007); Hurley and Noë (2003); Nunn et al (2002); 
Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001)]. When synaesthetes listen to spoken words or to 
specific letters the area V4 usually lights up56. [Tootell and Hadjikhani (1998)]. Despite 
its activation, the area V4 keeps on performing its standard role in processing and 
realising colour experiences and doesn’t defer to new sources of inputs. This, according 
to Hurley, shows that “language inputs get routed in synaesthetes not just to their 
normal destinations but also to this area of visual cortex, where they elicit colour 
experiences”. [Hurley (2007), p.642]. Once again the normal qualitative character of 
cortical activity seems to dominate the nonstandard one. 
 
Cortical deference is instead found when blind subjects read Braille. Brain imaging 
studies in fact reveal the activation of area V1 in the occipital cortex both in congenitally 
and early blind subjects during Braille reading. [Sadato et al. (1996), (1998); Buchel 
(1998); Cohen et al. (1997)]. In Braille reading the visual cortex is recruited to process 
                                                             
56 V4 is an area of the extra-striate visual cortex that contributes to process colour information. [Zeki 
(1973)].V4 is also involved in form recognition and exhibits long-term plasticity.  
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non-standard inputs. Crucially, these atypical inputs are tactile. In normal sighted 
subjects, these tactile inputs would have been projected to the somatosensory cortex, but 
they are now processed by the visual one. In cases of Braille reading, we therefore have 
an impaired subject, whose visual cortex comes to perform a tactile perceptual function 
while acquiring a tactile qualitative expression. Thus here we have a case in which V1 is 
involved in supporting occurrences in different sensory modalities. [Kiverstein & Farina 
(forthcoming)]. The phenomenology of Braille reading in congenitally and early blind 
subjects is probably tactile but we certainly have a case in which the visual cortex defers 
qualitatively to map its nonstandard (abnormal and atypical) tactile inputs. Braille reading 
is therefore an example of what Hurley and Noë have called “neural rerouting”.  
 
Another example of cortical deference is found in congenitally blind subjects who have 
undertaken a significant amount of training with a tongue-display unit (TDU) [Bach-y-
Rita and Kercel (2003)]. The continuous use of the TDU device activates the visual 
cortex, at least in congenitally blind subjects. This activation, as we have extensively seen 
in the previous chapter, in turn induces clear tactile sensations in the blind but not in the 
sighted subjects. [Kupers and Ptito (2004)]. A rerouting to nonstandard cortical targets 
takes place in blind subjects and their cortical activity defers to the nonstandard source of 
input. SSDs are therefore an example of what Hurley and Noë call “external rerouting”. I 
will return to SSDs explaining, in more details, why they count as an example of 
deference via external rerouting in the next section of this chapter. For now, I want to 
establish the idea that there are two cases of plasticity: what we called neural dominance 
and neural deference.  
 
The fact that both dominance and deference occur needs explanation. These plasticity 
cases seem to raise a series of crucial concerns for the internalist perspective. How can 
the same neural correlate support different experiences? That is, why do some cases of 
neural rerouting result in dominance and others result in deference? In short, why does 
the brain defer in some cases and dominates in others? And then “when the brain defers 
why does the same cortical activity figure in the realisation of experiences of different 
types?”[Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming), § 2]. Here above, we have seen that when the 
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brain defers we get same neural activity but different type of experience. When it 
dominates instead, we get the same brain activity and the same type of experience. 
Answering the question of why the brain defers rather than dominates in some cases will 
therefore be to answer the question of why neural activity of the same type supports 
experience with one phenomenal character rather than another57. Hurley and Noë claim 
that the internalist fails to explain why the brain defers in some cases and dominates in 
others. This is why they think that the internalist cannot explain why experience has one 
quality rather than another. The internalist fails to explain why brain activity supports 
experience with one phenomenal character rather than another because the argument for 
NCCs fails to account for the different quality type realised. But why can’t the NCCs 
explain neural deference and above all, do we have another argument that can give us a 
better explanation of these two cases of plasticity? Hurley and Noë believe we do.  
5.4 The Variable Neural Correlates Argument 
 
On an internalist account of phenomenal awareness the brain is considered as the minimal 
substrate metaphysically sufficient for the realisation of experiences of a given type. 
Hurley and Noë however think that it is kind of hard to find conclusive answers to the 
questions I have raised in the previous section if we stick to the belief that the biological 
substrate of phenomenal awareness is housed within the head of the organism and 
confined to the physical boundaries of its brain. They believe that if we want to succeed in 
explaining the different qualities realised in the experience we need to focus on something 
else. For this reason, they introduce the idea of the two mappings. There is, they argue, 
one mapping that correlates the distal stimulation in the environment and the embodied 
activity of the subject to the sense organ, and there is another mapping that links the 
changes that take place in the sense receptors of the organ to specific neural activity; this 
latter leading to the production of the relevant conscious experience. Hurley and Noë 
argue that the internalist fails to explain the difference in quality type realised because she 
                                                             
57 Of course, the internalist could just answer with shrug this question and say: we don’t know yet, but one day 
we might. Such an answer however, would not do justice to the efforts and energy that Hurley and Noë have 




just focuses on the first mapping and on the intrinsic properties associated to the NCCs. 
In order to bridge the gap and account for the different quality type realised, one instead 
needs to focus on the second mapping and investigate the changing relations that the 
embodied perceiver entertains with its own environment. In these changing relations, 
Hurley and Noë notice, there are often specific patterns and regularities that characterise 
the subject’s interaction with her milieu. Hurley and Noë call these patterns of regularities 
sensorimotor contingencies [O’Regan & Noë (2001)]. Sensorimotor contingencies are: 
“dynamic patterns of interdependence between sensory stimulation and 
embodied activity. What drives changes in qualitative expression of a 
given area of cortex….(are) higher-order changes, in relations between 
mappings from different sources of input to different areas of cortex and 
from cortex back out to effects on those sources of  input, which are in 
turn fed back to various areas of cortex”. [Hurley & Noë (2003), p.146]. 
 
This interaction is partly shaped by the perceiver’s movements and partly forged by 
movements in the environment. Sensorimotor dynamics are thus multimodal and 
interactive patterns that dynamically link together brain activity with body and world. It is 
to these patterns of regularities that Hurley and Noë appeal to account for the different 
quality of experience58. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. An example might be 
helpful to clarify this last bit. The example I mention here is borrowed from Noë’s Action 
in Perception (2004). Noë asks us to describe the sensation we experience when sipping 
a glass of wine. He claims that this sensation can be explained in terms of the agent-
environment interaction that takes place in our mouths when the wine rolls across our 
tongues [Noë (2004), p. 220] The “input”, he claims, is the wine in the mouth of the 
perceiver, and the “higher-order changes” (as Hurley and Noë have referred to them) are 
those patterns of interaction that hold between the tongue of the perceiver and the wine 
that is being sipped. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)].  
                                                             
58 Here it is important noting a potential ambiguity in the way in which Hurley and Noë talk of “sensory 
input”. The locution “sensory input” can be either used to refer to the proximal changes that take place at the 
level of the sensory organ or to the distal stimulation that is the source of these changes. In this chapter I take 
the Dynamic Sensorimotor Theory to refer to the idea that the qualities of one’s phenomenal experience 
depend on patterns in stimulation that emerge through the perceiver’s embodied interaction with the 
environment. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. Some philosophers have investigated this ambiguity even 
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Now, this idea of two mappings and the appeal to sensorimotor contingencies as a way  
to connect them seem to provide Hurley and Noë with powerful weapons to fend off 
their opponents. The focus on the perceiver’s embodied interactions with the world and 
on the higher-order changes that accompany these interactions seems to provide Hurley 
and Noë with a new set of explanatory tools that allows them to successfully account for 
the production of conscious experiences. Crucially, this new set of explanatory tools is 
not available to the intracranialist. It is not available to the intracranialist, because the 
intracranialist a priori rejects the possibility that the perceiver’s embodied interactions 
with the world can constitute the substrate metaphysically sufficient for conscious 
experiences. The intracranialist in fact locates the locus of such experiences inside the 
brain. 
But what does this argument tell us about the plasticity cases abovementioned and how 
does it explain the occurrence of, say, neural deference? In the previous section, I have 
taken Braille reading and SSDs as examples of neural deference. In agreement with 
Hurley and Noë (2003), I have taken the former to be an example of neural rerouting and 
the latter a case of external rerouting. In the last bit of this section, I want to look a bit 
more closely at SSDs and try to explain how the argument proposed by Hurley and Noë 
is supposed to account for the kind of deference we find when we use these devices. As 
one can easily imagine, Hurley and Noë explain the rerouting that occurs in SSDs along 
the line I have presented above –that is, in terms of the particular way in which a cortical 
area come to participate in the perceiver’s sensorimotor interaction with the environment. 
Shall we endorse this claim? Let me look at some empirical findings to test this 
hypothesis.   
In a topical study, Ptito & Kupers (2005) recruited a group of early blind patients and 
trained them up to use a standard TDU. The TDU, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, converts visual inputs into tactile stimulation while delivering this stimulation on 
the tongue of the patient via tactile pins arrays opportunely located. The task in which the 
participants on the Ptito and Kupers‘study were engaged was to determine the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
further. For an in-depth treatment of this issue, I invite the reader to look at the nice exchange between 
Briscoe (2008) and Kiverstein (2010). 
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orientation in space of a letter (T) presented on a desktop computer. The experiment was 
conducted on both blind and control subjects, and these were blindfolded. After initial 
training, the experimenters performed a series of PET scanning on the participants’ 
brains. The experimenters found the activation of “large areas of occipital (cuneus, 
inferior, medial and lateral occipital cortex), occipito-parietal and occipito-temporal 
(fusiform gyrus) cortices” in blind subjects. No activation of the visual cortex was 
however recorded in control subjects [Ptito & Kupers (2005), p. 486; Kiverstein & 
Farina (forthcoming)]. These findings have led Ptito and Kupers to conclude that 1) in 
blind patients the occipital cortex is recruited for tactile discrimination and 2) that the 
patients’ tongues come to act as portals to visual cortex. [Kiverstein & Farina 
(forthcoming)]. 
Now recall the idea of neural deference. Neural deference is a form of plasticity in which 
a cortical area is activated by abnormal inputs and as a consequence of this activation the 
cortex realises a new type of experience. While it seems obvious to see that the visual 
cortex is recruited by abnormal inputs it still remains controversial to determine the type 
of experience that accompanies the coupling of the blind user with the SSD59. For a 
response to this objection, the reader should refer to chapter 4 of this dissertation. I will 
just summarise it now. In the previous chapter I have argued that the SSD allows the 
visually impaired perceiver to develop a new mode of phenomenal access to the world. I 
have claimed that this new mode of access to the world qualifies as a novel form of 
perception that depends on other existing mode of experiencing. I have suggestively 
called this new form of perceiving, artificial synaesthesia. To the extent that the SSD 
makes available this new mode of perceiving, it therefore also qualifies as a new form of 
experiencing. SSDs are therefore a case of neural deference “because tactile inputs are 
processed by visual cortex to provide the expert users with an experience of a novel 
type”. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming),§3]. 
Crucially, the SSD triggers this new mode of access to the world only in skilled and 
trained users. Only after training in fact, the expert user is able to refer the proximal 
                                                             
 
59 For an in depth treatment of this point, see [Kiverstein, Farina and Clark (forthcoming)]. 
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stimulus to distal objects. That is, she no longer notices the stimulus coming from the 
device and instead uses these inputs to access and discover objects located in the space 
surrounding her body. This happens because the user has acquired the sort of familiarity 
required to deal with the sensorimotor contingencies delivered by the device. Once the 
user has acquired the capacity to deal with this set of sensorimotor skills, she immediately 
ceases to feel the proximal stimulation and her attention switches perceptually to the 
distal causes of it. Qualitative adaptation, Hurley and Noë conclude, thus depends on a 
process of sensorimotor integration and it is precisely this process that explains the 
occurrence of neural deference. 
“It is…the way in which the neural activity is bound within a larger 
dynamic of interaction with the distal object – that explains the distinct 
qualitative character of experience. The intrinsic character of the neural 
activity itself, or the mapping between the cortical target area and the 
sources of the afference, does no explanatory work.” [Noë 2007, p. 
(463)]. 
 
We can only explain the qualities of conscious experience if we think of the brain as a 
part of a brain-body-world system. Conscious experiences are therefore always inevitably 
tangled in the transactions between animals and the world around them. We can only 
bridge the explanatory gap between physical goings on and phenomenal awareness by 
expanding our conception of the minimal substrate so as to encompass embodied action. 
In short, “neural activity is always embedded in a sensorimotor dynamic”. [Noë (2004), 
p.227].   
 
5.5 Clark’s Intracranialism about Consciousness 
In the previous section I have outlined the variable neural correlates argument. In this 
section I focus on the criticism that Clark has raised against this argument.  Supersizing 
the Mind (2008) already contains the seeds of a bounded intracranial account of 
consciousness. Such an account has been further argued for by Clark in Spreading the 
Joy (2009), where he has doubted that the minimal physical substrate for some forms of 
conscious experience could include the goings on in the body and the world. Clark has 
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repeatedly asserted that the vehicles of phenomenal awareness are all in the head and has 
claimed that arguments for extended cognition do not generalize to support arguments 
for an extended conscious mind. [Clark (2009)]. In particular he has focused on the 
variable neural correlates argument60 and has attacked it mainly on two grounds.  
First he has noticed that contents can be used to individuate and categorise different types 
of experiences. He has then argued that when the dynamic sensorimotor theory of 
consciousness claims to be able to explain the different quality in experiences, it does 
nothing but claim its capacity of merely accounting for the contents of these experiences. 
What the dynamic sensorimotor theory is capable of explaining is therefore just how 
some kind of cortical activity can realise occurrences with a specific type of content. The 
sensorimotor theory thus offers us just a method for placing “various neural states into a 
content-based equivalence class” [Clark (2009), p. 971; Kiverstein & Farina 
(forthcoming)]. Sensorimotor theorists therefore conflate “a claim about the contents of 
experience with a claim about the nature of the representational vehicles of 
experience”. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming), §4].  
On these grounds, Clark has claimed that the dynamic sensorimotor theory of 
consciousness isn’t entitled to hypotheses that the vehicles of conscious experience are 
constituted by the embodied activity of an organism in dynamic interaction with its 
environment, at least on the basis of considerations concerned with variable neural 
correlates. Contents, he contends, are different from vehicles – the bearer of contents. If 
the argument for the variable neural correlates of consciousness fails to account for the 
vehicles of consciousness - that is, it only accounts for the contents of the experience, it 
then follows that such an argument is useless when it comes to arguing for extended 
consciousness - a view about the vehicles of conscious experience. The argument for the 
                                                             
 
60 Here I focus on the variable neural correlates argument, but Clark has also mounted an attack on what he 
has called the DEUTS argument for extended consciousness. [Clark (2009)]. The acronym DEUTS stands for 
Dynamic Entanglement (DE) + Unique Temporal Signature (UTS). The DEUTS argument has been used by 
proponents of the sensorimotor theory [Cosmelli and Thompson (2011); Noë and Thompson (2004); 
Thompson and Varela (2001)] to argue for extended consciousness and consists of two different but not 
separate claims. The first part of the argument (DE) says that brain, body and world are dynamically entangled 
in such a way that the causal contribution of each cannot be isolated from the causal contributions of the other 
elements. The second part of the argument (UTS) is instead to do with the idea that neural states must evolve 
over time in specific ways to support conscious experiences. In this chapter I have chosen not to discuss the 
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variable neural correlates thus fails to rule out the hypothesis that the supervenience base 
necessary for the production of conscious experience is biological and pretty much 
confined within the brain of the individual.  It fails to rule out this hypothesis because the 
variable neural correlates argument doesn’t possess any explanatory advantage over the 
one that endorses the narrow substrate thesis. The variable neural correlates argument 
doesn’t possess any explanatory advantage over the NCCs because one can give other 
accounts of contents that don’t appeal to sensorimotor contingencies.   
So, the appealing to extended sensorimotor dynamics, threatens to underestimate the 
contribution of the standard approach and, correlatively, to overemphasize those of the 
proposed alternative. [Clark (2009)]. Furthermore, the variable neural correlates 
argument too quickly dismisses the resource available to the intracranialist. Hurley and 
Noë have presented the internalist position as if the intracranialist was limited in his 
explanation of the different quality type realised simply to the NCCs. However, Clark 
remarks, one can find much more evidence for the internalist understanding if one looks 
at things more carefully. The intracranialist, he says, is not just keen to correlate, as 
Hurley and Noë would, particular experiences with some neural activity in the cortex (via 
NCCs); but she is also quite interested in the relation and the function that specific 
cortical regions come to perform, in concert with a range of other brain areas, when a 
number of different individuals execute a task. The internalist, Clark maintains, can 
therefore still appeal to the many different manners in which NCCs make a given agent 
functionally poised to do or say certain things. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. This 
offers her the conceptual link with those theories that think of consciousness in terms of a 
“global workspace” of information. [Baars (1997)].  
According to these theories, neurons group to form coalitions of neurons. [Koch (2004)]. 
These coalitions or clusters of neurons gradually enter into full competition with each 
other. This competition is driven by the availability of frontal and sensory areas of our 
brains. [Baars (1988); Dehaene et al. (2006)]. According to global broadcasting theories 
of consciousness, the cluster of neurons that wins the competition gets broadcast by 
                                                                                                                                                                             




those areas and, as a consequence, “can be consumed by systems that report, reason, 
evaluate, decide and lay down episodic memories”. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. 
In a forthcoming, co-authored paper with Dave Ward and Tom Roberts, Clark has linked 
the understanding of phenomenal awareness in terms of global broadcasting to his action-
space view [Clark (2000)] and has argued that: 
 
“…what counts for (what both explains and suffices for) visual perceptual 
experience is an agent’s unmediated knowledge concerning the ways in 
which she is currently poised (or more accurately, the way she implicitly 
takes herself to be poised) over an ‘action space’. An action space, in this 
specific sense, is to be understood…as a matrix of possibilities for 
pursuing and accomplishing one’s intentional actions, goals and projects.” 
(Ward et al, forthcoming, §5) 
 
Clark therefore thinks that the appealing to global broadcasting of information buys the 
agents opportunities for action. In particular the information that gets broadcast becomes 
instrumental for the agent because it can be used to enable her capacity of planning and 
acting. What really matters for the action-space view are therefore the possibilities for 
actions not the physical activity deployed to accomplish them. It is thus “the knowing, not 
the acting (far less the moving), that bears the explanatory weight”. [Ward et al. 
(forthcoming), §5]. 
 
Suppose we agree with Clark and implement the action-space view within the internalist 
understanding of consciousness. At that point, Clark continues, the internalist could fully 
account for the questions raised by the variable neural correlates argument in terms “of a 
theory of contents that tells us how to place patterns of neural activity into content-
based equivalence classes”. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming), §4]. The action-space 
view would therefore account for the contents of conscious experience in terms of the 
space of actions that the experience provides. As a consequence the dynamic 
sensorimotor theory of consciousness would be deprived of its major argument against 
intracranialism. There wouldn’t be any logical reason in fact to prefer the variable neural 
correlates argument and its appeal to sensorimotor dynamics to its more conservative 
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contender, the one that houses the biological substrate sufficient for conscious experience 
within the cortex of the individual61. 
 
Clark’s criticism is certainly well-grounded. It hits the target and nicely shows that the 
most the variable neural correlates argument can pretend to establish is just a stand-off 
between the dynamic sensorimotor theory of consciousness and the intracranialist 
perspective. These two theories in fact possess compelling arguments to account for the 
realisation of the different quality in experience and therefore seem to answer (equally 
well) the concerns I have raised about neural dominance and neural deference. Both also 
have reasonable explanations for the mechanism that leads to the individuation of the 
contents of experience. Are we facing a stalemate again? Clark thinks so. He also thinks, 
however, that the stalemate can be overcome if we look at empirical findings. For this 
reason he invites us to consider the work of Chris Eliasmith (2008) and Wolf Singer 
(2001). He says that Eliasmith’s and Singer’s works can offer us the means to get out of 
the stalemate and decide the dispute in favour of the intracranialist.   
 
Clark claims, on the basis of the empirical studies abovementioned, that the physical 
machinery of consciousness requires a high-bandwidth information flow. He believes that 
the body gets in the way of this kind of high-bandwidth information flow and that it slows 
down the transfer of information from world to the brain. On these grounds, he then 
argues that the vehicles of consciousness can't be distributed across the boundaries of 
brain, body and world; but must rather be located inside the brain because it is only inside 
the brain that we find the fast temporal binding that is required for the construction of 
conscious experience. The body, on his account, therefore acts as a low-pass filter62; 
preventing extra-neural and environmental resources from forming the substrate 
metaphysically sufficient for conscious experience.  In a remote footnote placed toward 
the end of Spreading the Joy, Clark (2009) however acknowledges that this claim, the 
                                                             
61 So the truth of the action space view would save the internalist. However, the action-space view is not the 
only resource available to the internalist to rescue his argument. Tillman Vierkant has rightly pointed to me 
that parallel arguments could also be given for all kinds of internalist views. 
62  “A low-pass filter is any physical medium that allows low frequency signals through while reducing or 
blocking higher frequency signals”. [Clark (2009), p. 985]. 
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idea that the body acts as a low-pass filter, is historically contingent and only valid for 
human beings “circa 2009”. 
 
It is important to note that in the same footnote, Clark doesn’t rule out the possibility 
that future Brain-Machine Interfaces could change this situation by providing the kind of 
fast temporal binding that he thinks is required for the production of authentically 
extended substrates of consciousness63. Clark warns: “properly ‘jacked-in’ via some 
future fast, broad-bandwidth interface, we might yet expand the physical substrate of 
conscious experience itself”.[Clark (2009), p.987]. He therefore says this could happen, 
but it hasn’t happened yet. So what are the conditions that could make this happen and 
when would a Brain-Machine Interface support the minimal substrate sufficient for 
phenomenal awareness? One could say that incorporation is the necessary condition for 
the emergence of such Brain-Machines Interfaces. When the device is incorporated in 
fact, it becomes part of the machinery that supports phenomenal awareness and 
automatically constitutes its supervenience substrate without necessarily allowing for 
high-bandwidth information flow64. In the last section of this chapter I will not look at the 
argument for incorporation; this will rather be on the focus in the next chapter. I shall 
however address a related point that is concerned with plasticity and integration. 
 
If Brain-Machines Interfaces can allow for the integration of a tool in a way that supports 
extended cognition and if Clark himself doesn’t rule out the possibility that the same 
could happen in the case of consciousness, then why can’t we presuppose that SSDs 
provide us with just such a case? In the next section, I come to terms with this question 
and eventually wrap up the chapter with an objection raised (in private correspondence) 
by David Chalmers. This objection seems to preclude the possibility mentioned above. 
                                                             
63 This is of course Clark’s requirement. One doesn’t necessarily need to agree with him. It could be 
questioned for instance, that consciousness requires (necessarily) high-bandwidth information flow. One 
could also resist the idea that Brain-Machine Interfaces, circa 2009, could not provide such a flow. [Again see 
Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. 
64It may be objected that SSDs are vulnerable to the same concern raised by Clark’s bandwidth argument. 
According to this worry, the interface between the SSD and the user acts as a low-pass filter, excluding the 
SSD from counting as a part of the machinery that realises consciousness. However, I am not persuaded that 
the SSD acts as a low-pass filter anymore than I am persuaded that the eyes and ears do. Thus, I am not 
completely convinced that the bandwidth argument has the force Clark takes it to have. Proper discussion of 
this issue must however be conducted elsewhere. [Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming)]. 
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5.6 Extended Cognition but (probably) not Extended 
Consciousness? 
 
Clark (2003) has consistently claimed that SSDs are excellent examples of brain-machine 
interfaces. These interfaces, he has argued, cause in the aptly trained perceiver an 
“extended or enhanced agent confronting the wider world” [Clark (2008), p. 31]. SSDs, 
on his account, count as a case of extended cognition because their use brings about, via 
incorporation, the mastery of novel abilities and consistently enhances the user’s 
cognitive and behavioural skills. Clark has famously claimed that SSDs should not be 
regarded, as external stand-ins for already existing intracranial processes [Clark (2003)], 
but must be rather taken as providing the means of expanding cognition towards new 
horizons, in ways that couldn’t be experienced without them. [Auvray and Myin (2009)]. 
In sum, Clark has asserted that the kind of cognition that is triggered by SSDs cannot be 
reduced to something already available in the brain before their use. He has called these 
interfaces “mind enhancing tools”, [Clark (2003)] and has used them as a central case in 
arguing for extended cognition [see Clark (2007), (2008), pp. 35-7 for instance]. In 
Spreading the Joy, as we have seen above, Clark has however claimed that a rejection of 
the thesis of neural sufficiency for consciousness cannot be justified on the basis of 
current SSD evidence but has not ruled out the possibility that SSDs or any other Brain-
Machine Interface could, in the future, provide the high bandwidth information flow that 
he believes is required for the production of conscious experiences. So, here comes the 
question: if SSDs or any other Brain-Machine Interface can support extended cognition 
via incorporation and if Clark himself allows the same could happen in the future for 
consciousness, then why can’t we say that SSDs provide us with just such a case? The 
interface in the case of the TDU is the metal plate delivering the tactile information to the 
tongue of the subject. In the vOICe the interfaces are instead the earbuds that the skilled 
user utilises to decode auditory stimulation. In both cases these interfaces, at least in the 
well-trained user, progressively fade from awareness in a way that suggests that the 
device has been fully incorporated into the subject’s perceptual repertoire. If SSDs fade 
from awareness and get factored into the subject’s perceptual repertoire, couldn’t we 
then count them as cases in which the external device forms part of the supervenience 
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substrate sufficient for consciousness? Wouldn’t this be sufficient for the high-bandwidth 
information flow required by Clark?  
 
Clark will say no, for the reasons mentioned above. Now, a potentially fruitful response 
to his understanding of consciousness could be one that emphases the idea of 
Complementarity and is grounded on both plasticity and integration. Now recall, 
Complementarity is the idea that the differences between internal and external allow for 
the environment to play a transformative role in cognition. Plasticity, as we have 
extensively seen in the previous chapters, is to do with the capacity of the brain to rewire 
and reconfigure itself according to specific environmental stimulation. Integration is what 
one gets as a result of cortical plasticity when the brain develops to rely on the presence 
of some external resource (such as SSDs) in its processing.  
 
Now, SSD perception counts as a case of extended cognition because through plasticity 
the brain comes to work in symbiotic partnership with the technology65. SSDs exploit the 
remarkable opportunism afforded by neural plasticity to get factored into the processing 
of perceptual information and become incorporated into the cognitive routine of the user 
in a way that extends her mind. SSD perception also counts a case of Complementarity, 
at least for the visually impaired, because it allows the user to accomplish something she 
couldn’t accomplish without the device. When the device is finely integrated into neural 
processing in such a way that internal processing relies on the device to accomplish 
something it couldn't accomplish without it, the device comes to support the machinery 
that realises the cognitive process and allows for a brain, body and world crossing 
architecture. Additionally, when the perceiver successfully masters the sensorimotor 
dependencies produced by the SSD, her sense of what she can and cannot do in the world 
changes. After the perceiver has familiarised with the effects of movement on sensory 
input from the device, she can recognise the shape of objects, avoid obstacles, she can 
read, catch a ball thrown in her direction, she localise items in the external world and 
progressively gain the ability to attribute the proximal stimulation the device is causing to 
the distal causes of it. [Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming)]. So training with the device 
                                                             
65 This point will be on focus in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
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causes the subject to experience new action possibilities and give her new knowledge of 
what she can do with her body. Thus, when properly deployed the SSD seems to become 
a part of a larger system. This larger system also allows the subjects to achieve something 
they couldn’t achieve on their own. This in turn suggests that SSDs support embodied 
and skilful behaviour in the world. Rather than being low-pass filters, SSDs therefore 
appear to favour skilful cognitive practises and integration of different perceptual 
strategies via some sort of high-bandwidth information mechanism that flows through the 
body into the device. Does this suffice to say that SSDs become a part of the substrate of 
consciousness? In other words, can SSDs count as a case of extended consciousness? 
 
David Chalmers thinks not. He has objected to me (in private correspondence) that SSDs 
don't count as a case of extended consciousness because the SSD is performing the same 
function as the eye. The eye, he has claimed, is a perceptual mechanism but isn't usually 
thought of as part of the neural correlate of perceptual experience. Since we don't 
normally count the retina as a part of the supervenience base of consciousness, why 
should we count the SSD as part of the substrate of phenomenal awareness? In other 
words, if SSDs are just substituting for the eye why should we think of them as 
constitutive of conscious experiences66?   
Now, this is I reckon a very good objection. I could try to respond to this objection by 
showing that SSDs don’t act as a low-pass filter any more than the eyes or ears do, but I 
want to play this chapter safely. I therefore bite the bullet and stop the discussion here67. 
Despite Chalmers’ criticism this chapter has not been wasted because I have negatively 
shown that we probably don’t get an argument for extended consciousness on the basis 
of plasticity and integration. It has therefore been very useful as an attempt to see how far 
my ideas can be potentially pushed.   
                                                             
66 Despite Chalmers rejecting the idea that SSDs count as cases of extended consciousness; he agrees with me 
on the point that they can still extend perception and cognition. Chalmers therefore thinks that SSDs can still 
count as a part of the supervenience base for unconscious perception because of parity type considerations. 
67 I have however provided a response to Chalmers’ objection in a co-authored paper with my supervisor 
Julian Kiverstein. The paper is forthcoming in F. Paglieri (Ed.), "Consciousness in interaction: the role of the 
natural and social context in shaping consciousness". Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
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Before I conclude this chapter however, let me notice that the Chalmers objection is 
analogous to the causal/constitutional conflation quite often levelled against extended 
cognition, except that in this case it is directed to extended consciousness. This objection 
is therefore similar to the worry that Rupert raises against incorporation. Rather than 
tackle the question of whether incorporation really buys me extended consciousness, I am 
now going to look at attempts to argue that incorporation is not sufficient even for 
extended cognition. So, in the next chapter I address Rupert’s criticism and go on to 
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In the previous chapter I explored the possibility that SSDs don’t just relocate the 
boundaries of cognition, but may also stretch the bounds of perceptual awareness. I have 
initially claimed that SSDs count as cases in which the conscious mind extends but have 
concluded that we can't probably make a knockdown argument against intracranialist 
accounts of phenomenal awareness on the basis of them. Rather than tackling the 
question of whether incorporation buys me extended consciousness, in this chapter I am 
going to be looking at attempts that argue that incorporation is not sufficient even for 
extended cognition. So, here I basically address Rupert’s criticism of incorporation and 
go on to discuss the less audacious claim of whether it really buys me EMT. The goal of 
this chapter is therefore to make an argument for Extended Cognition and 
Complementarity by further emphasising the role played by man-made artefacts in 
cognitive extension. 
 
In section 1, I introduce the notion of cognitive dovetailing and show how the idea of 
incorporation has been used to argue for extended cognition [Clark (2003, 2007, 2008)]. 
Having introduced the idea of cognitive incorporation, I then focus on a series of topical 
studies involving the plasticity of the body schema68. I investigate the phenomenon of 
recalibration of the peripersonal space and turn my attention to the so-called bimodal 
neurons. I suggest that these neurons become the keystone to make a real (both 
philosophically dense and scientifically robust) distinction between true incorporation and 
mere tool usage. 
 
In section 2, I discuss Rupert's caveats about incorporation and analyse the responses he 
runs to undermine EMT. [Rupert (2009)]. In essence, Rupert doesn’t buy the inference 
from incorporation to extended cognition made by proponents of EMT because he 
doesn’t accord to our phenomenology much weight in deciding questions about what 
                                                             
68 [Iriki et al. (1996); Obayashi et al. (2000; 2001); Ishibashi (2002a,b); Iriki and Maravita (2004), Maravita, 
Spence and Driver (2003), Maravita et al. (2002)] 
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cognitive processing goes on. Since our phenomenology has been systematically 
unreliable about this in the past, he claims, it is simply not up to phenomenology to 
decide this issue. And even if we take phenomenology to explain the sense of an extended 
body, he continues, phenomenology at best just shows us the privilege of organismically 
located phenomenal experiences thereby supporting the embedded view and its 
attribution of a privileged role for the organism in cognition.    
 
In section 3, I run my replies to Rupert. Contra Rupert’s idea that the intention to reach a 
rake can still be interpreted in terms of the causal interrelations between the rake and the 
arm, I propose an argument for transparency that embraces sensory substitution and is 
based on the distinction between active and passive use. I argue that only active and 
expert SSD users can experience, through coupling with the device, cross-modal 
occurrences that compensate for the sensory loss; whereas inactive or naive users fail to 
do so because they just get stimulation from the device but no cross-modal mapping. I 
suggest that it is only in active users that the enmeshing between the agent and the device 
is fully realised and therefore argue that it is only in cases of active use that the tool 
becomes geared, factored and incorporated into the agent’s body schema so that both of 
them (the agent and the tool) come to work together as an entangled and transparent 
system of cognitive analysis.  
 
This argument works quite nicely against the first objection that Rupert has raised to 
counter the idea of incorporation. But it leaves me potentially vulnerable to the second 
objection that he has moved against the idea of transparency. In responding to my 
argument, Rupert could in fact still appeal to the emulator theory to reintroduce the 
interface between the user and the tool and to demonstrate that an embedded 
understanding of the situation is not only possible but also more feasible. To block his 
move, I look at what happens when a tool user gets prediction of the kind required for 
emulation and put forward an empirical hypothesis that suggests that when the brain 
comes to predict the sensory consequences of movements performed while using a tool, 
it includes the tool in the model of the body it uses to guide action. In essence, I claim 
that when the brain is able to predict the consequences of using the tool, it automatically 
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starts treating the tool as if it were a part of his body. So, contra Rupert, I argue that 
prediction doesn’t so much reintroduce an interface as show how the interface fades 
away and progressively disappears. The virtues of this second argument against Rupert 
are therefore twofold.1)My argument doesn’t appeal to subjective and quite controversial 
phenomenological reports; 2) its seems to offer the conceptual palette necessary to 
overturn Rupert’s counter argument by embracing the same perspective he also endorses.  
 
6.2 Incorporation and the Extended Mind Thesis 
 
Bernard Stiegler has noticed that “we are now in the midst of a revolution in cultural and 
cognitive technologies, and in the very foundations of knowledge”.[Stiegler (2010), 
p.13].  In his Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (1998) he has offered a very 
original analysis of the relation between humans, technology and time. Drawing on works 
in various disciplines (ranging from evolutionary biology to palaeoanthropology and 
continental philosophy) Stiegler has suggested a description of human life as 
“epiphylogenetic”. He has used this term to describe the consistent reliance of human 
beings on prosthetic supplementation and has argued that humans are ‘essentially in 
default’, always in need and ready to promiscuously couple with technical prostheses in 
order to prosper and survive69.  Now, prosthetics is a word of Latin origin and denotes 
addition or better extension. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "prosthetics" as "the 
branch of surgery concerned with the replacement of defective or absent parts of 
the body by artificial substitutes". In this section I will examine “prosthetics” in reference 
to the potential extension of the body  by means of artificial resources. I will argue that 
the coupling with appropriate interfaces maximally emphasises the role of human beings 
in creating whole new agent-world circuits; dynamical ensembles within which 
augmented agents can emerge. Andy Clark (2008) has discussed a series of cases that 
                                                             
 
69 A similar understanding has been endorsed by Merlin Donald (2000). In his brilliant essay, “The central 
role of culture in cognitive evolution: A reflection on the myth of the Isolated mind”, Donald describes 
humans as peripatetic self-assemblers of minds. Andy Clark (2003), Norman Donald (1993, 2010) and David 
de Leon (2003) have also favoured analogous positions. For some criticism and for an understanding that 
praises the virtues of the embedded view, the reader might instead refer to Jaron Lanier (2010).  
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nicely show this idea of new systemic wholes [Varela, Thompson & Rosh (1991)] 
achieved via incorporation. It is to such cases that I now quickly turn. 
The Cypriot-Australian artist Stelarc has dedicated his art to transforming his biological 
body. The mission of his pioneering activity is to demonstrate that the body, at least in 
the way it has been traditionally conceived, is obsolete. The aim of his artistic 
performances is therefore to offer a new framework within one can reconceptualise the 
very notion of human being. This is why in his performances Stelarc often integrates 
pieces of robotics and modern technology in his own body. The most famous among 
these integrations is probably the so-called “third hand”. The “third hand” is a mechanical 
actuator that Stelarc occasionally attaches to his right arm. This mechanical actuator is 
normally used to perform routine functions (such as writing, grasping/releasing objects 
and so on). Stelarc controls this actuator through a series of electrodes placed on 
strategic muscles on his legs and abdomen. By commanding these muscles with his brain, 
he then reports achieving complete mastery over the device. It is worth noting here that 
the muscle sites Stelarc uses to control the device are not normally activated for hand 
control. This allows him to move his “third hand” quite independently of the other two. 
Although the device is not worn all the time, Stelarc reports that after years of practise he 
no longer feels the actuator as an appended prosthesis but rather perceives it as a genuine 
bodily extension70. Stelarc is in fact fully “able to operate the third hand intuitively and 
immediately, without effort and not needing to consciously focus”. [Clark (2003), 
p.116]. In other words, the “third hand” has become so finely tuned so deeply and 
fluently integrated into his own body that it now functions pretty much like his real 
biological hands function. 
 
This case is quite striking, I believe, as it nicely reveals that human agents have the 
special capacity to plastically re-negotiate their bodies so as to incorporate always new 
structures into their own cognitive and perceptual repertoire. The third hand deployed by 
                                                             
70 Following Heidegger (1927) and his notion of ready-to-hand, I use the expression “transparent equipment” 
to describe an “equipment through which the subject can act on the world without first willing an act on 




Stelarc surely constitutes a case of successful incorporation but there are also other cases 
that deserve careful attention. 
Another striking example of incorporation involves the U.S. Navy innovation known as 
the tactile flight suit. The flight suit (a sort of vest) is mostly worn by inexperienced craft 
pilots in training. The vest can nevertheless be worn by expert pilots and in their case it 
allows them to perform more difficult tasks with ease. The suit works by producing 
specific bodily sensations on the skin of the wearer. More precisely, it generates puffs of 
air when the helicopter tilts on one side. With training, the pilot gradually learns to 
interpret these puffs of air as indicating that the craft has just tilted. Expert military pilots 
get so skilled at interpreting stimuli originating from the suit that they can even use it 
while blindfolded. [Clark (2008)].   
 
Similar work on tactile substitution has been undertaken on space suit gloves. NASA 
engineers have realised a series of robots that can perform tasks in space under the direct 
control of an astronaut in a spacecraft. This control is achieved through a master-slave 
relation called teleoperation. In short, the astronaut places his hands in controlling gloves 
situated inside the spacecraft and uses these particular gloves to move and perform 
specific actions. His actions are then transmitted to the robot, so that when the astronaut 
moves, the robot follows his commands. This system is called telepresence. It is worth 
noting that telepresence let the astronauts also experience, via proprioception, the same 
mechanical resistance that the robot encounters in the exploration of its space [Bach-y-
Rita et al. (1987)] and therefore seems to produce a strong and profound coupling 
between the user and the tool. While telepresence was originally designed to assist 
astronauts’ duties in space, it has nowadays found important applications also in hospitals 
(robots for clinical surgery) or on the battlefield (bomb-defusing robots). 
 
At this point, a question naturally arises concerning the nature of the relationship between 
humans and all these tools. How should we think of such cases? It seems that both the 
craft and the robot act as bodily extensions for their commanders. Both the suit and the 
glove in fact swiftly and deeply link the pilot and the astronaut to their “tools”. The suit 
and the glove therefore appear to act as sensory interfaces, establishing a direct 
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communication pathway between the brain and the external device. This direct, high 
bandwidth communication pathway is aimed at assisting and augmenting the 
pilot/astronaut’s cognitive and sensory-motor functions by smoothly linking her 
movements to the external tools. This profound coupling, this persisting dovetailing with 
these interfaces allows both the pilot and the astronaut to develop a kind of close-loop 
interaction analogous to the one that characterises Stelarc’s relationship with his “third 
hand”.   
 
Now, Clark and many other proponents of EMT believe that this persistent dovetailing 
leads to forms of progressive dovetailing that produce reconfigured bio-technological 
platforms. They produce these reconfigured bio-technological platforms, they say, 
because humans “are biologically designed to fluidly incorporate new bodily and 
sensory kit”. [Clark (2007),p.270]. These brand new bio-technological ensembles, they 
continue, are nevertheless achieved only in a context of goal driven activity and motor 
engagements. This plastic and dynamic understanding of the relationship between the 
user and the tool would indeed favour an image of the agent as embodied and extended. 
It is therefore no surprise that proponents of EMT describe this interaction as a case of 
real cognitive and perceptual extension; extension that occurs because our bodies not 
only renegotiate their boundaries but come to incorporate external factors via cortical 
plasticity71. Is this really sufficient for real cognitive extension? And above all does this 
process entail extended cognition? There is not wide agreement on this point. 
 
A sceptical reader, one who opposes EMT, might well raise the following worry. We can 
become expert, he could say, at using a third hand, a suit or a space glove. We could 
proficiently deploy them in ways that credibly involve a dense sub-personal coupling, and 
this could even yield transparency in use72. Yet, he could claim, we wouldn’t necessarily 
                                                             
71 Let me stress the connection between this argument and the argument I have made for EMT based on 
plasticity earlier on in this dissertation. In the second chapter of this thesis I have argued that it is the 
enmeshing, the dovetailing, the symbiotic partnership between inner and outer that sculpts, moulds, and 
forges (via repeated engagements) many of our cognitive functions and have shown that plasticity is the pre-
condition that triggers this process. Since plasticity also plays a crucial role in the argument from 
incorporation, any challenge to this argument would also count as a challenge to me. 
72 Let me just say a bit more about this notion of transparency. The idea is that the tool becomes transparent 
when it is no longer noticed but instead is absorbed in whatever task we are using it to perform. In other 
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feel the third hand, the suit or the space glove as genuine parts of our body. Yes, he 
could concede, we could be proficient users of many different tools, and these tools could 
certainly become transparent in use. This wouldn’t however entail the feeling of a lost 
capacity when one of the tools we have been so expertly using is not available or in use. 
In other words, the sceptical reader might still press the following concern: why should 
we talk here of new system wholes, of reconfigured bio-technological platforms and of 
cognitive extensions, when we can still explain the relationship between the human and 
the device in terms of a user in command of a detached tool? Aren’t all these cases just 
cases in which the same old mind causally exploits a shiny new tool? Why should we 
think of human minds as genuinely extended or augmented by socio-cultural or 
technological tweaks? This is certainly a legitimate worry, perhaps the right one to press. 
There are ways to respond however. A close look at the impressive body of research on 
tool use by primates conducted within the last decade by Italian and Japanese 
neuroscientists shall help us addressing this pressing concern.  
 
Recent studies in neuroscience have reported the discovery, in primate brains, of a class 
of very specific neurons, the so-called bimodal neurons. Maravita and Iriki (2004) 
describe these neurons as “pre-motor, parietal and putaminal neurons that respond both 
to somatosensory information from a given region and to visual information from the 
space”. [Maravita and Iriki (2004), p.79]. The discovery of these neurons is ascribable to 
Iriki and colleagues. [Iriki et al., (1996)].  In studies conducted on Japanese macaques 
during the ‘90s, Iriki and co-workers demonstrated that the visual receptive fields of 
bimodal neurons in the intraparietal sulcus can expand along the axis of a rake 
immediately after the rake is deployed to retrieve food pellets presented by the 
experimenters beyond the animal’s reaching space. [Bonifazi et al. (2007), Farnè et al. 
(2007)]. In conducting this study, Iriki and coleagues also noticed that the expansion of 
the visual receptive field occurred after only few minutes of practise and relatively short 
time of training. Furthermore, this expansion was reported to visually incorporate the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
words, it is only when the external prop is no longer felt as an appended prosthesis that it becomes geared to 
work in partnership with its user. This way, the tool’s boundaries progressively fade away, the device 
becomes less obtrusive and the user feels increasingly at one with the tool so that attention can be taken up 
entirely with the task at hand. In short, transparency seems to occur when the equipment we use becomes like 
our own bodies, something we don’t normally notice in acting.   
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tool into the peri-hand space of the macaque. Additionally, the extension of the visual 
receptive field in macaque was temporary and contingent. It in fact contracted back to 
the pre-tool-use size shortly after rest activity or passive holding. These findings have led 
scientists to conclude that the expansion of the visual receptive field in the macaques is 
strongly dependent on the intentional and purposeful use of the rake to reach remote 
objects. 
 
Analogous results have also been observed in humans. Studies in humans have in fact 
revealed that in patients affected by unilateral neglect, the use of a rake or of a stick as a 
tool for reaching actually extends the area of visual neglect so as to embrace the space 
accessible through the joint coupling with the device. [Clark (2007)]. These findings on 
humans have led Berti and Frassinetti (2000) to claim that: “the brain makes a distinction 
between far space (the space beyond reaching distance) and near space (the space 
within reaching distance)” and that… “simply holding a stick causes a remapping of far 
space to near space. On these grounds, Berti and Frassinetti have concluded that “the 
brain, at least for some purposes, treats the stick as though it were a part of the body”. 
[Berti and Frassinetti (2000), p. 415].  
 
Makin and colleagues (2007) have reported evidence for a representation of the peri-
personal space in humans by using fMRI in healthy participants. [Brozzoli et al. (2011)]. 
Farnè and Ladavas (2000) have also investigated “how information about the position of 
a target object perceived through the senses is converted into motor commands” 
[Schicke (2007), p.3616] and demonstrated that visuo-tactile extinction in impaired 
subjects extends to the space around the axis of the rake after the rake has been used by 
the patient to retrieve tokens dispensed in far distance. [Serino (2006); Serino et al. 
(2007)]. The variability of the spatial boundary near human peri-personal space has been 
further highlighted by other topical studies that establish the possibility of modifying peri-
personal space by means of different kinds of tool-related experiences [Ladavas (2002); 
Ladavas & Farnè  (2004); Farnè et al. (2005)]. These studies have replicated the results 
obtained by Iriki and provided further evidence for the idea of plastic reorganisation of 
body-schema demonstrating that these recalibrations are not only possible but are actually 
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highly flexible and experience-dependent. [Ladavas & Serino (2010)]. In particular, Farnè 
and colleagues (2005) have demonstrated that the multisensory peri-hand area “can be 
extended differentially by using tools of different length, and that the external border of 
the area elongated through the use of tools is not sharply limited to the tool tip, but 
extends (fading) beyond it”. [Farnè et al. (2005), p.245]. In line with these findings, 
Holmes, Calvert and Spence (2004) have also found that “when the tool-use task requires 
using the shafts or the tips of the tools, visuotactile interactions are stronger at the tips 
of the tools than in the middle of the shaft. When the handles of the tools are used, 
however, visuotactile interactions are strongest near the hands and decreased with 
distance along the tools”. [Holmes, Calvert and Spence (2004), p.62]. 
 
More recent evidence reported by Farnè et al. (2007) has also revealed the existence of 
cross-modal extinction caused by visual stimulation and has further corroborated the idea 
that genuine extension of the peri-hand space and successive incorporation of the tool 
used occurs after active manipulation. All these findings therefore seem to support the 
idea that in human beings reorganisation of the peri-hand space and subsequent tool 
incorporation happens73, in a context of motor engagements, through progressive 
elongation of the visuo–tactile peri-hand space. This has lead researchers to conclude that 
“the active use of a tool to physically and effectively interact with objects in the distant 
space appears to produce a spatial extension of the multisensory peri-hand space that 
encompasses the whole length of the tool”. [Farnè et al. (2007), p.440]. Where do all 
these findings leave us and what is the significance of all these studies for phenomenology 
and the cognitive sciences? 
 
All these works, I believe, have a profound impact on the way we think of both the space 
around us and of our relationships with the tools we use to test and explore our 
                                                             
73 Here I should probably be more careful and try to disentangle these two points more clearly. Here is a quick 
attempt. Reorganisation of peri-personal space and tool incorporation aren’t necessarily the same thing. The 
former is to do with the egocentric content of perception: what is reachable for us and what is our perception 
of the space. This seems to be about the world. The latter is instead about the representation of the body - and 
so is about the self.  For an in-depth analysis of this distinction, the reader might refer to de Preester (in press) 




environments.These studies in fact suggest that tool-use does not simply extend 
peripersonal space, but rather “that the tips of tools actively manipulated in 
extrapersonal space can be incorporated into the brain's visuotactile representations of 
the body”. [Holmes, Calvert and Spence (2004), p.62]. Additionally, these results seem 
also to confirm that once the perceiver has learned the sensory consequences of carrying 
out a specific motor action, the on-board neural machinery starts treating these external 
tools as transparent equipment, real parts of its body. The perceiver’s body schema – “the 
neural model of the body that represents the position and configuration of the body in 
space” [Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming), §5] – is thus reconfigured so as to comprise 
the external tool. It would therefore seem that these plastic neural changes that occur in 
the brain after tool-use can be used to formulate a scientifically informed and 
philosophically productive definition of the notion of incorporation. Clark (2008) indeed 
uses some of these findings to account for cases of reconfiguration and of brain, body, 
world crossing architecture.   
 
On Clark’s account, this plasticity of the body-schema yields effective incorporation. 
Incorporation, he however notices, can only occur within a dynamical context of motor 
engagements and goal-driven activity. The context has to be one in which the perceiver 
first represents the tool and its properties and then models the situation presented by 
forming a plan of action in which the tool is successfully utilised. Only in such a context 
can the perceiver eventually specify a detailed set of instructions to the body about how 
to carry out the plan. [Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming)]. Clark argues that this 
complex strategy triggers the process that leads to the recalibration of the body-schema 
and that this reflects “new bodily and promiscuous sensory opportunities”. [Clark 
(2008),p.38]. On these grounds, he therefore draws the distinction between genuine 
incorporation and mere use74. Clark finds in this distinction an opportunity to defend 
                                                             
74 It is worth noting here that there are many more scenarios that this debate could unfold. The 
use/incorporation distinction is certainly not the only one at stake. For instance, De Preester & Tsakiris (2009) 
have noticed that we have to distinguish cases of genuine “incorporation” in which our sense of embodiment 
is authentically and profoundly transformed from cases of “extension” in which the spatial boundaries of the 
body are only temporarily and transiently modified. De Preester & Tsakiris argue that one can only find 
authentic cases of incorporation in patients in which the prosthesis is felt as a part of their body. On these 
grounds, they therefore suggest that genuine incorporation not only transiently alters motor and perceptual 
abilities but also establishes deep changes in the “feeling of ownership”. Such changes aren’t however 
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views that describe us humans not just as ‘inescapably locked-in agents’, subjects whose 
minds and corporeal capacities are at best apt for mere scaffolding, but rather as 
cognitively permeable actors [Clark (2007)]; agents in which the use of extra-biological 
resources is not simply deployed causally but rather becomes skilfully integrated into our 
problem-solving routine to count as parts of “a new systemic whole”. [Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch (1991)].   
 
This idea of a “new agent-world circuit” [Clark (2008)] realised via assimilation of 
external structures is surely fascinating. It shouldn’t nevertheless distract our attention 
from the main point of our discussion. One question in fact remains to be answered. What 
are the conditions for genuine cognitive incorporation? In other words, what does such 
integration require? The first condition for genuine cognitive incorporation to occur is 
that there is a possibility of coupling and therefore that the resources to couple with are 
present and “ready-to-hand”. [Heidegger (1927)]. Other crucial requirements are the 
reliability and the openness of the system. The system must be mastered by the user and 
needs to be totally open and also “on-line”. It must therefore be both susceptible of 
external stimulation – that is, subject to deep and transformative processes of re-
structuring - and capable of learning new, complex problem-solving strategies. These 
strategies must be deployed to achieve the delicate temporal tuning of multiple different 
factors. These factors must in turn feedback in the bodies of information available to the 
subject while carrying out some sort of on-line problem solving. It is therefore the 
temporal tuning that leads to successful coupling. It is only when “such couplings are in 
place and when the bounds of skin and skull are rendered functionally irrelevant that 
cognition can extend gracefully into the world”. [Clark (2010), p.97].  Minds like ours, 
Clark concludes, are therefore naturally poised, evolutionarily constrained and 
wholeheartedly directed to promiscuous couplings both with the biological and with the 
artefactual. This “peripatetic” attitude [Donald (2000)] towards licentious self-
                                                                                                                                                                             
established when the peri-personal space around the body is simply extended through tool usage. [Kiverstein 
and Farina (forthcoming), §5].The tennis player in fact doesn’t feel impaired when she ceases using her racket 




assemblage and re-engineering, on Clark’s view, substantially weakens any ancestrally-
closed, brain-bounded account of human cognition. 
6.3 Rupert’s Caveat about Incorporation 
 
As we have seen above the phenomenology of tool use is a delicate issue, one in which it 
is difficult to find widespread agreement. The studies on bimodal neurons and on 
extension and recalibration of the peripersonal space analysed above invite a number of 
phenomenological arguments (e.g., smooth coping, sense of location and sense of 
control) that can all be used to support the thesis that incorporation occurs via motor 
engagements and goal-driven activity. These “phenomenological” arguments have all 
been deployed, with different strategies, by proponents of EMT [Clark (2008); Gallagher 
& Zahavi (2007); (Wheeler (2005)], who on these grounds have defended the idea that 
cognition extends. However, many prominent critics of EMT have not been persuaded by 
them. In particular, Robert Rupert in his recent state-of-the-art treatment (2009, see ch.8) 
has criticised both the range and the validity of these arguments and has proposed to re-
describe all the cases of incorporation abovementioned (and similar ones) in terms of 
tool, body and the causal dynamics of their interaction. In essence, Rupert has argued 
that we ought to distinguish the “fairly acceptable” claim that incorporation yields new 
agent-world circuits, re-engineered bio-mechanical systems; from the more radical 
assumption that buys the inference to extended cognition and therefore envisages literal 
cognitive extension. Rupert is prone to grant the existence of the former just by giving an 
embedded account of cases of incorporation but attempts to resist the latter on the 
grounds of his notion of organism-centred realiser.    
 
In what remains of this section, I analyse the response that Rupert has formulated against 
the so-called sense of location argument and show the extent to which his response 
undermines the relevance of incorporation for EMT. In the spirit of presenting the 
embedded position in the strongest possible way, I then turn my attention to the 
argument from smooth coping and discuss Rupert’s appeal to the emulator theory as a 
way to counter the idea of transparency achieved through active usage. Before I proceed 
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any further with my analysis of Rupert’s criticism, let me briefly restate, in its strongest 
form, the first of the arguments I will be analysing.  
The sense of location argument is based on the idea that sometimes humans, especially 
after consistent practice with a specific tool, come to experience a sense of bodily 
extension and take this feeling as a reliable indicator of the location of their cognitive and 
perceptual processing. The body, to them, seems to stretch and extend well beyond its 
natural boundary so as to include the tool being used. In other words, the process of 
recalibration of the body-schema entails an inclusion of the external tool into the 
machinery that realises the user’s cognitive capacity75.The most immediate consequence 
of this argument, at least for proponents of EMT, is the truth of the extended view. Clark 
(2003 and elsewhere) has extensively used this argument to argue for EMT and I have 
comprehensively presented the case he is making for it in the previous section of this 
chapter. This isn’t the only argument that he and his allies have deployed to defend EMT 
on the basis of incorporation76. In discussing these arguments Clark has emphasised the 
importance of other factors (such as the persistence and reliability of coupling and the 
mastery of the tool) for successful incorporation.“The phenomenological sense of an 
extended presence, however, quite often plays an argumentative role in its own”. 
[Rupert (2009), p. 165].  This is evident, Rupert notices, when Clark talks about the 
plasticity of the body-image.   
One of the experiments that Clark discusses to highlight the existence of this remarkable 
plasticity is borrowed from Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998). This experiment is 
conducted in the following scenario: there are two subjects sitting in chairs, one behind 
the other, both facing the same direction as if they were in a single line. The subjects sit 
close to each other so that the person in the rear can fully extend her arm and touch the 
nose of the subject in the front. The person in the rear performs this action while 
blindfolded and holds out her hand to the experimenter who stands in front of her. The 
                                                             
75 For a complete treatment of this point see Section 1. 
76 As I noted in the previous paragraph, another argument that has been used by proponents of EMT to 
support the idea of cognitive extension is the argument for smooth-coping. I will analyse this argument in 
more detail later on in this section. One might also mention the so-called sense of control argument. I won’t 
be discussing such an argument in this section nonetheless. 
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experimenter takes up the subject’s hand and causes the person’s finger to tap, at 
irregular rhythm, against the nose of the subject who sits in front of her. In parallel, the 
experimenter taps with the same irregular rhythm the nose of the person who sits in the 
rear. Results show that about 50 % of the persons who sit in the rear report the sense 
that they are tapping their own nose, as if they were perceiving their noses as stretching 
and extending 80 to 90 cm in length. [Rupert (2009), ch.8].  
Now, Rupert makes three considerations about these findings. First, he claims that these 
results don’t tell us anything about the physical location of cognition simply because the 
location of my nose has nothing to do with the location of my cognitive processing77. 
[Rupert (2009), p.165]. Second, he notices, these reports are clearly wrong and based on 
an illusion. In truth, everyone knows that the subjects are not tapping their own noses. 
Third, he tries to explain this illusion of bodily extension in terms of the neural 
mechanisms that the brain has to deploy for correlating different sources of stimulation 
with different sensory modalities. In analysing the mechanisms that realise this illusion, 
Rupert compares the neural explanation of it with the explanation he gives of the studies 
involving tool-use. He claims that the same neural explanation applies to both cases. The 
findings on tool-use, he continues, in indicating the existence of neural correlates for the 
internal representations that describe the way in which the monkey thinks of its own 
body, seem to favour an embedded interpretation of the phenomenon of incorporation. 
These findings, Rupert claims, favour a non-extended interpretation of the phenomenon 
of incorporation because they reveal that the realiser of the relevant experience and of the 
cognitive state produced is still located inside the head and lies within the neural circuitry 
that represents the location of the hand or of the arm.  
In short, Rupert explains this feeling of bodily extension as a direct consequence of the 
interactions that occur between and among neural signals. So even though the activation 
of the bimodal neurons seems to suggest that the user’s body-schema might well extend 
beyond the boundary of the user’s body so as to comprise and include an external tool; 
                                                             
77 In truth, Clark and proponents of EMT are not making a claim about the location of one’s nose as Rupert 
seems to suggests [Rupert (2009), p.165] - rather the point is about the experience of one’s nose and of the 
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the realiser of the thought of this “alleged” extension is for Rupert still located within the 
skin and skull of the organism. 
This criticism doesn’t seem to be particularly challenging for a friend of EMT and 
certainly doesn’t suffice to establish the embedded (organismically-bounded) view against 
the extended alternative. Clark or any other proponent of EMT would in fact surely agree 
with Rupert in asserting that there has to be some sort of neural change driven by our 
onboard neural machinery in order for a tool to become incorporated. But when the tool 
is actively and proficiently used, she would continue, a reorganisation of the user’s body 
schema would take place and this would make the interface disappear from awareness. 
Once the interface has disappeared from awareness, she would conclude, the tool would 
get incorporated and cognition would gradually extend78. So, if Rupert wants to succeed 
in establishing his embedded view as a profitable alternative to extended accounts of 
incorporation, he needs to provide a preferable and more seductive explanation for the 
phenomenological feeling of transparency that expert tool users consistently report. 
Before I turn my attention to Rupert’s way to counter the phenomenological claim about 
transparency I just mentioned, let me briefly recall the argument that postulates its 
emergence.  
The argument from smooth coping is precisely the argument that envisages the 
emergence of a feeling of transparency in tool-use. This argument in fact says that in 
specific cases, cases of active and continuous usage, we progressively lose our awareness 
of the distinction between the boundaries of our body and those of the tool we use. If 
sometimes and under certain circumstances we are not fully aware of such a distinction, 
then it would seem that the cognitive theory that best describes the idea of smooth coping 
is one that draws no firm boundaries between bodily and extra-bodily features; an 
account that envisages online form of coupling and recruitment, a perspective that entails 
the possibility of bodily reconfiguration and self-re-engineering. It is therefore no surprise 
                                                                                                                                                                             
boundaries of one’s body more generally.  So the real question to answer is: does the experience of the 
boundaries of one’s body tell us anything about the location of cognitive processing?  
78 For an in-depth discussion of this point and for an additional defence (centred on SSDs) of the claim that 
full transparency is achieved through active tool-use, the reader should refer to the next section of this chapter. 
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that this argument has been used by proponents of EMT [Wheeler (2005); Clark (2003), 
pp.33-34] to endorse their externalist accounts of cognition. 
Rupert strongly disagrees with these views. He reckons that when we perform actions 
with specific tools in the environment we engage in a series of complex relations with the 
world and acknowledges that these deep engagements might well give us a sense of 
fluidity or transparency. This isn’t however sufficient, he continues, to prove that when 
we use a hammer we feel it as a proper part of our body. It is one thing, he maintains, “to 
transcend conscious planning and the deliberate issuing of motor commands: it is quite 
another literally to lose all awareness of external items as separate from one’s body”. 
[Rupert (2009), p.160]. Having made such a claim, Rupert then introduces the emulator 
theory [Grush (1997,2003, 2004)] to undermine the idea that the best cognitive model 
capable of explaining cases of smooth coping is the one that draws no firm boundaries 
between the bodily self and the external resources. Rupert therefore appeals to the 
emulator theory to: 1) reintroduce the interface between the user and the device that the 
appealing to smooth coping had removed; and 2) to show that it is still possible to 
successfully describe incorporation within an embedded perspective.  
The emulator theory affirms that the brain scaffolds the on-board neural machinery and 
that this process of scaffolding leads to the formation of neural circuits that function as 
models and provide expectations of the sensory feedback by predicting the outcome of, 
say, the agent’s reaching on the grounds of specific stimulation or prior knowledge 
available to the subject. The interesting aspect of these models, Rupert claims, is that they 
can also run off-line and therefore can be used by the brain “to produce imagery, estimate 
outcomes of different actions, and evaluate and develop motor plans”. [Grush (2004), 
p.377]. The appealing to the emulator theory thus endows Rupert with the means to 
resist more radical claims about cognition as it allows him to explain incorporation within 
an organismically-bounded framework, a context in which the significance of goal-driven 
activity and motor engagements is substantially reduced. Rupert thus tends to avoid the 
tempting appeal to what he calls, the “magical force of phenomenology” and rather tries 
to explain the agent’s reaching and the subsequent recalibration of her body-schema in 
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terms of the changes driven by predictions that occur at the brain level by virtue of 
attuned activity of specific class of emulator circuits. The emulator-based explanation 
therefore allows Rupert, at least so he claims, to describe the feeling of transparency as 
exclusively dependent on the interaction among neural signals.   
This way, it becomes possible for Rupert to embrace the idea of new systemic wholes 
without necessarily committing to the radical claims that go along with this idea, claims 
and theories that envisage literal mind extension. Appealing to emulator theory thus 
offers a plausible and more conservative explanation for the phenomenon of recalibration 
of the body-schema abovementioned. This scientific explanation is, for Rupert at least, 
more grounded than any other subjective phenomenological report and must be preferred 
to an extended one because it is less radical and more parsimonious. The important point 
about the emulator business is therefore that it seems to allow Rupert to keep a foot in 
both camps. The emulator theory in fact doesn’t preclude the formation of reconfigured 
bio-technological systems as envisaged by Clark, but at the same time invite us to 
endorse an embedded, organismic-centred account of cognition, because it tends to 
explain the phenomenon of incorporation in terms of the interactions that occur between 
and among neural signals.   
In short, the emulator theory seems to possess the same explanatory power of more 
radical accounts of incorporation but it doesn’t end up being so drastically radical. The 
acknowledgment of the explanatory power of this theory invites Rupert to attribute a 
causal role to tool-use in driving cognition and let him claim “a privilege to 
organismically located phenomenological experiences”. [Rupert (2009), p.169].  It is 
indeed the organism, he maintains, that causally interacts with external props and since 
the organism plays such a crucial role in cognition, then it seems logical to affirm that it 
has to be the organism and the neural activity correlated to it that must be considered the 
centre of this process. Needless to say, that this conclusion would favour Rupert’s 
embedded view over more radical ideas of friends of EMT. Shall we side with Rupert and 
embrace his embedded account of motor cognition? I suggest this might be too hasty.  
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6.4 SSDs: a Real Case of Incorporation 
 
Having presented in the strongest possible way the arguments that Rupert has deployed 
against EMT, I now try to respond to them by drawing the reader’s attention to the case 
of sensory substitution. I therefore discuss the case of SSDs as an example of tool use79. I 
firstly distinguish between active and passive use and then argue that only active and 
expert SSD users come to experience the feeling of transparency that characterises 
incorporation. Such a feeling, achieved by means of cognitive and perceptual 
supplementation, remains however precluded to inactive or naïve users. Inactive users in 
fact fail to experience this new form of perception because in their case the device is not 
mastered and it therefore doesn’t trigger the kind of cross-modal mappings required for 
perceptual supplementation. Perception in all these cases remains unaltered and the tool 
is not incorporated into the user’s information processing. Conversely, in cases of active 
use and direct manipulation the deep and profound entanglement required for real 
incorporation is achieved because the coupling with the device enables a new space of 
sensorimotor integration with the environment. This in turn triggers the activation of 
specific cross-modal mappings that favour the emergence of a new mode of phenomenal 
access to the world. Crucially, this new mode of access to the world is realised because 
of: 1) the substantial training that the user undergoes with the device; 2) the 
manipulations/actions that the user performs with the device in the world; 3) the skills the 
user develops while performing actions with the device. It is only when all these three 
factors are combined together that the “tool” becomes geared to work in a sort of 
symbiotic partnership with the subject, enables cross-modal mappings and thus gets 
factored and incorporated into the agent’s body schema, becoming fully transparent and 
fading from awareness. In this process of factoring both the agent and the tool become so 
deeply tuned, so finely integrated with each other that they can be said to form a single, 
entangled system of cognitive analysis.  
 
This is, in essence, the idea that I develop in the first part of this section to undermine 
Rupert’s embedded and somehow conservative understanding of the plasticity of the 
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body-schema. Let me describe my first argument against Rupert in a bit more detail. I will 
then briefly focus on how Rupert could respond to my argument in light of the emulator 
theory and shall conclude this section and the chapter by showing that his argument 
rather than reintroducing the interface between the user and the tool, seems instead to 
favour an understanding in which the interface de facto disappears. 
 
In SSD perception I distinguish two different cases (what I labelled as active and passive 
use). Let me introduce the case of passive use first. I will then turn my attention to the 
case of active usage and by highlighting the differences between the two, I shall 
demonstrate that it is only in the latter case that we get extended cognition and therefore 
that it is only in active use that we can experience transparency and true incorporation80. 
 
The classical example to mention in order to clarify the nature of passive use is the dentist 
chair built by Bach-y-Rita and colleagues in the early ‘60s to test the capacity of blind 
subjects to develop visual skills. [Bach-y-Rita et al. (1969)]. As we have seen in chapter 
4, in this experiment the overhead camera responsible for mapping the environment was 
fixed above the heads of the subjects and these were forced to sit on a dentist chair while 
embedded pins were delivering tactile information on the back of their chair. Lack of 
manoeuvrability and incapability of performing free movements in the environment 
determined in the subjects the impossibility to properly master the device While using the 
tool, the users were in fact constrained to perform a very limited amount of actions: they 
were not allowed to hold the camera, and as a consequence they could only develop a 
very restricted set of abilities and skills for the discrimination of the received stimuli. 
However “once users were given freedom, the possibility to hold the camera and to 
perform several movements with it, they then became able to perceive with the device”. 
[Auvray and Myin (2009), p.1046].  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
79 It is worth noting here that I could  make the same sorts of arguments on the basis of almost any artefact. 
What I am doing here is in fact arguing for artefact extension. 
80 It seems, prima facie, that the distinction between active and passive use doesn’t hold up because tool use is 
something that is always active. Thanks to my supervisor Tillman Vierkant for pressing this worry and asking 




This example is illuminating, I think. It in fact operatively highlights the distinction 
between active and passive use and at the same time nicely reveals that in standard cases 
of passive use there is an agent and a detached tool that is delivering either tactile or 
auditory inputs. These inputs however, aren’t used by the subject to genuinely perceive 
stuff out there. The inputs delivered by the external interface don’t mean anything to the 
user, neither do they let her experience a new kind of occurrence. There isn’t a novel 
perception, there isn’t a new mode of access to the world and the device barely replaces 
the modality the user has lost. Cases of passive tool-use definitely suggest a relation of 
causal necessity between the user and tool and seem to fit an embedded account, similar 
to the one embraced by Rupert, in which the device is simply providing inputs to the 
brain and therefore doesn’t become geared or enmeshed in the loop that leads to the 
production of new cognitive and perceptual functions. Crucially, the device does not 
become part of the loop because the user simply exploits it as a tool and causally deploys 
it as a means to ease her performance in specific tasks. This account of passive use isn’t 
however entirely negative. It in fact invites another reading; a positive reading, that 
suggests that (perhaps) there is something different going on in active use. The idea is 
that there isn’t an agent + a detached tool but rather that there is something new that 
active use is doing and therefore that there is something different that smooth-coping 
brings forth. It is only when the user is active in fact that these external inputs come to 
mean something to her. I suggest that in active use, we have an agent + a tool working 
together to deliver something new. But what is delivered exactly?   
 
What is delivered, I believe, is the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies that  allow the 
user to genuinely perceive stuff out there in the world. It is in fact only in the case of 
active use that the device can become geared, via training, to work in partnership with 
the user and grafted into the cognitive repertoire of the perceiver. This partnership in turn 
enables cognitive transformations that make the device disappear from awareness and 
become fully transparent. The idea that active use allows the user to individuate specific 
patterns of interdependencies in the stream of proximal stimulation generated by the 
device is however quite provocative and certainly needs more careful attention and 
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further spelling out. It is here that I can therefore introduce my notion of cross-modal 
mapping.   
 
As noted above in SSD perception, there are two mappings that are being performed 
when the perceiver actively uses the device. The first mapping is the mapping that is 
generated by the device itself. This mapping is shared by both active and inactive users. 
The device at this stage physically maps the environment onto either auditory or tactile 
inputs. As a result of this activity of mapping, the user can either get something that 
might resemble a visual stimulation or an auditory one. Upon receiving this crucial 
information from the device the perceiver’s brain finds in the auditory/tactile stream 
specific sensorimotor contingencies81. This is where the second mapping begins to work. 
The sensorimotor contingencies that become available to the active user inform the 
perceiver about things that are out there, in the external environment. The brain now 
starts processing auditory or tactile inputs and gradually transforms these inputs so that 
they can be understood as being about stuff out there. The device is therefore 
transforming environmental inputs into outputs that the brain re-cycles and re-elaborates 
in conjunction with the SSD. Crucially, the outputs the brain is producing are device 
involving. These outputs in fact contribute to create a new space of biotechnological 
synthesis between the user and the world and therefore allow for incorporation of the 
device. Perceiving by means of an SSD in fact requires perceptual-motor learning, which 
only arises when actions structure perception. 
 
To repeat, in the case of active SSD perception we have two mappings. The first one 
goes from vision to audition or touch. The second one links audition or touch as 
experienced by the brain to specific sensorimotor contingencies for the SSD and 
therefore provides the SSD user with a new mode of phenomenal access to the world and 
a set of skills that progressively allow the SSD to fade from awareness.[see chapter 4 for 
an in-depth analysis of this point].  Active tool-use is in fact exploited by the brain to 
discover, via the coupling with the device, the relevant sensorimotor contingencies that 
trigger the experience of the new mode of phenomenal access to the world. Thus, active 
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use seems to be device involving. Through active use in fact the perceiver learns about 
the sensory consequences of her actions and of her bodily movements. After substantial 
training with the device the user discovers specific patterns in the stream of proximal 
sensory stimulation that she experiences and therefore becomes able to refer the source of 
these patterns of proximal stimulation generated by the device to external objects. 
[Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming)]. 
 
Crucially, this is something the perceiver can learn and achieve only after she has 
familiarised with the sensorimotor contingencies produced by the device. Once the 
perceiver has familiarised with the complex set of sensorimotor interdependencies that 
hold between self-movement and proximal stimulation – that is, once the perceiver has 
undertaken substantial training with the device, the second mapping can successfully take 
place. At this point, the user no longer notices the proximal stimulation but her attention 
automatically turns to what is causing it and the device fades away from awareness. The 
inputs from the device are now interpreted as being caused by a distal stimulus [Auvray 
et al. (2005)], while “the perceiver comes to understand that the variation in stimulation 
she has undergone is due to the spatial properties of external things”. [Kiverstein and 
Farina (forthcoming), §3]. So, while using the external prop, the agent progressively gets 
to understand the many different ways in which her actions influence the sensory 
stimulation generated through the coupling with the device. “As the user becomes 
increasingly familiar with the effects of movement on sensory input from the device, the 
interface linking her to the prop becomes less and less obtrusive and she becomes 
increasingly at one with the device in a way that leads the brain to treat it as part of the 
active body”.  [Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming), §5].This way, the user of the SSD 
and the device get amalgamated, the device disappears from awareness and gradually 
becomes transparent and at one with its user, so that we can think of them (the user and 
the device) as forming an entangled, integrated system of cognitive analysis.  
 
It is therefore the abilities the user acquires, the skills she develops in conjunction with 
the SSD that determine whether the device and the perceiver combine and amalgamate to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
81[Noë (2009, 2004); O’Regan & Noë (2001a,2001b)]. For a complete treatment of the sensorimotor 
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work in symbiotic partnership. [Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming), §6]. When the 
perceiver becomes proficient at using the SSD she can individuate and master the 
patterns of interdependencies generated by the device and her sense of what she can do in 
the world is automatically reconfigured and profoundly transformed. Training with the 
SSD thus alters the perceiver’s sense of what she can and cannot do with her own body. 
Through the active coupling with the SSD the perceiver comes to interpret and 
experience the world out there as a new space of bio-technological coalescence, a space 
of coupling that enables new action possibilities.   
The embedded account doesn’t seem to capture (or in any case fails to acknowledge by 
silently ignoring it) the philosophically relevant difference between the case in which the 
device is simply delivering inputs (the passive case) and the case in which the device is 
instead used to genuinely perceive stuff out there (the active case).  It is only when the 
device is actively used that the interface between the device and the user disappears from 
awareness, and it is only in this case that the device can become fully transparent and be 
at one with its user. Transparency, on my account, is thus supposed to be the 
phenomenological marker of incorporation. Transparency buys me incorporation because 
transparency is precisely what happens when the user acquires the skills necessary for 
perceiving with the device.  Skills are therefore the missing piece of the puzzle, the most 
crucial factor that the embedded view ultimately fails to take into account.   
To this idea of transparency achieved via active tool-use by means of cross-modal 
mappings, Rupert would almost certainly oppose the appeal to the emulator theory as 
described in the previous section. He would reject the validity of the phenomenological 
claim about transparency postulated by smooth coping and further reinforced by my 
treatment of SSDs conducted above and would probably say that when the brain has 
learned the sensorimotor contingencies that lead the user to the second mapping, the 
brain would just start using emulators to predict the  movements required for performing 
actions with the tool. So, by appealing to the emulator theory Rupert would certainly try 
to reintroduce the interface between the user and the tool that the appealing to 
phenomenology and smooth coping had attempted to remove. What would be my 
                                                                                                                                                                             
approach see chapter 5. 
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response to this objection and how can I undermine Rupert’s rejoinder? My strategy to 
undermine Rupert’s counter argument  is to look at what happens when the user gets 
prediction of the kind required for emulation and see if this is still compatible with an 
embedded approach.  
In what remains of this chapter I therefore attempt to mount an attack on Rupert’s 
understanding of incorporation by showing that even if there is an emulator that is 
making the predictions for using the tool, when the brain comes to predict the 
consequences of performing actions and movements with the tool it no longer treats the 
tool as separate from the body but incorporates it. So, rather than reintroducing the 
interface between the tool and the user, the emulators actually reveal us how this 
interface disappears. 
 
As I said in the previous paragraph, in order to counter the transparency argument from 
smooth coping outlined in precedence Rupert could appeal to the emulator theory and 
say that when the brain has learned the sensorimotor contingencies necessary to trigger 
the second mapping and master the device, it  just starts using an emulator circuit to 
predict the consequences of tool usage. On these grounds, he would claim that there is no 
real incorporation because the presence of the emulator circuit prevents the interface 
from fading from awareness. Let me just make this point here: isn’t being able to predict 
the consequences of using a tool precisely what the user needs in order to incorporate the 
tool? If the brain can predict the consequences of performing actions with the tool then it 
seem to me that the brain has already started treating the tool as a part of its body. In 
other words, even if an emulator circuit is set up and in place, the brain can still treat the 
tool as an essential effector thereby ceasing to recognise the distinction between actions 
carried out with a body part and actions carried out with the tool. I find comfort for this 
claim in the work conducted by Frederique de Vignemont (2010) and colleagues on the 
rubber hand.  
 
The so-called rubber hand illusion is evoked when subjects see an inflated rubber glove or 
a dummy hand being stroked while their own “unseen” hand is patted in synchrony. 
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[Kammers et al. (2009)]82. The stroking results in a feeling of ownership which induces 
the perceivers to relocate the perception of their own “unseen” hand in the immediate 
vicinity of the dummy hand/inflated rubber glove that is being stroked. [Botvinick & 
Cohen (1998)].  In reality, however, the real hand is usually far more distant from the 
dummy hand/inflated rubber glove than the subjects had thought. In the rubber hand 
illusion there seems to be a conflict between proprioception which tells the subject that 
her hand is in one place and vision and touch which tell her instead that her hand is where 
the rubber hand is. The rubber hand illusion is therefore based on a sort of discrepancy in 
location. This discrepancy is however quickly overcome by ‘‘visual capture’’ of the 
tactile sensation, in a way that allows “a multimodal match that leads the subject to the  
proprioceptive drift”. [de Vignemont (2010), p.678].   
 
Now, contra standard neuropsychological taxonomies,  de Vignemont (2010) attempts to 
describe the rubber hand illusion within a more dynamical framework. In particular, she 
invites us to embrace a model that appeals to Bayesian inference in order to account for 
the multimodal match mentioned above. Classically, a Bayesian model is a model that 
uses probability functions to postulate the existence of some sort of a priori knowledge. 
This knowledge is supposed to determine how a given system behaves in light of specific 
biological and environmental constraints. A rough comparison can be drawn with the 
emulator theory. The Bayesian model proposed by de Vignemont, as the emulator theory 
embraced by Rupert, is characterised by a prior probability distribution for its structure 
and parameters. De Vignemont argues that the Bayesian model: “represents the relative 
plausibility of different locations of the hand and aims at computing the posterior 
probability, that is, the degree of belief in the prior hypothesis conditioned on the 
observation of sensory evidence”. [de Vignemont (2010), p.678].  The model she 
develops to account for the rubber hand illusion therefore aims at representing the whole 
lot the subject knows about the procedure and mechanisms that convert and transform 
the state of the world into sensory information for the subject, so that once the posterior 
probability is processed the system comes to possess an accurate estimate of the world 
and the position of the subject in it. Thus, the specific way in which the subject utilises 




bodily information influences and determines the way her brain encodes it. This is the 
model, de Vignemont maintains, that the brain comes up with when it attempts to predict 
inputs. The interesting fact is that in this model the brain resolves the conflict 
abovementioned in favour of vision and touch by generating the proprioceptive illusion. 
The brain therefore favours multimodal integration and represents “the body both as the 
effector and as the goal of the action”. [de Vignemont (2010), § 7].   
 
Crucially, the result of this prediction is one that lets the rubber hand be experienced as a 
part of the subjects’ bodies. [Carruthers (2009)]. That is, “the subject experiences a 
sense of ownership over the hand”. [de Vignemont (2007), p. 438]. “It is important to 
note however, that in this illusion the rubber hand is not experienced by the subjects as 
an addition to their bodies, rather the rubber hand is felt to become a part or their 
bodies”. [Botvinick & Cohen (1998), p. 756]. The subjects do not feel the rubber hand as 
if they now possess an extra hand; rather they perceive that the bounds of their bodies 
have been transiently modified to include the rubber hand rather than their real hand. 
[Carruthers (2009), p.126]. In what remain of this chapter, I will try to use this crucial 
point as a leverage to develop my argument further. 
  
Having quickly presented this multimodal understanding of the rubber hand illusion, I 
now try to develop analogous considerations for the cases of incorporation that I have 
mentioned earlier on in this chapter. In particular, I put forward the empirical hypothesis 
that says that when the brain predicts the sensory consequences of action with the tool, it 
is then able to predict inputs generated by it. This claim seems to be now much stronger 
and powerful than it was at the beginning of this chapter. Extrapolating from the rubber 
hand illusion in fact allows us to say that the model of the body that the brain produces to 
predict the inputs is precisely one that includes the tool, just as in the rubber hand illusion 
the model of the body was one that included the rubber hand itself.  
 
I find further empirical evidence for this idea in recent experimental work conducted on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
82 See also [Tsakiris and Haggard (2005)and Ehrsson (2009, 2004)]. 
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brain-machine interface83. [Nicoleis et al. (2003)]. This work undertaken on macaque 
monkeys has shed new light on the mechanisms underlying tool-incorporation [Crist and 
Lebedev (2008)], and demonstrated that “primates can learn to reach and grasp virtual 
objects by controlling a robot arm through a closed-loop brain–machine interface”. 
[Carmena et al. (2003), p.193]. 
 
In their most famous experiment Carmena and colleagues implanted a series of electrodes 
in the frontal and parietal lobes of a macaque monkey. These electrodes allowed a 
monitoring computer to track and record neural activity across multiple cortical units 
while the monkey was learning how to use a joystick to move a cursor across a screen. 
[Carmena et al. (2003),O’Doherty et al. (2009)]. In a second stage of the experiment, the 
joystick was disconnected. The macaque could however still display remarkable 
performances at controlling the movements of the cursor across the screen by using its 
neural activity opportunely guided by the intervening interface. [Clark (2008), ch.2]. In 
the third and final stage of the experiment, the original commands were transferred to a 
robot arm whose actions were converted into on-screen cursor movements. The 
experiment revealed that:   
 
“after only a few days of playing with the robot in this way, the monkey 
suddenly realized that she didn't need to move her arm at all. Her arm 
muscles went completely quiet, she kept the arm at her side and she 
controlled the robot arm using only her brain and visual feedback.". 
[Nicolelis, Science Daily, (2008)]84. 
 
 
Additionally, the analysis of the signals emitted by the macaques' brains while learning the 
new task showed that the onboard neural circuitry was progressively reorganizing to 
adapt to tool-use. 
 
                                                             
83Brain-computer technology has received attention from many philosophers during the last decade. [See 
Clark (2008), Fenton and Alpert (2008); Walter (2009), Kyselo (2011); to name just a few]. 
 




"It was extraordinary, Nicolelis continues, to see that when we switched 
the animal from joystick control to brain control, the physiological 
properties of the brain cells changed immediately. And when we switched 
the animal back to joystick control the very next day, the properties 
changed again”. [Nicolelis, Science Daily, (2008)]. 
 
 
These findings have led the experimenters to conjecture that the dynamics of the brain-
machine interface were incorporated into multiple motor and cortical representations of 
the monkey’s body schema. On these grounds the experimenters have therefore claimed 
“that the gradual increase in behavioural performance emerged as a consequence of a 
plastic reorganization whose main outcome was the assimilation of the dynamics of an 
artificial actuator into the physiological properties of fronto-parietal neurons”. 
[Carmena et al. (2003), p. 205: also mentioned in Clark (2008), p.34]. This, once again, 
seems to imply that when the motor cortex is able to predict sensory consequences 
of motor commands sent to the robot arm it begins to treat the robot arm as something it 
can control; as a part of the monkey's body. "Such findings therefore tell us that the 
brain is so amazingly adaptable that it can incorporate an external device into its own 
'neuronal space' as a natural extension of the body”. [Nicolelis, Science Daily].  
 
Clark (2008) has indeed used these results to argue that brain-computer interfaces are 
transparent bodily extensions that get factored and incorporated into the monkey’s body.  
 
To the extent that this work suggests assimilation or better incorporation of the robot 
arm into the monkey’s body, it also contributes to undermine Rupert’s embedded 
criticism of EMT. It does so in fact, by showing that even if a prediction is required in 
order to trigger motor cognition, this doesn’t yet preclude incorporation from happening; 
as this process seems to occur via forms of deep cortical sensorimotor integration. So, 
even if there is an emulator circuit in place when the brain predicts the consequences of 
an action while using a tool; the brain gradually starts treating the tool as a part of its 
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In this dissertation I have tried to defend the extended mind thesis. I started by locating 
EMT within the framework provided by the situated cognition movement and have then 
pinpointed its crucial tenets. In reviewing the most crucial arguments that advocates and 
opponents have formulated to argue for and against the idea of cognitive extension,  I 
have acknowledged a stalemate in which the debate between extended and embedded has 
fallen. Rather than fighting the battle for the extended mind thesis on a functionalist turf, I 
have proposed to focus on a second strand of thinking about EMT that is concerned with 
Complementarity. Complementarity is the idea that different components of a softly-
assembled system can play quite different roles and have different properties while 
nevertheless combining to make different but complementary contributions that enable 
flexible thinking and acting. I have argued that second-wave approaches, in exploiting the 
fine-grained functional differences between internal and external, can help to decide the 
debate in favour of EMT. I have therefore set up a defence of EMT on the grounds of 
Complementarity considerations involving the individual and its cognitive developmental 
niche. In particular I have focused on both the ontogeny and the phylogeny of cognitive 
systems.  
In exploiting the work conducted on neuroconstructivism I have tried to show the 
profound dovetailing, the symbiotic and complementary partnership, that characterises 
the relationship between brain and world. In particular, I have argued that both functional 
specialisation and at least some of our higher cognitive functions are experience-
dependent and that brain plasticity is a pre-condition for EMT. Brain plasticity is the 
capacity of the brain to change structurally and functionally in response to environmental 
stimulation. I have claimed that brain plasticity is a pre-condition for extended cognition 
because it enables human beings to incorporate environmentally located resources into 
their problem solving routines. By changing our very own neural machineries, cortical 
plasticity gets us something new that we wouldn’t otherwise get. This in my view is 
supposed to break the tie between embedded and extended.  
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I have then tried to broaden these considerations by looking at the phylogeny of cognitive 
systems. I have drawn a parallel between genecentric accounts of evolution and 
intracranialist understandings of cognition. In attacking the former on the grounds of 
empirical research drawn from evolutionary biology I have made a case against the latter 
by showing the complementary way in which brain and culture intermingle and become 
instrumental for organisms to achieve biological fitness in the long run. I have then 
argued that our cognitive abilities are fleshy, deeply embodied and developmentally 
plastic and that our biological nature is gradually co-opted, again via plasticity, by the 
trappings and effects of culture and society. 
In what remains of this closing summary I would like to point to some  open questions, 
whose significance for my research has become clearer after the discussion with my 
examiners. Addressing these pressing concerns shall be one of the main tasks of my 
doctoral studies. It is therefore with these open questions that I would like to conclude 
this dissertation:   
1) What is the relationship between Parity-based, functionalist defences of EMT and the 
Complementarity approach? That is, are Parity-style arguments and Complementarity 
considerations in tension or do they rather complement each other to make the case for 
EMT even stronger? 
2) Can we use developmental considerations to make a case for EMT? That is, is 
development sufficient to establish synchronic extensions or does it merely deliver 
diachronic explanations. In other words, does development just give you the causal 
dependence of the internal cognitive processes on the cultural environs or does it rather 
establish metaphisycal claims about constitution?   
3) Do we need a mark of the cognitive to discriminate between what is cognitive and 
what is not? In particular, do Complementarity defences of EMT need to be armed with 
one to break the deadlock? 
